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Foreword
T
he New Pact for Europe (NPE) is a remarkable synthesis of European thinking 
with an underlying message and balanced proposals. We should be very 
grateful to the European foundations who initiated and funded this project; 
the partner organisations who organised transnational and national debates; 
the members of the European and national reflection groups; the Advisory 
Group that I have had the honour to chair; and Janis A. Emmanouilidis  
and his colleagues who masterminded this bottom-up process and wrote this report.  
A European agreement in 2018 and a Franco-German initiative will not be far away 
from the proposals of this paper. They now know what to do!
The poly-crisis often had external roots such as the banking crisis coming from  
across the pond or the refugee crisis with people crossing the Mediterranean.  
But the main symptom of today’s troubles is internal: the destabilisation of our 
societies and democracies putting the core values of the European Union (EU)  
at stake. An election campaign in Europe (or in the US) is often a ‘clash of civilisations’, 
not between Europeans and those coming from outside, but among ourselves  
on how to build our own world. In that debate, intellectuals and think tanks cannot  
be neutral. In times of crisis technocracy is almost treason.
 
Populists lost battles in 2017, but they have not yet lost the war. The big danger is that 
some mainstream ‘pro-European’ parties are using populist language about identity 
and migration, deepening the divide in our societies and poisoning hearts and minds 
with aggressiveness and violence. It is ironic that the populist movements themselves 
are finally reluctantly accepting the unavoidable reality of the EU and the euro.
After Brexit and the recent events in Catalonia, people see the (potential) damage 
of leaving the European framework. Populists want to be popular! There is some 
convergence between different kinds of populism. But the future lies elsewhere.  
This convergence will only lead to stagnation and, finally, to the collapse of the EU, 
because they will never agree to give the Union the tools to face the root causes  
of our problems and the key solutions: prosperity, security and fairness. The nation 
state is unable to provide solutions to the challenges of a globalised world. It is an 
illusion and a lie. No ‘failure’ of Europe will ever give credit to ‘stand-alone’ approaches.
 
Tackling these challenges requires a sense of compromise. This report describes  
the building blocks of such an understanding and the concrete stepping stones ahead. 
We need to balance responsibility and solidarity, security and solidarity, national 
sovereignty and integration, growth and cohesion. We always need both blades  
of the scissors.
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We will fail to find an agreement between North and South on future EMU reforms, 
and between West and East on the migration challenge, if we cannot combine 
solidarity with security and responsibility. Tensions are surmountable on one condition: 
we need the political will and leadership to overcome them. Then we will obtain  
the win-win solutions, so fundamental in this report.
 
Of course, ‘the devil is in the detail’. But behind each detail one will find the values 
required for a solution. Once agreed, the compromises must be implemented  
as soon as possible. It’s a matter of credibility. We have to break the stagnation  
of the past four years.
Are we ready to face a future financial crisis although we know that it will come?  
No. Are we ready to face the current ‘Libyan’ crisis or other future African crises?  
No. Are we aware that economic growth is no longer enough to foster social cohesion? 
No. Are we aware that the current growth rate of 2% is not enough to make our social 
systems sustainable? No. Are we drawing the right lessons from the social implosion  
in the US? No. On all those fronts, we know what to do. Numerous reports, among 
them official documents from European institutions, are at our disposal. What we lack 
is leadership and the right balance between conflicting interests and sensitivities.  
This NPE report shows the way out. 
We are informed about the impossibilities, about the constraints, about societal 
support or the lack of it. Some are blaming France and Germany for reclaiming their 
role as Europe’s engine – but at least, they will try to move things forward.  
Others merely have vetoes or sterile suspicion. ‘Plus est en nous’. We can do more.  
We can do better.
The Leaders’ Agenda approved by the European Council is very ambitious. The leaders 
will take decisions chapter by chapter. The inconvenience of this approach is that 
one can lose sight of the bigger picture and of the possible transversal links and 
compromises. Let us not forget that we must convince Europeans of the added value, 
of the value and the values of the Union. Therefore, a broader perspective  
and a ‘philosophy’ are needed.
Defeating populism is not an aim in itself. It is the result of positive action to protect 
better our citizens against threats whilst keeping our democracies, our economies,  
our societies open. The defeat of populism is a ‘collateral benefit’ of that action.
Let us transform fear into hope.
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Preface
T
he past decade of turmoil has rocked the European Union (EU) 
to its foundations. This has undermined public confidence in the 
European project and exposed deep divisions over both the causes 
of the recent crises and the solutions needed to overcome them.
Five years of discussion in more than 120 national and transnational 
debates on the future of the EU organised under the auspices of the  
New Pact for Europe project have underlined the extent of those divides. 
They are fuelled by a lack of understanding among member states of each 
other’s preoccupations, concerns and interests, which has made finding 
solutions to seemingly intractable problems a much more difficult  
(and sometimes insurmountable) task.
As the EU emerges from this decade of crisis, it is clear that an open  
and frank debate within and between member states – on the issues  
that concern them most and spark the deepest divisions – is essential.  
It enables the development of responses that reflect the interests of all EU 
countries. It can also help to restore a sense among the elite and the public 
that belonging to the Union is still good for them and their countries –  
and is equally beneficial for all member states.
That is what the NPE project has been all about: providing a platform  
for and fostering such debates, and exploring how the major challenges 
facing Europe are interconnected. It can also help to deliver solutions  
that will demonstrate that EU membership is still a win-win for everyone 
– not for the sake of the EU project itself, but for the sake of the citizens 
whom it exists to serve.
That process has led to the current report, which reflects the differences 
of perception, experience and current concerns to elaborate the key 
elements of an ambitious but realistic package deal. This comprehensive 
bargain - which covers the economic and social, migration, and security 
fields - could provide a basis to re-energise and galvanise support for  
the EU.
This is not yet another long wish list of what could and should be done;  
nor does it seek to present radically new ideas for action. Indeed, many 
of the proposals this report contains have already been floated or even 
formally discussed. 
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It is the approach that it takes to identifying what needs to be done 
that is radically different: the starting point for elaborating the deal 
outlined here was discussions in national and transnational meetings 
aimed at identifying the key interests and issues of greatest concern in 
each member state, seeing where they overlap and where they diverge 
significantly, and considering how a cross-dimensional approach could 
deliver a package deal in which everyone gets something and no one has 
to give too much away. 
This report would not have been possible without the strong commitment 
of our colleagues from the European Policy Centre: Janis A. Emmanouilidis 
as rapporteur and author of this report, as well as Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer as 
project coordinator and their colleagues Paul Butcher, Rebecca Castermans, 
Marc de Fleurieu, Elma Durdevic, Giovanni Grevi, Corina Stratulat and 
Fabian Zuleeg, who gave valuable input and backing to the process.
We would like to express our immense gratitude to Jacki Davis and Natasha 
Walker for their support in the project conceptualization and debate 
facilitation, and to Jacki for the editing of the final report.
Our special thanks go to the members of the Advisory Group under  
the chairmanship of Herman Van Rompuy, the members of the European 
Reflection Group, and more than 200 members of the National Reflection 
Groups for their passion, openness and commitment.
Finally, we would like to thank all the partners in the implementation  
of this project – the Egmont Institute, EuropaNova, the Finnish Institute 
of International Affairs, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign 
Policy, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Jacques Delors Institut - Berlin, Institute 
of Public Affairs, Open Estonia Foundation – for their crucial involvement 
over the past two years.
Finally, we want to thank our partner foundations, the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation, Open Estonia Foundation, the BMW Foundation and the 
Network of European Foundations, for their strong and lasting support.
King Baudouin Foundation, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Open Society Initiative for Europe
Brussels, November 2017
Shaping a bottom-up compromise
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New Pact for Europe
T
he New Pact for Europe (NPE) initiative – launched in 2013 and 
steered by the King Baudouin Foundation, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
Open Society Initiative for Europe and the European Policy 
Centre, supported by Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Open 
Estonia Foundation, the BMW Foundation and the Network of 
European Foundations – aims to rebuild trust through national 
and transnational dialogue and develop new common ground on the 
way forward for the European Union.
In its latest phase between 2016-17, the NPE initiative drew on diverse 
opinions across Europe to analyse the ‘state of the Union’ and formulate 
recommendations for the future. In over 45 national and transnational 
conversations, the project’s participants debated key policy challenges 
(migration, internal and external security, and economic and social 
issues) to explore what could be done to make the EU better serve  
the diverse interests of its member states and citizens.
National Reflection Groups in ten EU countries – Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia 
– kicked off these dialogues, followed by transnational exchanges 
between these national groups. The discussions revealed the scarcity 
of open and honest debates between Europeans, in which everyone 
can listen to each other as well as articulate their own frustrations, 
hopes and fears. It became clear during the process that trust between 
Europeans has been damaged and needs to be rebuilt, but also that we 
have much more in common than we often think and that the divisions 
we sometimes perceive as unbridgeable are not so deep. 
The national and transnational discussions provided the basis for  
a deliberative body called the European Reflection Group, made up 
of representatives of the National Reflection Groups, and an Advisory 
Group chaired by Herman Van Rompuy, to draw out the key elements  
of a wider package deal aiming to bridge the divisions between 
member states.
This is the third NPE report. It is the culmination of five years  
of work at EU and member state level. It reflects more than 120 national 
and transnational debates with policymakers, experts, civil society 
organisations, ‘ordinary’ citizens, and other stakeholders across Europe, 
which took place between 2013-2017 in 17 EU countries.
For more information on the NPE project,  
please visit newpactforeurope.eu
Sponsors
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Executive summary
After years of multiple crises, the European Union of 27 (EU27) should re-energise the European 
project. This third New Pact for Europe report, which is the culmination of five years of work 
reflecting more than 120 national and transnational debates throughout Europe, argues that the 
EU27 should have the political will and courage to agree on an ambitious but realistic win-win 
package deal to overcome deadlocks and counter the danger of a more regressive, nationalistic, 
closed, illiberal and authoritarian Europe, the greatest challenge we are currently facing.
STATE OF THE UNION
To move forward, we must recognise where 
we stand now. Three characteristics of 
today’s European Union will shape its future 
development: 
q  The poly-crisis of the past decade has 
not been fully overcome. The Union has 
succeeded in proving the many prophets of 
doom wrong, confounding predictions of 
its imminent collapse, the euro’s implosion, 
‘Grexit’, or the end of Schengen. But despite 
some undeniable progress, structural deficits 
in the European construction remain. The 
Union has been remarkably resilient but it is 
not yet ‘storm-proof’.
q  After years of pain, the EU27 must also 
repair the collateral damage caused by the 
poly-crisis: the fragmentation and distrust 
among member states, and between national 
capitals and ‘Brussels’; the perception that 
European cooperation is no longer a win-win  
exercise from which all EU countries and 
citizens benefit; the widespread belief that 
the Union is unable to balance national 
interests fairly, with smaller countries feeling 
that the ‘rules of the game’ are not the 
same for everyone; a widening divergence 
in real (economic gap) and thinking terms 
(differences in how people see the situation); 
the rising social inequalities and political 
divides within countries; the frustration with 
the EU’s inability to tackle the poly-crisis; and 
the damage to the EU’s external reputation, 
with many outside Europe questioning 
whether it can emerge stronger from the 
trials of the past decade. 
q  On a more positive note, there is now a 
new sense of optimism about the Union’s 
future. The unifying effect of Brexit and Donald 
Trump’s election; the return to economic 
growth; the upswing in citizens’ confidence in 
the European project; and the fact that 2017 
was not the political annus horribilis that many 
feared it would be, have all fuelled hopes that 
the European project could be given new 
momentum after years of crises.
But while optimism is cautiously returning 
to the European scene, it is far too early 
to celebrate. The discussions in the NPE 
framework underline concerns that the 
EU27 might not, at the end of the day, take 
advantage of the renewed confidence.
The Union must not only tackle the 
unresolved poly-crisis and collateral damage, 
but also face a much more fundamental 
threat: a surge in authoritarian populism 
that is testing the basic foundations of 
liberal democracies. The influence of 
those advocating simplistic solutions to 
complex problems is expanding, with their 
political rhetoric and ideology framing or 
even dominating public discourse. Europe 
is at risk of becoming more introverted, 
backward-looking, protectionist, intolerant, 
xenophobic, and discriminatory as well as 
more inclined to oppose globalisation, trade, 
migration, heterogeneity, cultural diversity, 
and the principles of an open society. Albeit 
not confined to Europe, this threat is more 
fundamental for the EU given that the 
Union is still much more vulnerable than its 
constituent nation states.
The Union has 
succeeded in 
proving the 
many prophets 
of doom wrong, 
confounding 
predictions of 
its imminent 
collapse, the euro’s 
implosion, ‘Grexit’, 
or the end of 
Schengen.
There remains 
frustration with 
the EU’s inability 
to tackle the  
poly-crisis.
There is now a new 
sense of optimism 
about the Union’s 
future.
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POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
Based on this analysis of the state of the 
Union, this report argues that the EU27 must 
exploit the current window of opportunity, 
which is neither very wide nor expected to 
remain open for very long. If the EU27 can 
show political leadership, there is potential 
for an ‘EU renaissance’. Through concrete 
deeds, the EU could demonstrate its ability to 
protect its members and citizens.
Europe does not need to be re-invented, 
but it must be re-energised and made 
‘future proof’. European cooperation is 
not an ideology: it is a necessity in an 
interdependent world in which individual 
countries cannot defend their values, 
interests and aspirations alone. The EU 
must act collectively to bolster its defences 
and withstand future storms. If the EU27 
fail to exploit the window of opportunity, 
Eurosceptic forces will cheer and attract even 
more support among a growing number  
of disillusioned citizens.
So, what should be done? This report makes 
two main recommendations: the EU and 
its members should agree on an ambitious 
but realistic win-win package deal; and they 
must fight the danger of a more regressive, 
nationalistic, closed, illiberal, and authoritarian 
Europe by addressing the fundamental 
factors fuelling the persistent threat of 
authoritarian populism at European, national, 
regional and local level.
WIN-WIN PACKAGE DEAL
The proposed package deal does not pretend 
to be a ‘grand bargain’ aspiring to solve all 
problems in one go with one giant qualitative 
leap forward. It is less ‘grand’ in its objective, 
concentrating instead on the immediate future 
and aspiring to achieve tangible progress  
in the framework of the current EU Treaties.
This package deal aims to reflect the 
distinctive interests and aspirations of 
member states and citizens. Some are 
more anxious about economic prospects 
or social affairs, others put more emphasis 
on migration and security. There is thus 
a need to include all three dimensions 
in a package deal, with intra- and cross-
dimensional compromises. This approach 
will help to bridge the gap between different 
camps. Enlarging the negotiation agenda 
beyond one specific field to identify wider 
agreements can contribute to overcoming 
red lines in individual areas, which have in the 
past proved unsurmountable.
While acknowledging that political hurdles 
persist and that the actual outcome of 
negotiations among the EU27 is difficult to 
anticipate, the ambitions of this report are 
three-fold.
q  First, it demonstrates that sketching a 
win-win package deal is possible. For each 
dimension, the report provides a rationale, 
basic objectives and concrete elements to be 
included in a bargain.
q  Second, it hopes that by explicitly laying 
out such proposals, it can spark national and 
transnational political debates about the 
future of Europe, which is a central aspiration 
of the NPE project.
q  Third, a deal that takes the various 
positions between and within EU countries 
into account can help to counter the current 
fragmentation among member states and 
the escalating polarisation of our societies, 
which is the fertile ground on which 
extremist and authoritarian populists thrive.
With respect to the economic and social 
dimension, the package deal is designed 
to secure the stability of the euro, spur 
sustainable growth and reboot the 
process of economic convergence, while 
strengthening the Union’s ‘protective arm’ 
and preserving unity among the EU27 and 
the members of the euro area. It seeks to 
balance the expectations of different camps: 
the ‘responsibility and competitiveness’ 
camp who want a stricter implementation 
of rules, re-affirmation of the ‘no bail-out’ 
principle, a reduction of risks, more market 
discipline, and greater pressure on EU 
countries to implement long-overdue 
structural reforms; and the ‘solidarity and 
caring’ camp who want more flexible and 
smarter rules with greater discretion, the 
direct or indirect introduction of common 
risk-sharing instruments, more support from 
the European level for national reform efforts, 
The Union must 
not only tackle 
the unresolved 
poly-crisis and 
collateral damage, 
but also face 
a much more 
fundamental 
threat: a surge 
in authoritarian 
populism that is 
testing the basic 
foundations 
of liberal 
democracies.
Europe does 
not need to be 
re-invented, 
but it must be 
re-energised and 
made ‘future 
proof’.
The proposed 
package deal does 
not pretend to be 
a ‘grand bargain’ 
aspiring to solve 
all problems in 
one go with one 
giant qualitative 
leap forward.
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more fiscal room for public investment, 
and actions to reduce macroeconomic 
imbalances. It also considers the mounting 
concerns of non-euro countries that 
further EMU reforms might leave them at a 
disadvantage and push them further into the 
EU’s periphery (see infographic pages XVI-XVII).
With respect to migration, the package 
deal aims to move the EU closer to a 
comprehensive human mobility strategy. 
It seeks to balance security and solidarity 
concerns to enhance the notion of a 
‘protective Europe’ while avoiding the pitfalls 
of a ‘fortress Europe’. To achieve this aim, the 
bargain identifies tangible actions to bridge 
the divide between two camps: the ‘security’ 
camp who argue that Europe must counter 
the sense of insecurity among its citizens and 
protect itself from potentially overwhelming 
numbers of people trying to reach it; and 
the ‘solidarity’ camp who insist on the need 
to boost solidarity among EU countries and 
with those knocking on Europe’s doors and 
with countries of origin and transit (see 
infographic pages XVI-XVII).
With respect to security, this report argues 
that the widespread support for deeper 
internal and external security cooperation 
could help to coalesce an overall accord 
between the EU27. The NPE discussions 
revealed distinct priorities and divides 
between countries, but there was also strong 
agreement across Europe that member states 
need to deepen cooperation on both internal 
and external security. Progress on security 
could foster conciliations in the economic and 
social as well as the migration dimension, 
where member states have drawn some 
clear red lines. Within the security dimension, 
there are two priority areas that enjoy the 
strongest support among the EU27: defence 
cooperation and the fight against terrorism 
(see infographic pages XVI-XVII).
As in the past, implementation of the deal 
presented in this report would result in 
more differentiated integration, with 
different groups of member states intensifying 
cooperation in different policy fields. Fuelled 
by the willingness to move forward, greater 
differentiation would be guided by functional 
and pragmatic needs, and not by a desire 
to create a closed ‘core Europe’ (Kerneuropa) 
involving only a limited number of EU 
countries. The creation of a two-tier Europe 
with diverse classes of membership is neither 
likely nor desirable.
COUNTERING AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM
The elaboration and implementation of a 
compromise among the EU27 is necessary, 
but it is only one step. The analysis in this 
report confirms that the danger of a more 
regressive, nationalistic, closed, illiberal, 
and authoritarian Europe is very profound. 
The response needs to encompass a variety 
of efforts at various levels of governance. 
Since there is no silver bullet that can 
avert this danger, the report presents 
four principles that should be borne in 
mind when looking for ways to counter 
authoritarian populism.
q  The European Union must deliver 
credible results and strengthen its role as 
a ‘democratic watchdog’, by concretely 
addressing the multiple insecurities fuelling 
authoritarian populism; avoiding raising 
expectations it cannot live up to; ending the 
Brussels blame game which plays into the 
populists’ hands; demonstrating that the EU 
is not an agent of ‘unfettered’ globalisation; 
and strengthening its ability to respond to 
serious breaches of its fundamental principles 
when governments flout their membership 
obligations.
q  Politicians must convince citizens 
without imitating authoritarian populists, by 
presenting a persuasive and positive counter-
narrative based on a credible set of actions 
at the national and European level instead 
of copying the political rhetoric and policy 
prescriptions of authoritarian populists; 
demonstrating to citizens why European 
cooperation is still a win-win from a national 
perspective; and promoting the ability of 
citizens to ‘experience Europe’.
q  Defenders of liberal democracy must 
acknowledge citizens’ legitimate concerns 
and boost their democratic participation, 
taking their hopes and fears seriously 
The package deal 
is designed to 
secure the stability 
of the euro, spur 
sustainable 
growth and 
reboot the process 
of economic 
convergence, 
while 
strengthening the 
Union’s ‘protective 
arm’ and 
preserving unity 
among the EU27 
and the members 
of the euro area.
The package deal 
aims to move 
the EU closer to 
a comprehensive 
human mobility 
strategy. It seeks 
to balance security 
and solidarity 
concerns to 
enhance the 
notion of a 
‘protective Europe’ 
while avoiding 
the pitfalls of a 
‘fortress Europe’.
Deeper internal 
and external 
security 
cooperation could 
help to coalesce 
an overall accord 
between the EU27.
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rather than dismissing them as irrational, 
exaggerated or even irrelevant; listening 
to those from other EU countries as well, 
given our increasing interdependence; and 
boosting citizens’ involvement in EU decision-
making.
q  People should be constantly reminded 
of the true nature and objectives of 
authoritarian populists by revealing 
that they want to divide our societies 
and undermine the basic pillars of liberal 
democracy; and by demonstrating that most 
of their proposals are either unrealistic or 
economically ludicrous.
THE WAY FORWARD
The elaboration and subsequent 
implementation of an EU27 package deal 
will require a strong impetus from an 
inclusive Franco-German initiative. To win 
broad support, however, this initiative must 
consider the views of other member states 
and leave them ample room to contribute 
to the outcome of a collective process. The 
bargain presented in this report could help 
to inspire and promote such an inclusive 
process since it has been explicitly drafted 
with the interests, concerns and ambitions of 
the EU27 in mind.
Generating public support for the 
implementation of a package deal will 
require a Europe-wide debate at national 
and transnational level. It must begin as 
soon as possible and involve a multiplicity of 
stakeholders ready to engage in a critical but 
constructive debate about Europe’s future. 
The experience of the NPE project has shown 
that such discussions are most constructive 
when they are based on tangible proposals 
rather than on a vague exchange of views 
about ‘more or less’ Europe.
It is by no means certain that the EU27 will 
be able to strike a compromise. It will take 
strong political will and even more political 
courage. But this is what leadership is 
ultimately about: understanding the need for 
action, identifying opportunities, pre-empting 
potential risks, and taking concrete next steps 
while having a sense of the overall direction. 
Now is the time for all Europeans to show such 
leadership.
This report has demonstrated that there 
is a lot of work to be done and unfinished 
business to be completed, that there is a 
window of opportunity, that inaction would 
risk future crises, and that a win-win bargain 
to re-energise the EU and strengthen its 
ability to protect its members and citizens 
from future storms is possible. It is now up to 
all of us to respond to this call and for future 
generations of Europeans to judge us.
Greater 
differentiation 
would be guided 
by functional and 
pragmatic needs, 
and not by a desire 
to create a closed 
‘core Europe’.
This report 
confirms that 
the danger of a 
more regressive, 
nationalistic, 
closed, illiberal, 
and authoritarian 
Europe is very 
profound.
The bargain could 
help to inspire 
and promote an 
inclusive process 
since it has been 
explicitly drafted 
with the interests, 
concerns and 
ambitions of the 
EU27 in mind.
Now is the time for 
all Europeans to 
show leadership.
Presenting the first NPE 
report at the 40 under 
40 Young European 
Leaders Conference, 
February 2014.
THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE
The danger of a more regressive, nationalistic, closed, 
illiberal, and authoritarian Europe is very profound.
NATURE OF THE BEAST
   Growing polarisation of societies
 People’s genuine grievances
  
 Anti-establishment resentments
  Discontent with representative  
democracy
  New information channels in closed  
echo-chambers
”WINNERS & LOSERS”  
OF CHANGE
 
 Socio-economic insecurities and rising 
inequalities 
  
 Cultural and societal insecurities
 
Generational insecurities 
  
 Technological insecurities 
 Security insecurities 
 
EUrope’s PERCEIVED 
VULNERABILITIES
  The EU as an ‘agent of unfettered  
globalisation’
 
 The EU as a powerless and ‘inconsequential’ 
construction
  The EU as an undemocratic, distant,  
and ‘elitist’ project
  
 The EU is losing its moral high ground
AN UNRESOLVED POLY-CRISIS
The poly-crisis of the past decade has not been fully overcome. The Union has been remarkably resilient but it is not 
yet ‘storm-proof’. After years of pain, the EU27 must also repair the collateral damage caused by the poly-crisis.
RESILIENCE AND A NEW MOMENTUM
The EU27 must exploit the current window of opportunity, which is neither very wide nor expected to remain open for very long.   
Unifying effect of Brexit
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSION
The bargain needs to strike a fair balance between the ‘responsibility and competitiveness’ camp and the ‘solidarity 
and caring’ camp while preserving the principle of unity among the EU27 and the members of the euro area.
FEWER RISKS AND MORE  
DISCIPLINE ACROSS THE UNION
 Speed up the Capital Markets Union
 
 Enforce the no-bailout rule through the 
introduction of a credible debt restructuring 
mechanism
  
Reduce regulatory uncertainties and hurdles 
undermining cross-border investment
 
  Enforce the Fiscal Compact and the Stability  
and Growth Pact rules and obligations
  Establish contractual Reform and Investment 
Agreements
  Reinforce the links between national reforms 
and EU funding
  Scale up technical assistance programmes
  Complete the Single Market to enhance  
Europe’s global competitiveness
  Speed up work on more comprehensive  
free trade agreements
UNITY BETWEEN EURO  
& NON-EURO AREAS
 
  Avoid any kind of discrimination  
based on the euro  
  Open the new forms of cooperation  
among euro-area members to non-euro 
countries 
 
 Do not undermine the role of existing 
supranational institutions by creating parallel 
structures
  Inform countries outside the euro area about 
major euro-area developments
  Do not create barriers to future membership  
of the euro area
MORE SOLIDARITY BETWEEN  
THE MEMBER STATES
  Complete the Banking Union through  
the gradual introduction of a European  
Deposit Insurance Scheme
  Reduce the burden of non-performing loans  
on banks
  Enable the European Stability Mechanism  
to function as a credible backstop to the Single 
Resolution Fund 
  Establish a crisis shock-absorption mechanism 
through complementary European 
Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme  
and/or  ‘rainy day’ fund
  Exclude some public investment from  
a country’s deficit calculation
  Stimulate investment and demand in EU 
countries with excessive surpluses
  Support citizens disproportionately affected  
by major structural reforms
  Intensify the fight against tax evasion  
and avoidance
  Safeguard the level-playing field within  
the Single Market
 
  Introduce concrete measures to implement  
the European Pillar of Social Rights
COLLATERAL DAMAGE
  Widespread frustration with the EU’s inability  
to tackle the poly-crisis
  Rising social inequalities and political divides  
within member states
  Widening divergence in real (economic gap) 
and thinking terms (differences in how people 
see the situation)
Re-energising Europe / A package deal for the EU27
COUNTERING 
AUTHORITARIAN  
POPULISM
To counter authoritarian populism, four principles  
must be borne in mind:
DELIVER CREDIBLE RESULTS  
AND STRENGTHEN THE EU  
AS A ‘DEMOCRATIC WATCHDOG’
 
 Address the multiple insecurities  
fuelling authoritarian populism
  
  Avoid raising expectations the Union  
cannot live up to
 
 End the Brussels blame game that plays  
into the hands of the populists
 
  Demonstrate that the EU is not an ‘agent  
of unfettered globalisation’
  Enhance the EU’s ability to act as a ‘democratic 
watchdog’
CONVINCE CITIZENS WITHOUT 
IMITATING AUTHORITARIAN POPULISTS
  
Do not copy the political rhetoric and 
prescriptions of authoritarian populists
 
  Present a persuasive and positive  
counter-narrative 
  Demonstrate why European cooperation  
is a ‘win-win’  from a national perspective
  Promote the ability of citizens to ‘experience 
Europe’
ACKNOWLEDGE CITIZENS’ 
CONCERNS AND BOOST THEIR 
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
 
 Take citizens’ hopes and fears seriously  
rather than dismissing them as irrational, 
exaggerated or even irrelevant
  Listen also to the concerns of people from  
other EU countries
 
  Boost citizens’ involvement in EU  
decision-making
REMIND PEOPLE OF THE TRUE 
NATURE AND OBJECTIVES  
OF AUTHORITARIAN POPULISTS
  
  Authoritarian populists seek to divide  
and polarise our societies
 
  Authoritarian populists seek to undermine  
the basic pillars of liberal democracies
  
  Proposals made by authoritarian populists  
are either unrealistic or economically ludicrous
THE MIGRATION DIMENSION
The bargain needs to reflect security and solidarity 
concerns to enhance the notion of a protective Europe 
while avoiding the pitfalls of a ‘fortress’  Europe.
MEASURES TO COUNTER  
INSECURITY
 Increase and accelerate returns
 Speed up national asylum procedures
  Establish asylum processing centres in major 
transit countries to reduce irregular flows
SOLIDARITY BETWEEN  
MEMBER STATES
  Create a permanent relocation mechanism
  Make asylum recognition rates converge  
across member states
  Incentivise municipalities to welcome refugees 
or asylum-seekers
  Establish asylum-seeker reception centres  
in Central and Eastern European countries
  Create an asylum-seeker ‘exchange mechanism’
  Better inform refugees about welcome 
conditions in EU member states
SOLIDARITY WITH COUNTRIES  
OF ORIGIN & TRANSIT
 Boost (financial) support to Africa
 
 Establish a permanent European resettlement 
framework
  Create legal avenues of (economic) migration
  Increase financial support to improve  
the conditions for migrants in Libya
  Reform EU policies that negatively impact 
countries of origin and transit
The migration 
and refugee crisis 
The external and internal 
security threats
 The financial, economic 
and euro area crisis
THE SECURITY DIMENSION
External and internal security cooperation could help  
to coalesce an overall bargain between the EU27.
DEFENCE COOPERATION
 
 Establish an ambitious  
and inclusive PESCO
   
  Support defence cooperation with adequate 
financial instruments
  Coordinate the review of national  
defence planning
  Reinforce the rapid response capacity
  Strengthen the military operation  
planning capacity
  Revise the rules on the common funding  
of EU military operations
FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
 
 Foster a culture of cross-border cooperation 
between national intelligence agencies  
and law enforcement authorities
 
 Boost efforts to prevent and counter 
radicalisation within Europe
  
Tackle the implications of the blurring  
boundaries between internal security  
and external defence
After years of multiple crises, the EU27 should re-energise the European project. The EU27 should have the political will and courage to agree  
on an ambitious but realistic win-win package deal to overcome deadlocks and counter the danger of a more regressive, nationalistic, closed, illiberal 
and authoritarian Europe, the greatest challenge we are currently facing.
 
 Fragmentation and distrust among  
member states
  Inability to fairly balance national interests:  
a ‘crisis of leadership’
 Damage to the EU’s external reputation
  European cooperation no longer  
a win-win exercise
  
Unifying effect of the election 
of Donald Trump
 
 Return to economic growth
  2017: not the political ‘annus 
horribilis’ that many feared  
it would be
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This report reflects more than 120 national and transnational debates on the state and future 
of the European Union (EU), which have taken place in a majority of EU countries since 2013 
under the auspices of the New Pact for Europe (NPE) project.
LESSONS FROM THE PROJECT 
The different phases of this project have 
shown that: 
q  There are serious doubts in many quarters 
that European cooperation is still a positive-sum 
game from which all EU countries can profit.
q  Policymakers, academics, EU experts, and 
‘ordinary’ citizens in one country often have 
little understanding of the situation in other 
member states: we talk more about each 
other but not enough with each other. 
q  The biggest EU countries often hesitate 
to assume leadership, even when asked to 
do so, while smaller member states feel that 
the ‘rules of the game’ are not the same for 
everyone – that some EU countries are more 
equal than others.
q  Europe’s crisis is in many ways the 
result of national crises with negative 
repercussions for European cooperation.
q  Policymakers and experts tend to set the 
strongest red lines in their area of expertise, 
while those who are less familiar with certain 
dossiers seem more inclined to overcome 
divides and strike compromises.
q  There are many differences but also many 
common perceptions within and between 
EU countries over the future of European 
integration.
The NPE debates have also underlined:
q  How difficult it is for people to listen  
to each other – and how significant this  
is – in an interdependent European environment;
q  How important but also how hard it is to 
reach out to people who are critical of, or do 
not care about, the European project;
q  How tough it is to conduct a frank 
transnational debate, even though people 
appear willing to be more self-critical about 
their own country’s role in the EU crises. 
A major lesson from all these experiences is 
that there is an urgent need to restore trust 
among the EU27 and regain the support of 
citizens and elites. To do this, Europe must 
create a new win-win situation reflecting 
the distinctive interests and concerns of 
governments and citizens. As in the past, 
when progress towards the Single Market or 
the euro was only possible by compensating 
those who would profit less from them, the 
EU27 must once again strike a bargain that 
benefits all member states.
This report tries to elaborate a new bargain. 
It argues that after many years of crisis, 
the EU should exploit the window of 
opportunity created by an apparent turn 
in the tide after Brexit and the election of 
Donald Trump in the US, with economic 
growth coming back to Europe, and a series 
of defeats for populist parties fuelling  
hopes that the European project might be 
re-energised after years of crises.
The President of the European Commission, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, the French President, 
Emmanuel Macron, and the President of the 
European Council, Donald Tusk, have all laid 
out proposals calling for a new era. During his 
2017 State of the Union address before the 
European Parliament, President Juncker said 
that he wanted to catch the “wind in the sails” 
that the European project currently enjoys, to 
fix Europe’s roof “now that the sun is shining.” In 
his speech at La Sorbonne, President Macron 
outlined a vision on how to rebuild the 
European house calling for “sovereign, more 
united and democratic Europe.” At the October 
2017 EU Summit, President Tusk presented a 
‘Leaders’ Agenda’ setting out a blueprint for 
2017-2019 aiming to ”cut the Gordian knot on 
the most sensitive issues.”
There is an urgent 
need to restore 
trust among the 
EU27 and regain 
the support of 
citizens and elites.
As in the past, 
when progress 
towards the Single 
Market or the euro 
was only possible 
by compensating 
those who would 
profit less from 
them, the EU27 
must once again 
strike a bargain 
that benefits all 
member states.
Europe must not 
be re-invented, but 
it needs to be re-
energised.
Introduction
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WIN-WIN PACKAGE DEAL
The EU27 still have to prove that they can seize 
the opportunity and provide a new sense of 
direction for the years to come. A new package 
deal could do just that. It must cover what 
citizens see as the most pressing problems. It 
must be both pragmatic and ambitious. 
Given disagreements among member states, 
this report does not propose a quantum leap 
in integration. But the bargain outlined here 
could help to overcome the stalemate and 
move the EU forward.
If the EU27 can show political leadership,  
there is some potential for an ‘EU renaissance’. 
If they can create momentum by agreeing on 
tangible actions, they could prove how responsive 
they are to their citizens’ needs, desires, and 
concerns. Through concrete deeds, the EU could 
demonstrate its ability to protect its members 
and citizens from potential future storms.
Europe must not be re-invented, but 
it needs to be re-energised. Bolstering 
the defences of a ‘protective Europe’ will 
help the EU to regain trust and support. 
European cooperation is not an ideology: 
it is a necessity in an interdependent 
world in which individual member states 
cannot defend their values, interests and 
aspirations. The EU must act collectively 
to strengthen its defences and withstand 
future storms. If the EU27 fail to exploit this 
window of opportunity, Eurosceptic forces 
will cheer and attract even more support 
among a growing number of disillusioned 
citizens.
So, what should be done? This report makes 
two recommendations to re-energise 
European integration and to make it ‘future-
proof’. The EU and its members should agree 
on an ambitious but realistic win-win package 
deal; and they must fight the danger of a 
more regressive, nationalistic, closed, illiberal, 
and authoritarian Europe by addressing the 
fundamental factors fuelling the persistent 
threat of authoritarian populism at 
European, national, regional and local level.
But efforts at European level will not be 
enough. Crucial competences remain in the 
hands of member states and nation states are at 
the centre of political discourse. Consequently, 
much needs to be done by liberal democratic 
forces in the member states to counter 
authoritarian populists. This report does not 
pretend that there is one silver bullet that could 
avert this danger. It suggests concrete ways 
to confront the persistent peril coming from 
political forces trying to undermine the Union’s 
basic values and principles.
TOUGH QUESTIONS
In formulating the main components of a 
package deal, the NPE debates sought to 
answer several questions: 
q  What are the major characteristics of 
today’s European Union? To what degree 
have the EU and member states overcome 
the so-called poly-crisis? What kind of 
collateral damage has been caused by the 
multiple storms that have hit the EU and its 
members since 2008?
q  Why has the Union been so remarkably 
resilient in the face of disintegration forces? 
Why is there now a new sense of optimism 
in Brussels and other capitals about the EU’s 
prospects? Will the EU27 seize the current 
window of opportunity to agree on a win-win 
package deal? What could happen if they lack 
the necessary will and courage to embrace 
further reforms? 
q  What is the biggest danger currently 
facing our societies? Why have we not 
outstripped authoritarian populists and 
what is the menace they constitute about? 
What are the forces playing into their hands? 
What could be done to counter the danger 
of a more regressive, nationalistic, closed, 
illiberal, and authoritarian Europe?
This report analyses the current state of the 
Union (1.1) and probes the illiberal peril 
facing the EU and its members (1.2). On this 
basis, it elaborates a new win-win package 
deal between the EU27 (2.1) and outlines 
basic principles to counter the persistent 
threat from authoritarian populism (2.2). It 
concludes with an outlook on the upcoming 
debate on the future of Europe.
European 
cooperation is not 
an ideology: it is 
a necessity in an 
interdependent 
world.
If the EU27 can 
show political 
leadership,  
there is some 
potential for an 
‘EU renaissance’. 
Bolstering the 
defences of a 
‘protective Europe’ 
will help the EU to 
regain trust and 
support. 
This report 
makes two main 
recommendations 
to re-energise 
European 
integration and 
to make it ‘future-
proof’.
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STATE OF THE UNION: THREE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS
AN UNRESOLVED 
POLY-CRISIS
The migration and refugee crisis
The financial, economic and euro area crisis
The external and internal security threats
RESILIENCE AND 
A NEW MOMENTUM 
Unifying effect of Brexit
Unifying effect of Donald Trump’s election
2017: not the political 'annus horribilis'
that many feared it would be
Return to economic growth
Widening divergence in real (economic gap) 
and thinking terms (differences in how people 
see the situation)
Inability to fairly balance national 
interests: a 'crisis of leadership'
Widespread frustration with the EU's 
inability to tackle the poly-crisis
Damage to the EU's external reputation
COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY THE POLY-CRISIS
Rising social inequalities and political 
divides within member states
European cooperation no longer 
a win-win exercise
Fragmentation and distrust among 
member states
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THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE: THE PERSISTENT THREAT OF AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM
NATURE 
OF THE BEAST
Growing polarisation of societies
Anti-establishment resentments
Discontent with representative democracy
New information channels in closed 
echo-chambers
People's genuine grievances
Danger of a more regressive, nationalistic, 
closed, illiberal, and authoritarian Europe
Generational insecurities 
Security insecurities 
"WINNERS & LOSERS" 
OF CHANGE 
Technological insecurities 
Cultural and societal insecurities
Socio-economic insecurities and rising 
inequalities 
EUrope’s PERCEIVED
VULNERABILITIES
The EU as an 'agent of unfettered 
globalisation'
The EU as a powerless and 
'inconsequential' construction
The EU is losing its moral high ground
The EU as an undemocratic, distant, 
and 'elitist' project
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State of the Union  
Three characteristics
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The work conducted in the context of the 
NPE project in recent years has shown that 
it is ambitious and inevitably somewhat 
speculative to assess the current state of the 
Union, given the complex and evolving nature 
of developments in today’s volatile times. 
Ultimately, it will be the task of historians to 
thoroughly evaluate the significance of the 
current phase in Europe’s history.
It is nevertheless clear that, despite many ups 
and downs, the European integration process 
has been an undisputed success story, even 
if the cumulative impact of recent crises has 
endangered some of its major achievements 
and still casts a shadow over its future. The 
NPE debates organised at national and 
transnational level have shown that there 
is a deep appreciation of the benefits of 
European integration. But they have also 
exposed that there are good reasons to be 
critical of the current state of the EU.
The grand objectives that lay behind the bold 
experiment launched by the EU’s founding 
fathers in the 1950s – securing peace, 
freedom, stability and security, and providing a 
solid basis for economic and social prosperity 
throughout the continent, grounded in the 
rule of law and a shared commitment to 
fundamental values – remain valid today. 
At the age of 60, the EU and its members 
can take pride in an “unrivalled record of 
accomplishments“ (see Greek NPE report) that 
testify to the success of the European project.
The Union has been pivotal in overcoming 
deep historical divisions and assuaging 
nationalist and irredentist passions, while 
at the same time boosting the collective 
prosperity of European citizens. It has been 
a consistent guardian of human and civil 
rights within the framework of open and 
pluralist societies. It has upheld tolerance 
and respect for national, ethnic, religious, 
cultural, and ideological differences. 
It has underwritten democratisation 
and economic transformation in its 
southern and eastern periphery. It has 
directed development funds to weaker 
economies, allowing them to improve their 
infrastructure and living standards, while 
enabling advanced economies to thrive in a 
deepening and expanding Single Market, 
with a single currency at the heart of the 
integration process. It has delivered seminal 
improvements in the lives of its citizens in a 
wide range of areas, from mobility, economic 
opportunities and development to workplace 
and consumer rights, the environment, 
research and education.
Nevertheless, the project is not – and never 
was – perfect. The integration process has not 
been without major hiccups and the history of 
European integration is littered with crises. But 
despite a series of heavy blows, the European 
project has, until now, always bounced 
backed and emerged stronger than before, 
proving itself to be remarkably crisis-proof. 
This is mirrored in Europeans’ recognition that 
integration, despite its flaws, was and continues 
to be the best option to secure a better future 
and to protect Europe’s collective interests.  
A poll conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation 
for this report (see figure 1) shows that a 
strong majority of Europeans (54%) support 
greater political and economic integration.
So, what are the main characteristics of 
today’s EU that hold the key to its future? The 
discussions held in the context of the NPE 
project have identified three:
q An improved but still unresolved poly-crisis;
q Collateral damage caused by the poly-crisis;
q Strong resilience and a new sense of 
optimism.
Source: eupinions, a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. For more data see www.eupinions.eu
76% 
54% 
46% 
15% ES 
IT
DE 
EU 
FR 36% 
29% 
MORE LESS
PL
SUPPORT FOR MORE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
 
SHARE OF RESPONDENTS IN FAVOUR OF LESS AND MORE INTEGRATION
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1.  An improved but unresolved poly-crisis
The poly-crisis that has buffeted Europe over 
the past decade has been more serious and 
threatening than most crises in recent history. 
For many years, crisis mode became the 
new normal, with many people questioning 
whether the EU could find a way to prevent 
the myriad problems besetting it from 
spiralling out of control.
Even before these multiple crises struck, 
Europe’s societies and economies were 
already facing complex challenges: ageing 
and shrinking populations, which requires 
changes to welfare states; an overriding need 
to address the problems related to climate 
change and the scarcity of natural resources; 
rising socio-economic inequalities within 
countries; mounting economic concerns 
deriving from an increasingly interdependent 
and more competitive global environment; a 
fear of falling behind as other regions of the 
world begin to catch-up and even overtake 
the EU in some areas; insufficient integration 
of those from a migrant background into 
European societies; and low economic 
growth rates in many parts of Europe.
Europe was thus already under pressure 
to adapt to a changing environment, 
but the multiple crises of recent years 
have exacerbated existing problems and 
deficiencies. Deep cracks appeared in the 
European project. The EU’s very future has 
been called into question.
Europe’s poly-crisis includes several multi-
rooted and interlinked crises, from its 
financial, economic and currency woes to the 
migration and refugee crisis and the diverse 
security risks facing Europeans at home, in 
their neighbourhood and internationally. 
Europeans have tried their best to avoid the 
most negative outcome in each case, but 
have not yet been able to make the Union 
‘future-proof’. None of the major problems 
have been fully solved, structural shortfalls 
in the European construction remain and 
member states must now also contend with 
the cumulative collateral damage caused by 
the poly-crisis.
Many of the reforms essential to achieve 
long-term stability have stalled, with 
major policy disagreements between and 
within member states repeatedly leading to 
paralysis or half-hearted policy responses.
THE FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND EURO AREA CRISIS
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers  
in 2008, Europe became the epicentre  
of the biggest financial and economic  
crisis since the Great Depression of  
the 1930s. What began as a government 
debt crisis in one of the smallest economies 
on the EU’s periphery soon exposed 
the fundamental flaws in a fully-fledged 
monetary union without an equally strong 
economic, fiscal, financial, and political  
union. The euro area crisis involved many 
complex, multi-rooted and interlinked  
sub-crises, including a banking crisis,  
a public debt crisis, a private debt crisis, 
a competitiveness crisis, a growth and 
investment crisis, a social and employment 
crisis, as well as a political and institutional 
crisis. The EU is still haunted by the 
consequences of all this and the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) remains 
incomplete, despite some remarkable reform 
achievements since 2010 and a recent 
improvement in overall economic sentiment.
As the dominos began to fall, it became 
obvious that the Union – and especially the 
euro area – was insufficiently equipped 
to weather the storm; that EMU lacked the 
necessary institutional structures, rules, 
procedures, and instruments to prevent 
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such a crisis from beginning, spreading and 
deepening.
The original EMU construction foresaw that 
each country would handle its sovereign 
debt or banking problems on its own. There 
was no common rulebook for situations in 
which a member of the common currency 
faced a liquidity or solvency crunch; no 
mechanism to support countries who had 
lost access to financial markets; and no 
common institution to monitor the potential 
risks of national financial institutions. When 
the crisis struck, there was no textbook 
that European and national decision-makers 
could turn to for guidance on how to react 
effectively.
Responses have often been slow, insufficient 
and sometimes ill-advised, and the results 
sometimes meagre and disappointing. But 
despite these shortcomings, the EU and its 
members have individually and collectively 
made remarkable progress in recent years. 
The pressures generated by fears of a euro 
implosion or an involuntary exit by one or 
more countries have made many reforms 
and developments possible at both European 
and national level, which were unthinkable 
before the crisis began.
Despite these achievements, the EU has 
struggled to get ahead of the curve and 
persuade markets and citizens that it can 
meet the fundamental challenges it is facing. 
At times, it seemed that the ‘crisis snowball’ 
might trigger an avalanche with the potential 
to bury the euro and the European project 
beneath it.
The national and transnational NPE 
discussions organised in 2016-17 have shown 
that fears of a ‘euro meltdown’ have receded 
significantly, but many of the underlying 
causes of the crisis remain unresolved, 
leaving the euro zone vulnerable to the next 
crisis. The Union still lacks an instrument 
to deal with potential insolvency crises 
in an orderly fashion or to cushion large 
asymmetric economic shocks. Economic 
divergence between EU countries has 
expanded and (youth) unemployment 
levels remain unacceptably high in member 
states hit hardest by the crisis. While it may 
be necessary to interpret the Stability and 
Growth Pact rules with great flexibility at 
times to promote growth, this undermines 
the credibility of a rule-based system. Despite 
all the efforts to create a Banking Union, 
it remains incomplete and the European 
financial system and capital markets are still 
highly fragmented and vulnerable.
Europe is unable to exploit its full economic 
potential. GDP growth has improved, but 
is still fragile and unevenly spread. Annual 
productivity growth remains low compared 
with Europe’s global competitors. Low energy 
prices and a favourable euro exchange rate 
have provided some positive tailwinds, but 
public and private investment are much 
lower than, for example, in the US. Levels 
of unemployment, public debt and non-
performing loans that are not serviced by 
debtors have not returned to pre-crisis levels 
in many member states (see figure 2). 
Source: Eurostat, Unemployment by sex and age – annual average; Eurostat, Government decit/surplus, debt and associated data; 
IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators
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Some EU countries are still lagging behind 
their foremost rivals in the competitiveness 
stakes. Surplus countries (led by Germany) 
are not using their fiscal space sufficiently 
to stimulate growth. In structural terms, 
the EMU still lacks many of the elements 
proposed in the Four Presidents and 
Five Presidents reports or the European 
Commission’s more recent reflection paper 
on deepening EMU.
All of this demonstrates that the EU 
institutions and member states still have a 
long way to go to complete the EMU and 
overcome the euro area crisis and its multiple 
negative consequences in a sustainable way. 
After years of nursing the euro area through 
the pain, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
wants to reduce the burden of safeguarding 
the currency’s stability. It needs to gradually 
adapt its monetary policy to focus on 
inflation and economic growth. Governments 
would have to go much further in deepening 
EMU integration to secure the euro’s long-
term future. But they are not eager to follow 
through. As a result, the euro is almost bound 
to face more real-life ‘stress tests’ in the 
coming years. There was broad agreement 
in the NPE discussions that the euro area still 
lacks some necessary ingredients to enable it 
to weather future storms.
There is thus no room for complacency at 
either European or national level. Collective 
efforts to solve the EMU’s remaining 
structural deficiencies have, however, lost 
momentum since 2012, with the receding 
danger of a euro meltdown undermining 
governments’ willingness to overcome the 
deep remaining divisions and take bold 
reform decisions.
The NPE debates have shown that there are 
two major camps between and within EU 
countries opposing each other. Those in the 
‘responsibility and competitiveness’ camp 
want a stricter implementation of rules, a 
re-affirmation of the ‘no bail-out’ principle, 
a reduction of risks within the euro area 
and more market discipline. They also wish 
to heighten pressure on EU countries to 
implement long-overdue structural reforms 
to bolster the competitiveness of these 
countries and that of the EU in a challenging 
global economic environment.
The ‘solidarity and caring’ camp calls for 
more flexible and smarter rules, the direct 
or indirect introduction of common risk-
sharing instruments, more support and 
incentives from the European level for 
national reform efforts, more fiscal room 
for public investment and higher levels of 
public spending, and actions to reduce 
macroeconomic imbalances. They also 
call for steps to develop the Union’s ‘caring 
dimension’ by reinforcing its ability to 
secure minimal social standards at member 
state level, even though social policies are 
ultimately determined at national level.
Both sides have not only expressed their 
aspirations and hopes but also defined 
red lines when it comes to future EMU 
reforms. The experience of recent years 
has shown just how difficult it is to bridge 
their differences. NPE discussions have 
furthermore revealed that there is mounting 
concern in countries which have not 
yet adopted the euro that they might be 
discriminated against and disadvantaged by 
further EMU reforms and pushed further into 
the EU’s political periphery – a prospect most 
people in these countries want to avoid.
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Migrants wait to be rescued by 
the Italian coast guard in the 
Mediterranean Sea, 30 nautical 
miles from the Libyan coast,  
6 August 2017.  
(ANGELOS TZORTZINIS / AFP)
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THE MIGRATION AND REFUGEE CRISIS
In 2015, a crisis of unforeseen magnitude 
unfolded, with an unprecedented number of 
people arriving on Europe’s shores creating 
a major new source of tension, disunity, 
public discontent, and uncertainty. The 
very existence of a borderless Europe in the 
framework of Schengen was called into 
question. As NPE debates have shown, this is 
a major concern for Europeans, independent 
of the positions of individual governments. 
Although the numbers arriving have now 
fallen significantly, migration pressures are 
likely to remain and the issue will continue 
to dominate national debates in many 
countries. Despite progress in recent years, 
the EU and its members are still struggling to 
come up with effective internal and external 
responses and to move closer to a common 
migration, asylum and refugee policy worthy 
of the name. The lower numbers since 
2016 have reduced the pressure to go much 
further and there are signs that complacency 
is creeping in.
Since 2015, more than 1.5 million people 
have entered the EU irregularly by boat or 
land, mostly via the Eastern Mediterranean 
route from Turkey through Greece or 
through the ‘central Mediterranean route’ 
from the northern shores of Africa, especially 
from Libya, to Italy (see figure 3).
Worldwide, more than 60 million people 
have fled their homes and around 20 
million of them are currently in the Union’s 
immediate neighbourhood, especially in 
Turkey, Lebanon, Libya, and Jordan. Although 
over 80% of the world’s refugees are hosted 
in developing countries, Europe is – and will 
continue to be – an attractive destination for 
many.
Despite severe pressures, the EU and 
its members find it difficult to forge 
compromises on sensitive issues related 
to the migration and refugee challenge. 
Transnational and national NPE debates 
have clearly exposed the deep differences of 
opinion between and within EU countries, 
with people divided into two basic camps. 
Though they already existed before 2015, the 
crisis has widened the gap between them.
In one camp are those who argue that 
Europe has a moral, humanitarian, historical, 
and legal obligation to support those in need 
of help and refuge. They insist that European 
societies are strong enough to aid and 
welcome people forced to flee their homes, 
and maintain that putting up fences between 
EU countries or creating a ‘fortress Europe’ 
is no solution. The EU and its members 
should rather welcome refugees and asylum-
seekers, and ensure that everything possible 
is done to share the burden between 
countries and support the integration 
of newly-arrived migrants. Many in this 
‘solidarity’ camp also argue that migration 
is positive from an economic perspective 
and that it could help alleviate the costs of 
ageing and shrinking populations in most EU 
countries. Controlled economic migration is 
thus a necessity for Europe to secure its long-
term prosperity.
60 million 
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Source: UNHCR, Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean, Sea arrivals evolution – Mediterranean sea, Comparison of monthly Mediterranean sea arrivals to Greece and Italy; Institute of Migration, Missing Migrants
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In the other camp are those who argue 
that Europe must protect itself from the 
large number of people trying to reach the 
continent. They emphasise the need to 
secure the EU’s external borders and argue 
that failing to protect Europe’s frontiers will 
undermine security and the free movement 
of people within the Schengen area. Many 
in this ‘security’ camp believe that ‘open 
doors’ and ‘generous support’ have motivated 
many more people to come, and that 
Europe’s migration policy should be much 
tougher in the future. They insist that there 
is an upper limit to the numbers that the 
EU and individual member states can cope 
with because it will be very difficult and 
costly to integrate millions of people into 
European societies and economies. Some 
even argue that the EU is endangered by 
‘foreign infiltration’ undermining internal 
security and that the integration of large 
numbers of (Muslim) migrants constitutes an 
insurmountable and potentially dangerous 
risk to political and social cohesion within 
member states.
Given the diverse set of opinions and 
pressures on political actors, especially 
from authoritarian populist forces, the EU 
has struggled to identify and implement a 
common response that balances security 
concerns and solidarity efforts between EU 
countries. The ‘solidarity gap’ between EU 
countries was most evident in the fierce 
opposition to the emergency relocation 
scheme adopted in September 2015, with EU 
countries failing to fulfil their obligations and 
some of them challenging the decision in the 
European Court of Justice (Hungary, Slovakia) 
and/or facing infringement proceedings 
for failing to participate in the scheme 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland). A look 
at the numbers reveals big implementation 
discrepancies between EU countries. The 
relocation burden is not spread equally 
among member states, with large countries 
like Germany and France struggling to fulfil 
their commitments and some countries 
simply refusing to take any applicants at all 
(see figure 4).
Despite deep divisions between national 
capitals, EU member states have reached 
broad agreement on three core objectives 
to guide their response to the crisis: to 
prevent a further unravelling of the Schengen 
area; to safeguard Europe’s borders, and, above 
all, to reduce the number of people arriving 
in the EU in an attempt to regain control of a 
chaotic situation.
In relation to the latter, the effective closure 
of the Western Balkans route following a 
highly controversial agreement between the 
EU and Turkey had a significant impact. The 
agreement helped to significantly reduce 
the number of arrivals, but at the cost of 
pushing people towards the comparatively 
more dangerous Central Mediterranean 
route (see figure 3 on page 13). Human 
rights organisations have heavily criticised 
the Union’s actions, arguing that it has de 
facto led to a suspension of asylum laws and 
refugee rights in violation of European and 
international conventions.
Between 2015-2017, the migration and 
refugee crisis fuelled a number of policy 
1. An improved but still unresolved poly-crisis
Source: European Commission, Member States’ support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism as of 25 October 2017
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developments in the EU, such as the creation 
of the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency (Frontex); the provision of financial 
and material assistance to the countries 
most affected by the crisis (although both 
Greece and Italy feel that fellow member 
states have not shown enough solidarity); 
increased support for displaced people 
and refugee camps in crisis regions; a new 
Migration Partnership framework and External 
Investment Plan to address some of the root 
causes of migration and boost cooperation 
with third countries of origin and transit, 
especially in Africa; a military operation 
to combat people- and arms-smuggling; 
and a temporary European Resettlement 
Scheme. The latter provides direct legal and 
safe pathways to enter the EU. The numbers 
foreseen, however, are merely a drop in the 
ocean considering the millions of people in 
need of international protection.
The EU and its members have not, however, 
been able to agree on more systemic reforms, 
including long-overdue changes to the 
Common European Asylum System. The 
European Commission has come forward 
with numerous initiatives and legislative 
proposals aimed at moving things forward, 
but member states have struggled to reach 
compromises on these and other issues.
Crucially, in 2016, the Commission presented 
proposals aimed at creating a fairer, more 
efficient and more sustainable system for 
allocating asylum applications among 
member states. It included a corrective 
‘fairness’ allocation mechanism to determine 
automatically when a country is handling 
a disproportionate number of asylum 
applications and relocate all additional 
applicants to other EU countries. The 
Commission has also proposed a permanent 
European resettlement framework to 
establish a common set of procedures for the 
selection process and protection status for 
resettlement candidates.
These balanced and cautious proposals do 
not erode existing national competences. Yet, 
EU governments have not been able to find 
a compromise they can agree on, despite 
numerous proposals being floated to bridge 
the divide. They have also been unable to 
make progress on other reforms required to 
deal with the migration challenge effectively, 
such as creating more legal avenues for 
migration to reduce the lure of irregular 
migration, or reforming EU policies that 
affect rates of migration in areas such as 
agriculture, fisheries and the environment.
NPE discussions have shown that more needs 
to be done to effectively manage migration 
flows and overcome some of the policy 
stalemates the EU has been witnessing, 
which ultimately could even undermine the 
tangible benefits of Schengen. Member states 
need to agree on, and implement, a more 
comprehensive strategy regarding human 
mobility based on a more holistic concept 
of migration management. The NPE debates 
underlined that if they fail to do so, migration 
will remain a highly divisive issue, both 
between and within individual member states, 
with negative consequences for the Union as 
a whole.
What we have witnessed in recent years 
is a focus on ad hoc firefighting, with the 
attendant risk that the EU will run out of 
steam and fail to deliver more fundamental 
reforms. The sense of urgency that gripped 
the continent when refugees walked along 
motorways in the heart of Europe has gone. 
But with the crisis still fresh in people’s 
minds, policymakers find themselves trapped 
between voters’ desire for quick fixes and 
the complex reality of the situation, which 
requires a long-term approach based on a 
balanced compromise between the diverse 
camps within and among member states.
Migrants walk through the countryside after crossing 
the Hungarian-Croatian border in September 2015. 
(ATTILA KISBENEDEK / AFP)
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THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS
Europe encounters a rising number of 
external and internal threats. The pressure 
to assume more regional and global 
responsibility is also intensifying. Internally, 
the EU faces major security and societal 
challenges in responding to the accelerated 
pace of terrorist attacks. Externally, its 
immediate neighbourhood both in the east 
and south is characterised by instability and, 
at times, confrontation.
The national and transnational debates 
in the framework of the NPE project have 
revealed varying geopolitical priorities. 
To the east, member states face military, 
political, economic, and energy-security 
related threats and vulnerabilities, especially 
in their relationship with the EU’s biggest 
neighbour, Russia. To the south, the spread 
of conflict and ungoverned territories has 
created a security vacuum that is often filled 
by terrorists and criminals. In this volatile 
context, a unifying element is the election of 
President Trump, which has raised questions 
about the future global economic and 
political order, and Europe’s role within it.
In this new environment, a poll conducted 
by the Bertelsmann Foundation shows that 
an overwhelming majority of citizens across 
Europe (80%) want the EU to assume a more 
active role in world affairs (see figure 5). 
Progress has been made, but it remains to 
be seen whether the EU27 have the political 
will and energy to translate into actions the 
ambitions to reinforce the Union’s role as a 
comprehensive security provider.
With respect to internal security, the rise of 
terrorism is having a particularly negative 
impact on the public’s collective perceptions 
and concerns. Surveys show that it is 
regarded as a constant danger in many EU 
countries. In the words of the Belgian NPE 
report, “the terrorist bombings of the Brussels 
airport and Maalbeek metro station – striking 
at the heart of Belgium as an international hub 
– constituted the most unmistakeable wake-up 
call so far that security and prosperity can never 
be taken for granted.“
The fear induced by the terrorist attacks 
has also polluted the debate about 
migration and integration policies in 
Europe. With xenophobic parties exploiting 
citizens’ concerns, there is a serious risk 
that a narrow security-driven response to 
terrorism will prevail over the broader, more 
comprehensive approach required. The 
latter emphasises the need for appropriate 
prevention strategies and for addressing the 
root causes of extremism and radicalisation 
within Europe and beyond.
Social inclusion and integration, intercultural 
dialogue and respect, and improved socio-
economic prospects (especially among 
young people) are essential components 
in the fight against violent radicalisation. 
In recent years, however, the EU and its 
members have focused mainly on the 
security aspects and on reinforcing the 
capacity to uncover and dismantle terrorist 
networks and avert attacks. The EU has 
adopted numerous measures to support 
national responses to terrorism through 
closer cooperation among member states. 
Some progress has been made at European 
level, but in a reactive rather than pro-active 
way and at a slow and uneven pace.
1. An improved but still unresolved poly-crisis
Source: eupinions, a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. For more data see www.eupinions.eu
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In the field of external policy, the instability in 
Europe’s neighbourhood and the uncertainty 
regarding the US commitment to Europe’s 
defence have raised fundamental questions 
about member states’ responsibility for their 
own security and the EU’s role in defence 
matters. Governments have long dodged 
the former question and most have been 
ambivalent about the latter. But the NPE 
discussions have stressed a renewed sense 
of urgency in this debate and highlighted 
the need to invest more in defence and that 
disjointed national efforts are inadequate to 
equip Europe to cope with the security risks 
it faces.
Against this backdrop, progress has been 
made over the past year towards creating 
mechanisms that pave the way for deeper 
European defence cooperation and 
strengthen its strategic autonomy. The aim 
is to foster cooperation by coordinating 
the review of national defence planning, 
establishing a set of binding commitments 
for countries willing and able to sign up 
to more ambitious goals, and providing 
financial incentives for collaborative 
research and procurement projects. The 
output of these new tools and arrangements 
will depend on whether and to what extent 
governments decide to engage through this 
framework: while a degree of convergence 
can be detected, differences in national 
threat assessments, strategic cultures and 
views on the EU’s role have not vanished.
The debate on European defence has long 
featured three main divides between 
countries, which were also evident in 
many of the NPE transnational debates. 
The first relates to threat assessments, 
with most Central and Eastern European 
countries focused on the geopolitical 
challenges posed by Russia to the East, 
and Mediterranean EU countries chiefly 
preoccupied with the destabilisation of the 
Middle East and the vast region stretching 
from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. The 
second concerns the use of force, with 
countries like France prepared to undertake 
demanding military operations whether 
in multilateral formats or on their own, 
and others, notably Germany, much more 
cautious in mobilising military forces 
and less willing to take part in combat 
operations. The third is between those who 
think a stronger European defence policy 
would undermine the Atlantic Alliance and 
those who believe this would reinforce it.
EU countries still have varying geopolitical 
priorities and threat perceptions, but they 
have managed to maintain a common 
front towards Russia over Ukraine and to 
slowly shape a common approach to crisis 
management and capacity building in the 
Sahel. Diverse strategic cultures endure 
when it comes to the use of force, but gaps 
are slowly narrowing. The debate over the 
relationship between European defence 
and NATO has also shifted significantly over 
the past couple of years. It is now broadly 
accepted that reinforcing EU member states’ 
military capabilities will enable them to 
better contribute to the tasks and operations 
in both the EU and NATO contexts and that 
cooperation between the two is mutually 
reinforcing.
The June 2016 EU Global Strategy 
stressed the need for progress in defence, 
emphasising that Europeans must make 
a much bigger contribution to their own 
security, whether through NATO or acting 
autonomously; move towards ‘defence 
cooperation as the norm’; generate 
stronger capabilities through smarter, joint 
investment; and become more effective 
in using them. Many of these priorities 
have long been debated at EU level, with 
member states either disagreeing or making 
commitments that went largely unfulfilled, 
prompting the Global Strategy to warn 
that turning words into deeds is a matter of 
credibility for European defence policy.
The Strategy was presented at a time of great 
turbulence in European and international 
politics, between the Brexit vote and 
President Trump’s election. The NPE debates 
have demonstrated that, contrary to some 
predictions, both events have spurred a 
renewed sense of commitment in many 
countries to work together and present 
a common front on the international 
stage. Alongside an uncertain security 
environment in Europe’s neighbourhood, 
they have created a more conducive climate 
to make progress on Europe’s security and 
defence agenda. Differences remain, but 
national positions appear more fluid than in 
the past.
Most member states have accepted the 
need to invest more in their defence and 
have begun doing so. Until Brexit and the US 
election, the case for fostering EU defence 
cooperation did not gain much traction in 
national capitals, but since 2016, France, 
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significantly over 
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years.
It is now broadly 
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Germany and others have pushed the debate 
further through important papers and 
statements. These initiatives have helped shift 
the centre of gravity in the debate, alongside 
the Global Strategy implementation 
process in security and defence matters 
and the Commission’s proactive approach 
to supporting European defence research 
programmes and collaborative procurement 
efforts.
Multiple internal factors have contributed to 
accelerating progress. With the UK on its way 
out of the EU, Germany opted to team up 
with France and others to deepen European 
defence cooperation. The UK was not the 
only stumbling block to progress, but other 
sceptical countries could no longer rely on its 
veto when several others lined up to pursue 
more ambitious goals. This was also seen as 
an opportunity to send a message of unity 
post-Brexit and demonstrate a willingness to 
join forces to respond to citizens’ concerns. 
Security and defence were regarded as 
relatively ‘low-hanging fruit’, although 
individual countries’ level of ambition was 
very uneven. Furthermore, the prospect of a 
multi-speed Union, with clusters of countries 
cooperating more deeply in exclusive 
formats, worried some member states 
who feared being left out. It has therefore 
provided an additional incentive to join the 
debate and ensure that any arrangement for 
differentiated integration in defence matters 
is inclusive and considers various national 
concerns and priorities.
In short, those countries broadly in 
favour of a stronger EU role in security 
and defence, long unwilling to back their 
rhetorical commitment with real political 
capital, decided to throw their weight 
behind practical measures. Those sceptical 
of progress were unable to halt this new 
dynamic, although they opposed specific 
proposals and sought to dilute others. 
National positions did not shift overnight, 
but various political tides in Europe 
lifted the debate. The broadening of the 
agenda also helped: member states could 
disagree over some issues while having 
a strong interest in advancing on others, 
blurring the distinction between advocates 
of European defence cooperation and 
sceptics, and creating space for trade-offs, 
which are necessary if the EU27 want 
to deepen their security and defence 
cooperation. The EU27 still need, however, 
to prove that they will be able to fulfil the 
expectations they have raised with respect 
to the EU’s future role as a comprehensive 
security provider.
1. An Improved but still unresolved poly-crisis
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Jyrki Katainen  
talk to the media about the future of European Defence. (THIERRY CHARLIER / AFP)
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2.  Collateral damage
Each component of the EU’s poly-crisis is 
grim and complex on its own, and none have 
been overcome in a sustainable way. But the 
overall picture is even more complicated. 
The interlinked and mutually reinforcing 
crises have caused collateral damage, fuelling 
frictions both between and within member 
states. In the context of the NPE project, the 
national debates exposed the tensions within 
each country while the transnational debates 
revealed the high degree of fragmentation 
between EU member states.
Following the outbreak of the poly-crisis, the EU 
and its members have, by and large, sought to 
‘kick the can down the road’. Most of the time 
they have been in reactive mode, focusing on 
avoiding the worst possible outcomes without, 
on many occasions, being able to implement 
the remaining structural reforms required at 
European or national level.
From a pragmatic perspective, this may have 
been a rational way of dealing with the crises, in 
the absence of a ‘textbook’ that decision-makers 
could turn to for guidance and given the lack of 
consensus between and within member states. 
As a result, in most cases, the EU has only been 
able to address the symptoms of the crises 
rather than to tackle their multiple root causes. 
EU leaders often appeared as if all they could 
do was to buy time, hoping that some of the 
measures they adopted would deliver results, 
the situation would improve over time, and 
worst-case scenarios would not materialise. The 
result was a lot of improvisation under severe 
time pressure.
A lesson for many decision-makers has been 
that when things escalate, extraordinary 
measures can be adopted under intense 
pressure at the 11th hour to avoid the 
situation from imploding. This has worked on 
numerous occasions, but it is underpinned by 
a potentially dangerous logic: just because 
the EU has ‘survived’ does not mean the 
situation might not spiral out of control in 
future. Even if some crises grow ‘cold’, the 
embers of a smouldering fire could flare up 
again any time.
The accumulation of so many structurally 
unresolved crises has raised the risk of future 
escalation. Even if the situation looks better 
today than it did in 2015-16, it is by no means 
certain that the ‘iron law’ of European 
integration – that the EU always emerges 
stronger from a crisis – will prove itself again. 
Only if the EU comes through this difficult 
period, will it benefit from a ‘resilience 
dividend’. Having demonstrated that it can 
become ‘crisis-proof’, the EU will grow more 
mature, making it much harder to call its very 
existence into doubt.
But this is by no means certain and the 
greatest risk is a political ‘accident’ in 
a large member state that would have a 
serious impact on the Union as whole. What 
was true in the early phases of the euro 
area crisis remains true today: big countries 
are too big to rescue. The mood music in 
some founding members remains extremely 
sombre – as reflected in the Italian and 
French NPE debates – and the voices of 
those who question the benefits of EU 
membership have become much louder.
At the same time, the EU27 face an even 
deeper problem: the profound collateral 
damage caused by the poly-crisis at national, 
European, and global level. These unintended 
political, economic, social, and societal 
consequences limit the ability of the EU to 
take more assertive measures to address the 
fundamental causes of the crises. They have 
also led to a ‘crisis of national narratives’ about 
European integration. In many member 
states, people are now much more critical of 
the European project, as was all too evident 
in the national and transnational discussions 
held under the NPE project over the past five 
years. In the words of the Belgian NPE report, 
“a frank discussion about both the nature and 
the limits of European integration is becoming 
unavoidable.“ Hence any attempt to reform 
the European project needs to start with a 
thorough analysis of the negative effects 
of the poly-crisis and to take these into 
account when elaborating recommendations 
on the way forward.
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FRAGMENTATION AND DISTRUST AMONG MEMBER STATES
High levels of distrust among member 
states, and between national capitals and 
‘Brussels’ have not only affected governments 
and decision-makers but also societies as a 
whole, with an unprecedented resurgence of 
national stereotypes, nationalistic chauvinism, 
historical resentments, and a damaging 
blame game between governments and 
even between ‘ordinary’ people across Europe 
– north, south, east, and west. 
Signs of fragmentation were evident 
in many national and transnational NPE 
debates. Mutual accusations of a lack of 
solidarity have deepened the divides and 
weakened trust among member states. This 
phenomenon was further exacerbated by the 
refugee crisis, as countries hit hardest by the 
influx of migrants expected more support 
from other member states. It was also 
worsened by a failure to implement decisions 
taken collectively in Brussels, as with the 
temporary relocation scheme adopted in 
the context of the refugee crisis (see figure 4 
on page 14).
In parallel, there has been a loss of trust 
between national capitals and EU institutions, 
significantly hampering cooperation 
between ‘Brussels’ and the member states. 
Some argue that the EU institutions have 
(still) not understood the signs of the times 
and are intent on fostering supranational 
integration against the will of most citizens, 
who want the EU to concentrate on areas 
where European integration can provide 
genuine added value.
There are also those (especially in Germany, 
the Netherlands and some Central and 
Eastern European countries) who criticise 
the Juncker Commission for seeking to play 
a more political role, arguing that this runs 
counter to its essential impartiality and 
independence. Others (especially in Southern 
Europe and among smaller member states 
who traditionally see the Commission as their 
strongest ally) feel that it has lost power in 
the inter-institutional setting and is thus no 
longer able to provide strategic guidance. 
Whatever the individual reasons, the result 
is that EU institutions are less trusted, which 
hampers the overall functioning of the Union.
EUROPEAN COOPERATION NO LONGER A WIN-WIN EXERCISE
European cooperation is no longer perceived 
as a win-win exercise from which all member 
states and their citizens profit. There are 
serious doubts in many quarters about 
the Union’s added value, with a palpable 
feeling in many countries that European 
integration is no longer a positive-sum 
game (although the underlying reasons for 
this differ significantly). In both creditor and 
debtor countries, many people feel that the 
costs of the financial and economic crisis 
have not been distributed fairly: creditor 
countries feel that they have been forced 
to pay for the mistakes of others, while 
debtor countries hold that those on Europe’s 
periphery have suffered disproportionally 
from the crisis and the austerity measures 
imposed on them. Citizens in many EU 
countries feel the promise of economic 
prosperity and convergence through the 
Single Market and the euro has not been 
fulfilled, while others criticise the failure 
to push through structural economic 
reforms in countries lagging behind in the 
competitiveness stakes. The countries most 
affected by the refugee crisis (Austria, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, and Sweden) feel 
that their EU partners (especially in Eastern 
Europe) have failed to show enough solidarity 
by taking in an adequate number of migrants 
and asylum-seekers, while conversely, many 
in Eastern Europe argue that an excessive 
Willkommenskultur has fuelled much bigger 
influxes of refugees, undermining Europe’s 
security. This divide was evident in the NPE-
organised transnational debates.
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WIDENING DIVERGENCE IN REAL AND THINKING TERMS
There is a widening economic gap between 
EU countries. While some have managed 
to weather the storm, many others are 
struggling with lower long-term growth rates, 
a lack of regional and global competitiveness, 
insufficient public and private investment 
levels, higher real interest rates, persistently 
high public debt levels, very high levels of 
youth unemployment, and a deep social 
malaise. As a result, after years of gradual 
convergence before the crisis began, the 
EU has witnessed spreading economic 
divergence since 2007-8 (see figure 6).
Living standards and social conditions vary 
significantly across Europe, both between 
and within countries, putting an especially 
heavy burden on those hit hardest by the 
crisis (as highlighted in the Greek, Italian, 
French, and Portuguese national NPE reports). 
They can no longer counter macroeconomic 
imbalances through independent national 
monetary policies and are thus forced down 
the painful path of internal devaluation. 
Widening economic divergence also 
constitutes a problem for the ECB, which 
must conduct a single monetary policy in an 
increasingly heterogeneous currency area. 
The resulting near-zero inflation and low 
interest rates have been attacked throughout 
the EU, with economically weaker countries 
critical of the painful internal devaluations 
required to curtail deficits rapidly in a near-
zero inflation environment, while those who 
have weathered the storm much better feel 
that low-interest rates have placed a heavy 
burden on savers. These criticisms were very 
much echoed in the national NPE debates.
Alongside widening divergence in real terms, 
there has also been a rising disparity in 
how people view the situation in Europe. 
Policymakers, experts and the wider public in 
member states assess the state of the Union 
and the root causes, nature and gravity of the 
multiple crises it faces in very diverse ways. 
Europeans seem at times to be almost ‘living 
on different planets’: they do not share the 
same analysis, let alone agree on the remedy. 
These differences were underlined in the 
transnational NPE debates, with participants 
from separate EU countries often holding 
distinct interpretations of the situation and 
future challenges.
This widening divergence in real and thinking 
terms has widened the gap between 
member states, making it much harder to 
forge compromises and to implement joint 
actions and reforms requiring broad support 
at European and national level.
CHANGE IN GDP ACROSS MEMBER STATES
INDEX STARTS AT 100% IN 2007
Source: World Bank
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RISING SOCIAL INEQUALITIES AND POLITICAL  
DIVIDES WITHIN MEMBER STATES
Although their origins predate the financial 
and economic crisis, real and perceived social 
divides within EU countries have widened 
in recent years. This has fostered a growing 
sense of social injustice, which has fuelled 
indignation, despair and even anger in many 
parts of society, including also in member 
states that have been able to weather 
the storms of the financial and economic 
crisis. Rising inequalities undermine social 
contracts and may even endanger social 
peace within countries and between 
generations. Socio-economic progress is 
not felt evenly across all parts of society, and 
many feel that the gains of globalisation 
and free markets are unequally distributed, 
while everyone shares the risks of a more 
integrated global economy.
In parallel, political divides have widened 
within countries because of waning 
trust in traditional political elites and ‘the 
establishment’s’ ability to provide timely 
and adequate policy responses to today’s 
complex challenges. This has fostered a 
more fundamental ‘crisis of representative 
democracy’ characterised by widespread 
political disenchantment, a high degree 
of electoral volatility, anti-establishment 
reflexes, and pressures on all sides of the 
political spectrum. In almost all countries 
involved in the NPE process, mainstream 
liberal political forces have struggled to 
counter the simplistic and often counter-
factual rhetoric of populist forces on both 
the left and right (see the analysis of the 
persistent populist threat in chapter 2).
INABILITY TO FAIRLY BALANCE NATIONAL INTERESTS:  
A ‘CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP’
From a politico-institutional perspective, 
many feel that the EU’s governance 
structures are no longer able to balance 
national interests and reconcile diverging 
preferences within the wider context of the 
overall European interest. Critics claim the 
Union has become more intergovernmental 
as the powers and political weight of the 
European Council have expanded in times 
of crisis at the expense of the European 
Commission and the European Parliament, 
which are no longer capable of defending 
collective supranational interests. In parallel, 
there are widespread concerns (especially 
among smaller and less influential member 
states) about a perceived ‘unbalanced 
intergovernmentalism’ in the institutional 
system, with decisions heavily influenced or 
even dominated by the views and interests 
of specific member states, and with Germany 
playing a much more dominant role than 
in the past. All of this occurred while the 
Franco-German engine – which had helped 
to balance divergent interests in the EU for 
many decades – lost traction and relevance, 
leading to a much broader ‘crisis of leadership’ 
and another source of collective stalemate, 
given that Berlin and Paris where not able to 
jointly push things in the same direction. 
WIDESPREAD FRUSTRATION WITH THE EU’S INABILITY  
TO TACKLE THE POLY-CRISIS
A growing number of people have turned 
their backs on the EU during the poly-
crisis because of dissatisfaction with the 
current state of the Union. A survey of the 
Bertelsmann Foundation found out that 66% 
of citizens are not satisfied with the Union’s 
current direction (see figure 7).
And although levels of public support are 
improving, the EU is still widely perceived 
as having not been  ‘part of the solution’ but 
rather ‘part of the problem’ in the recent 
spate of crises. This perception has poisoned 
national debates and public attitudes 
towards the Union, as has the feeling that the 
EU is too elitist and does not represent the 
interests of ordinary citizens.
To a much greater extent than in the past, 
widespread frustration with the EU as it stands 
is also felt by political, economic, cultural, and 
intellectual elites, many of whom have lost 
Rising 
inequalities 
undermine 
social contracts 
and may even 
endanger 
social peace 
within countries 
and between 
generations. 
The Franco-
German engine  
lost traction 
and relevance, 
leading to a 
much broader 
‘crisis of 
leadership’.
Widespread 
frustration 
with the EU as 
it stands is also 
felt by political, 
economic, 
cultural, and 
intellectual elites.
 2.  Collateral damage
New Pact for Europe         23Third Report – November 2017
confidence that it can master the crises. This 
trend was also evident in the NPE debates, 
with experts and policymakers becoming 
much less ambitious and more critical of the 
EU over the past five years. Given that these 
elites can strongly influence public opinion, 
this development is particularly worrying. 
The widespread perception that today’s EU is 
unable to cope with the immediate problems 
it faces undermines trust in its ability to tackle 
future challenges. This perception is aggravated 
by an expanding ‘implementation deficit’: 
member states agree on measures at EU level 
which they then fail to implement at home, 
putting into question not only the Union’s 
problem-solving capacity but also, more 
fundamentally, adherence to the rule of law.
Frustration with the Union also raises 
questions about what unites Europeans, 
making it harder to foster the shared 
sense of identity and destiny required to 
generate active support for integration. 
At the same time, people have become 
increasingly aware of the growing 
impact of decisions taken in Brussels 
and Strasbourg and the high degree of 
interdependence among member states, 
especially in the euro area.
NPE discussions in the member states 
involving ‘ordinary’ citizens have shown, 
however, that many feel that they cannot 
influence the formulation of policies 
because of the EU’s complex and often 
incomprehensible decision-making system. 
This impression is also fuelled by national 
politicians’ tendency to blame ‘Brussels’ 
for some of their own failings and their 
reluctance to give the Union credit for its 
successes. Such attitudes aggravate the long-
standing legitimacy issue.
Despite the widening capability-
expectations gap, a broad majority of 
people still support the basic notion of 
European integration and cherish its many 
accomplishments (see figure 8). They are 
aware of the potential ‘costs of non-Europe’ 
if the EU implodes, and feel that most 
contemporary problems transcend national 
boundaries and cannot be solved at the 
national level alone. 
Source: eupinions, a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. For more data see www.eupinions.eu
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DAMAGE TO THE EU’S EXTERNAL REPUTATION
The EU’s inability to tackle the poly-crisis 
has not only undermined confidence in 
the ‘project’ among its own citizens and 
elites, but has also severely damaged its 
reputation on the international stage, with 
many questioning whether the Union can 
emerge stronger from the multiple crises it 
has experienced and begin to look outward 
again. This ‘loss of attraction’ is evident both 
in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and 
at global level.
In the Western Balkans, accession countries 
sense that the prospects for future rounds 
of enlargement will remain gloomy for the 
foreseeable future, which in turn limits the 
Union’s ability to influence political and 
economic developments in its immediate 
neighbourhood.
In the international arena, partners 
acknowledge Europeans’ declared desire 
to intensify cooperation in foreign, security 
and defence policy, but many have serious 
doubts that member states will put their 
money where their mouth is and fear they 
will (once again) remain preoccupied by 
internal affairs and fail to assume more 
global responsibility.
In global trade, there are concerns that 
heightened introspection might fuel 
protectionist tendencies in Europe, with a 
negative impact on international exchanges, 
although this has been countered by EU 
efforts to conclude and/or ratify bilateral 
trade agreements with leading international 
partners such as Canada, Japan and 
Mercosur.
 2.  Collateral damage
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3.  Strong resilience  
and a new sense of optimism
The EU’s inability to master the poly-crisis in 
a way that guarantees long-term stability, 
together with the collateral damage the 
crisis has caused, have raised fundamental 
questions about its future. Despite all the 
turmoil since 2008, the Union has, however, 
been remarkably resilient in the face of the 
forces of disintegration.
More recently, there has even been a new 
sense of optimism about its prospects, a more 
upbeat mood echoed in many NPE debates. 
The renewed unity following Brexit and 
Donald Trump’s election, a return to economic 
growth and the fact that 2017 has not been 
the political annus horribilis in Europe that 
many feared it would be, have all fuelled 
hopes that the European project might be 
re-energised after years of crises, although the 
jury is still out on where all this will lead.
Many prophets of doom have repeatedly 
predicted the EU’s imminent collapse, and 
they have repeatedly been proved wrong. 
Some predicted a Greek exit from the euro 
(‘Grexit’), others warned of an upcoming 
implosion of the common currency, the end 
of Schengen, or a military stand-off between 
the West and Russia over Ukraine. None of 
this happened, although at times it felt as 
if the situation might spiral out of control, 
and eventually the EU did have to face the 
consequences of one such ‘accident’ when 
the British voted for Brexit.
First and foremost, the Union’s strong 
foundations can explain its resilience: 60 
years on, integration has become part of 
Europe’s collective DNA. The many benefits 
of European integration, the increasing 
interdependence among member states 
(especially within the euro area), the deep 
and complex historical, political, economic, 
and societal ties that bind member states 
and citizens, have all made it extremely 
difficult to abandon the European project. 
Most people believe the ‘costs of non-Europe’ 
would be high and a clear majority of citizens 
want their country to remain in the EU.
Nevertheless, while interdependence and 
claims that ‘There is No Alternative’ (TINA) to 
European integration may have been strong 
enough to avert disintegration, they are 
not sufficient to rebuild the public’s trust in 
Europe’s future. This requires a much more 
positive and proactive narrative about the 
prospects for – and benefits of – European 
cooperation.
UNITY IN THE FACE OF BREXIT AND TRUMP
In their declaration on the 60th anniversary 
of the Rome Treaties (March 2017), EU 
leaders underlined that “Europe is our 
common future” and that, in the decade to 
come, they want a Union that is “safe and 
secure, prosperous, competitive, sustainable 
and socially responsible, and with the will and 
capacity of playing a key role in the world and 
of shaping globalisation” – although it is by no 
means certain that the EU27 will be able to 
fulfil their promise to make the Rome agenda 
“become tomorrow’s reality”.
Although the EU has by and large avoided 
cataclysmic developments, the narrow 
British vote for Brexit in June 2016 was 
a devastating blow. The result came as a 
surprise to many in Brussels and in national 
capitals. Continental Europeans watched 
the heated referendum debate in the UK – 
often based on exaggerations, false promises 
or even outright lies – with concern, but 
most thought fear of economic uncertainty 
following a vote to withdraw would 
ultimately prevent Brexit. They were wrong.
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More than a year after the referendum, the 
full consequences of the Brexit vote for the 
UK, for the EU27 and for the future relationship 
between Britain and continental Europe, are 
still not clear. After decades of expansion, this 
is the first time in the history of European 
integration that a country has opted to leave 
the EU. There is no precedent, and both sides 
are struggling to figure out precisely where 
the exit negotiations might lead. Meanwhile, 
the clock is ticking and the UK is due to exit 
the Union at the end of March 2019.
The negotiations are inevitably tough. The 
EU27 have defined clear principles and seem 
firmly committed to maintaining a united 
front, although the process might, at times, 
test their common positions, given some 
diverging economic and political interests. 
Meanwhile, the UK appears deeply divided, 
struggling to define what it wants out of the 
process and which financial and political 
concessions it is ready to make to build a 
constructive relationship with the EU.
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, 
many in continental Europe feared that it 
might trigger a negative domino effect in 
the EU27, that the Union would become even 
more fragmented and that other member 
states might be tempted to follow the 
British example. But that has not happened. 
Instead, the many uncertainties and potential 
political, economic, and societal costs of 
the British decision appear to have acted 
as an external unifier, both at the level of 
governments and the public (see figure 9). 
Even if the UK has not yet left the Union, the 
EU27 are trying to look forward and sketch 
a positive vision of Europe’s future without 
Britain. Brexit had a positive impact on public 
opinion in the EU27. The political instability 
and rising divisions in the UK, the risk of the 
country breaking apart, and the unfolding 
economic uncertainties and potential 
costs related to Brexit are demonstrating, 
under real-life conditions, that leaving the 
Union is a complex process involving many 
uncertainties, insecurities and costs. Most 
citizens in the EU27 – 55% according to a 
poll conducted by Pew – hold that Brexit is 
bad for the UK (see figure 9).
Donald Trump’s election as the 45th 
president of the United States is also 
fostering European unity and public support 
for European cooperation. His victory has 
strengthened public perception that the 
EU is a haven of stability and security. It 
showed that populists could come to power, 
even in countries with strong liberal and 
democratic credentials. In the months since 
his inauguration, Europeans have seen the 
negative impact of Trump’s election on the 
country’s political culture, polarised society 
and policy choices, from abandoning the 
Paris climate deal to backtracking from 
President Obama’s healthcare reform and 
introducing restrictions on migration. Trump’s 
election has also fuelled more international 
uncertainties, which in turn underlines the 
need for Europeans to remain united and 
assume more responsibility in their own 
region and on the global stage.
Source: Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, Q48b
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A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Adding to all this, some positive economic 
and political developments are fuelling 
a new sense of optimism about Europe’s 
future. Growth rates in the EU27 (1.9% in 
2016) and in the euro area (1.8% in 2016) 
are higher than in previous years and 
higher than in the US (1.6% in 2016). The 
improved economic situation is more solid 
and sustainable given that it is not built on 
an accumulation of public and private debt 
compared to the years before the eruption 
of the financial crisis. Furthermore, 2017 has 
not been the political annus horribilis that 
some had predicted: in several European 
countries, right-wing populist candidates 
did not do as well as expected and, in some 
cases, candidates with a clear pro-European 
vocation emerged victorious.
In Austria, Norbert Hofer, the candidate of 
the right-wing populist FPÖ (Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs), lost the presidential 
election to the green candidate, Alexander 
Van der Bellen, who opposed his opponent’s 
xenophobic and anti-refugee agenda and 
embraced a positive pro-European message. 
In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders and 
his Party for Freedom (PVV; Partij voor de 
Vrijheid) were not successful in the March 
2017 elections; although the PVV managed 
to become the second-largest party in the 
House of Representatives with 20 out of 150 
seats (13.1%). Nevertheless, they did worse 
than many opinion polls had suggested in 
the months before the elections. In France, 
Emmanuel Macron entered the Elysée Palace 
after a landslide victory, winning 66% of the 
vote in the second round of the May 2017 
presidential election against Marine Le Pen.
Emmanuel Macron’s win exalted the 
collective self-confidence of a country that 
has been a ”grande nation lost in Europe” 
as the French NPE report states. Within a 
few months’ time, this has already had an 
impact beyond France’s borders, giving 
Europe a fresh momentum, with President 
Macron and German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel repeatedly underlining and publicly 
displaying their commitment to European 
unity, and indicating that Paris and Berlin 
would intensify their bilateral cooperation 
and push for additional EU reforms after the 
German elections. But a dark cloud has 
been cast over their ambitions by the success 
of the right-wing nationalistic Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD) in the German federal 
elections (winning almost 13% of the vote) 
and the perspective of a new, more complex 
coalition government less willing to support 
ambitious EU reforms along the lines 
proposed by President Macron, who re-called 
his plea to rebuild a “sovereign, united and 
democratic Europe” in a very pro-European 
speech at the Sorbonne two days after the 
German elections.
The unifying effect of Brexit and President 
Trump’s election, combined with the 
mostly encouraging economic and political 
developments in 2016-17, have renewed 
confidence in the European project. But it 
is by no means certain that the EU27 can 
and will exploit the political window of 
opportunity to give it new momentum.  
They must tackle the unresolved poly-crisis 
and deal with the collateral damage caused 
by it in recent years. They also face a much 
more fundamental threat, which goes well 
beyond the future of European integration 
and which must not be underestimated: the 
danger of a more regressive, nationalistic, 
closed, illiberal, and authoritarian Europe – 
a danger that was shared throughout the 
national and transnational debates held  
in the framework of the NPE project.
French President 
Emmanuel Macron 
welcomes German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel 
upon her arrival at the 
Elysee Palace in Paris, 28 
August 2017. 
 (LUDOVIC MARIN / AFP)
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The biggest 
challenge
The persistent threat  
of authoritarian populism
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1. An unbeaten phenomenon
It is important to step back and pose a fundamental question: what really is the biggest 
danger facing Europe, and what are the factors fuelling it? A plain answer emerged from the 
national and transnational debates conducted within the NPE framework: as the rising support 
for authoritarian populists in many countries shows, profound unresolved problems make a 
more regressive, nationalistic, closed, illiberal and authoritarian Europe a constant danger in 
the years to come. To set the right priorities at all levels of governance in the fight against this 
threat, there is a need to thoroughly analyse the ‘nature of the beast’ by looking at individual 
cases and longer-term trends, and to understand how those who want to push our societies in 
an opposite direction can do so.
NO REASONS TO GIVE AN ALL-CLEAR
There is no reason to herald the arrival 
of a ‘post-populist moment’, as some 
commentators have done over-hastily in the 
first half of 2017. It would be a mistake to 
cheer prematurely.
In Austria, Alexander Van der Bellen won 
only a narrow victory to become president 
and more than a quarter of the electorate 
voted for the right-wing populist FPÖ in the 
October 2017 federal elections.
In France, things are not as clear-cut as 
they may seem, with Marine Le Pen winning 
many more votes than her father back in 
2002. There are also huge question marks 
over whether President Macron will be able 
to fulfil the high expectations his campaign 
has generated. If he fails – as his two 
predecessors did by and large – few would 
dare to predict how well Marine Le Pen, or 
another radical candidate, might do in the 
next presidential election in 2022.
In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders and his PVV 
have succeeded in shaping the public discourse 
and influencing policymaking on crucial issues.
In Germany too, the AfD’s anti-euro and 
anti-migration stance has had a significant 
influence on the political debate, even if a 
clear majority of German voters (87%) do not 
support its radical policy prescriptions.
In the Czech Republic, Andrej Babis led his 
right-wing populist party to a thumping victory 
in parliamentary elections in October 2017. 
Many mainstream parties fearful of losing 
(even more) votes have opted to adapt to 
or even copy the arguments and policy 
prescriptions of populist parties. They may 
not qualify as populists themselves, but they 
often use the same techniques and borrow 
some of their populist rivals’ arguments and 
rhetoric.
All of this indicates that the populist 
phenomenon, and the reasons underlying 
its success, remains a serious problem. 
Populism has been a constant companion 
for decades and there is no reason to 
believe that the phenomenon has peaked, 
as commentators may have suggested. 
Many populist parties have been around 
for decades and their share of the vote 
has more than doubled since the 1960s, 
with even bigger increases in their share 
of seats in European, national or regional 
parliaments (see figure 10 on page 30).
The surge of populism signals a profound 
menace that is raising the risk of a more 
regressive, nationalistic, closed, illiberal, and 
authoritarian Europe:
q A Europe that is increasingly introverted, 
protectionist, nationalistic, intolerant, 
xenophobic, and discriminatory;
q A ‘closed Europe’ that is backward-
looking and more inclined to oppose 
globalisation, trade and exchange, migration, 
heterogeneity, cultural diversity, and the 
principles of an open society;
250 members of the far-right 
Identitarian movement 
attend a march in Austria. 
(JOE KLAMAR / AFP)
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q A Europe that risks undermining its own 
moral values and humanitarian norms by 
repeating some of the mistakes that nation 
states have made in the past;
q A Europe in which the influence of those 
who advocate simplistic solutions to complex 
issues is spreading, with their political 
rhetoric and ideology framing or even 
dominating public discourse;
q A Europe where those who want to close 
minds and borders win.
This is currently the greatest threat facing 
us – one that is not confined to Europe, but 
that is more fundamental to the EU because 
it remains, in the minds of its citizens, a less 
resilient construct than nation states.
POLARISATION OF SOCIETIES
The dominant trend playing into the hands 
of those who advocate a different polity is 
the growing and enduring polarisation of 
our societies. The recent elections in the 
Netherlands, the Czech Republic, France, 
Austria, and Germany have shown how 
deeply divided these countries are between 
those who favour a liberal open society and 
those who seek more protectionist and 
nationalistic policy responses; between 
those who support European and global 
integration and those who wish to regain 
national sovereignty.
A divided society is the fertile ground on 
which extremists and authoritarian populists 
thrive. It is the basis upon which they can 
develop an ‘us versus them’ logic which 
undermines cohesion within and between 
societies. Polarisation and antagonism are 
not only in their interests, but are part of their 
political DNA. They start from the assumption 
that societies are ultimately separated into 
antagonistic groups. 
They are dividers who actively oppose the 
notion of a pluralist society, portraying 
themselves as the champions and defenders 
of the ‘ordinary pure people’ against the 
‘corrupt elite’. The latter, according to populists, 
represents the self-serving interests of ‘the 
establishment’ and favour ‘third’ groups 
such as immigrants over the interests of 
their ‘own people’. Populists claim that they 
alone represent the neglected but legitimate 
will of ‘the people’ against an immoral 
establishment, even if they only represent a 
minority of citizens. They define ‘the people’ 
as those who vote for them, and disregard the 
opinions and values of those who do not. They 
focus on ‘the people’s concerns’, but cannot 
and will not respect the common interests of 
wider segments of society, including the rights 
of minorities.
They want to establish ‘homogeneous’ 
societies and revert to ‘national actions’ to 
protect their ‘people’, although this makes no 
sense in a world that has long outstripped 
the confines of closed national frontiers.
To really understand the success of the 
populist phenomenon and the challenge it 
poses to liberal democracy, it is important 
to always keep in mind that populism is not 
an ideology with a clear policy programme 
1. An unbeaten phenomenon
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Figure 10
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and belief system, but rather a political 
logic – a way of thinking and conducting 
politics – characterised by the notion that 
society can be separated into antagonistic 
groups and that the ‘old establishment’ 
needs to be overthrown and replaced by the 
representatives of the ‘one virtuous people’ – 
even if the latter is pure fiction.
Unlike socialism, capitalism, fascism, or other 
major ideologies, populism does not rest on 
a clearly identifiable political programme 
and holistic vision of how the economy 
should be organised or how society should 
be ordered. Consequently, it is important to 
avoid simplifications when analysing the 
populist phenomenon and to clearly identify 
what are its underpinning factors.
THREATS TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Authoritarian populists undermine the 
pillars of our open liberal democracies: the 
rule of law, checks and balances based on 
a separation of powers, minority rights, as 
well as the protection of individual rights 
and civil liberties. They undermine free and 
fair elections, although they do not claim 
to test democracy per se. Rather they try to 
gain legitimacy by coming to power through 
elections and once in government, aim to 
mix democracy with a substantial degree of 
illiberalism. They advocate an ‘illiberal state’ 
which – according to its main champions 
such as Victor Órban or Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan – does not reject liberal democratic 
values, but does not use them to underpin 
the way the state is organised.
Like populism, illiberal democracy is not a 
recent phenomenon. It has been on the rise 
for some time, presenting an alternative to 
Western liberal pluralist democracies. It not 
only leads to an erosion of liberties, abuses 
of power and ethnic as well as national 
divisions, but also discredits the very notion 
of democracy. In the words of Fareed 
Zakaria written 20 years ago, ”the problems 
of governance in the 21st century will likely be 
problems within democracy. This makes them 
more difficult to handle, wrapped as they are in 
the mantle of legitimacy. […] Western liberal 
democracy might prove to be not the final 
destination on the democratic road, but just one 
of many possible exits.”
Right or left-wing populism becomes 
particularly dangerous for open liberal 
societies when it is combined with radical 
authoritarianism and nativism. Authoritarian 
populists aim to establish a form of 
governance based on a strong central 
power, which limits political pluralism and 
undermines the separation of powers and the 
independence of other authorities besides 
the executive. Nativists believe that one’s 
own country and people should come first, 
and that those who belong to ‘the people’ 
should be supported and not ‘outsiders’ such 
as immigrants or foreigners.
When authoritarian populists come to 
power, as they have done in Europe and 
beyond, they seek to gradually limit 
the powers of pluralist institutions and 
players such as the courts, media, rival 
political parties, and critical civil society 
organisations. They often legitimise this 
through legal acts which go through 
democratically elected parliaments. But 
once they feel strong enough to do so, 
they often ignore constitutional limits on 
their power and deprive citizens of basic 
rights and freedoms, arguing that this is 
necessary to ‘liberate’ the state from the ‘old 
establishment’ and to preserve and defend 
the collective interests of ‘the people’.
Even when in government, they continue 
to portray themselves and their supporters 
as victims, blaming their shortcomings in 
power on domestic and/or foreign elites 
who are allegedly undermining their efforts. 
This also makes it very difficult to influence 
developments from outside, as authoritarian 
illiberal populists will always argue that 
their critics are ‘foreign powers’ intent on 
undermining their country’s sovereignty and 
keeping the ‘old establishment’ in power. 
The NPE experience has shown how difficult 
it is to engage in a debate with them as they 
have on most occasions been unwilling to 
participate in public and/or off-the-record 
discussions. Once populists leave office, they 
once again try to portray themselves as an 
‘anti-establishment’ force, often invoking 
conspiracy theories and claiming that 
corrupt political and economic elites are 
acting behind the scenes to undermine 
systemic change reflecting the will of ‘the 
people’.
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2.  The nature of the beast
Underlying reasons for authoritarian populism
The populist surge did not come out of the 
blue and it would be a mistake to blame the 
populists for everything that has happened, 
as this would divert attention away from the 
underlying reasons for the phenomenon. 
Their success is the result of political, 
socio-economic, and societal challenges 
which question the prevailing order. They 
succeed when citizens feel the existing 
situation is at odds with their hopes, fears 
and concerns.
Their victory signals the defeat of 
established forces whose credibility has 
been eroded. They successfully exploit 
deficiencies in the system to strengthen 
their influence and power, even if some of 
their supporters’ concerns are not (fully) 
justified by the actual situation at the 
national, European or international level.
Put simply, authoritarian populism is a 
dangerous phenomenon but it is not 
the source of the problems facing liberal 
democracies in Europe and beyond. It is 
rather profound unresolved problems that 
enable populist parties and movements 
to flourish. But what are pre-conditions for 
authoritarian populism to succeed?
Four points seem particularly significant:
q First, authoritarian populists are 
successful when they can tap into people’s 
genuine grievances, dissatisfaction with 
the existing state of affairs and/or fears 
that things might get worse. Uncertainties 
and fears about the future play into the 
hands of authoritarian populists, who 
give voice to these concerns, frame them 
in an antagonistic fashion and promise a 
fundamental upheaval of the current order. 
From this perspective, they often become 
catalysts for political change as they 
heighten the pressure on the ‘establishment’ 
to take citizens’ concerns more seriously and 
deliver on their promises. Populists make 
demands, however, that neither they nor 
mainstream politicians can heed. They do so 
deliberately because they do not really want 
‘the establishment’ to succeed, thus allowing 
them to continue claiming that mainstream 
parties are not ready to do what it takes to 
tackle ‘the people’s concerns’.
q Second, authoritarian populists’ 
successes signal that citizens are deeply 
dissatisfied with those who have been in 
power, and feel that the political class has 
not delivered on its promises, that their 
concerns have been neglected because 
‘the establishment’ (including politicians 
and media) is corrupted by elite interests. 
Populists promise to (re-)gain control in 
the interests of all those who feel that their 
concerns have been ignored by the ‘ruling 
class’. They use their constant plea to ‘re-
establish’ national sovereignty as a central 
argument to rally support for their cause. In 
times of profound uncertainty, their promises 
to fight a ‘corrupt system’ and do whatever 
it takes to regain control, even if this means 
ruling their country with a ‘tough hand’, 
become attractive to many voters.
q Third, their success exposes 
dissatisfaction with the existing state 
of representative democracy. The sharp 
decline in trust in national institutions 
(governments, parliaments and the media) 
in recent decades plays into their hands. 
Dissatisfaction with representative 
democracy, as NPE debates have shown, is 
a sentiment felt all over Europe. It is fuelled 
by the circumstance that it has become very 
difficult to distinguish between mainstream 
parties, who offer very similar programmes. 
Voters thus feel that they are being offered 
no alternative.
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Authoritarian populists exploit this by 
arguing that they do have alternative 
solutions, even if they are rarely able to offer 
viable policy prescriptions to solve complex 
issues.
q Fourth, all this is intensified by a 
technological revolution which has 
fundamentally altered the way in which 
the public receives information in today’s 
new (social) media world. Many people 
are no longer exposed to opposing views 
and conflicting interpretations of facts. 
The dissatisfaction of citizens is reinforced 
in closed echo-chambers, where they 
receive one-sided information and only 
communicate with like-minded people.
Populists on all sides of the political 
spectrum have mastered and exploited 
modern communication channels (such 
as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter etc.) while 
mainstream political forces as well as 
traditional electronic and print media are 
increasingly failing to reach some parts of 
society. This marks the end of a balanced 
public discourse as we have known it, with 
more people now living in closed parallel 
worlds where they are not confronted with 
other opinions.
To counter authoritarian populism and the 
risk of illiberal democracy, mainstream parties 
must take the concerns of those who support 
populist parties and movements seriously. 
The phenomenon can only be effectively 
countered if the underlying reasons for its 
appeal and the consequences of illiberal 
populism are adequately understood; i.e. 
if we know what is enabling authoritarian 
populists to exploit the ‘us versus them’ logic 
in more polarised societies.
A man attends an anti-austerity demonstration in Ireland, March 2014. (TATYANA TURCHINA / FLICKR)
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3.  The ‘winners and losers’ of change
The main dividing line in today’s world 
is between the (potential) ‘winners and 
losers’ of change in an age of massive 
transformation in all spheres of economic, 
social, and political life. A division that is 
witnessed in all countries covered by the NPE 
project, even in those that have coped with 
the effects of recent crises.
In one group are those who feel that they 
are (or may become) victims of change and 
unable to influence the course of events. 
They are concerned that they might be left 
behind – even if they are not among the 
actual losers affected by transformative 
developments. By appealing to the first 
group, authoritarian populists gain much 
greater resonance across populations.
On the other side are those who are (more) 
confident that change is an opportunity 
from which they have and will continue to 
profit, given that they feel better equipped 
to cope with the negative aspects of change 
and are not doomed to simply accept its 
consequences.
Some refer to the first group as the ‘losers’ 
of globalisation. But ‘globalisation’ is too 
general a term, and in the minds of most 
people focuses primarily on the socio-
economic aspects and consequences of 
change. Economic anxieties have been (and 
will remain) significant.
Non-economic factors, however, play an 
equally significant role in sharpening the 
divisions in our societies. This explains why 
authoritarian populism appeals to many 
affluent and relatively well-off voters who 
are concerned about societal and cultural 
changes. There is thus a need to further 
deconstruct the nature and nuances of the 
phenomenon to better understand and 
address it.
The growing polarisation of our societies is 
fuelled by numerous insecurities, with many 
people feeling overwhelmed by the pace of 
change, making them profoundly anxious 
about their future.
This fear of change is a phenomenon that 
surfaced well before the crisis erupted, but 
the direct and indirect consequences of 
Europe’s poly-crisis have acted as a catalyst, 
further heightening feelings of insecurity in 
many parts of society and playing into the 
hands of populist dividers who want to push 
our societies in opposite directions.
So, what are the major insecurities fuelling 
people’s discontent and the polarisation of 
our societies?
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC INSECURITIES AND RISING INEQUALITIES
Many people fear that they will – or may – be 
negatively affected by changing economic 
realities. Although European societies are 
prosperous by global standards and enjoy 
the highest levels of social protection in the 
world, many citizens worry that they will be 
worse off than their parents and that their 
children may struggle even more.
These insecurities are fuelled by a widening 
wealth gap between the ‘haves’ and 
‘have lesses’; by job losses and unstable 
careers; by flat or falling income levels; 
by social exclusion and significant risks of 
poverty; by unfair tax practices benefitting 
large corporations; by pressures on social 
protection systems; by unfair trade practices 
affecting European industries; by intensifying 
competition not only in low-skill and low 
value-added industries but also in economic 
sectors which were until recently shielded 
from global competition; and by a general 
fear of being left behind in an increasingly 
competitive, unfair, and neo-liberal economic 
environment in which Europe’s share of 
global trade, GDP and population is shrinking 
dramatically (see figure 11). 
Many people no longer believe that change 
inevitably brings socio-economic benefits 
and, even if it does, more protection and 
stability are – from their perspective – 
preferable to greater economic gains. They 
question whether economic opportunities 
will be equally shared or only benefit some 
privileged ranks of society.
20% 14% 
14% 
495 
505 
515 
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
EU28 
8% 
20% 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
THE EU IN GLOBAL TRADE - EXPORTS
 SHARE IN % OF TOTAL EXPORTS
8% 
20% 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
EU28 
USA 
China 
THE EU IN GLOBAL TRADE - IMPORTS
 SHARE IN % OF TOTAL IMPORTS
5% 
30% 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
EU28 
China 
USA 
THE EU IN GLOBAL GDP
 SHARE IN % OF TOTAL
THE EU POPULATION TREND UNTIL 2050
NUMBER OF INHABITANTS IN MILLIONS
EU28 
USA 
China 
Source: For global trade gures – Eurostat, Share of EU in World trade for GDP gures – United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates Database for population gures – United Nations Population 
Division, Probabilistic Population Projections based on World Population Prospects
Figure 11
Many people no 
longer believe 
that change 
inevitably brings 
socio-economic 
benefits and, 
even if it does, 
more protection 
and stability 
are – from their 
perspective – 
preferable to 
greater economic 
gains.
36         New Pact for Europe Third Report – November 2017
CULTURAL AND SOCIETAL INSECURITIES
A growing number of people fear that 
traditional values, norms, and beliefs are 
being eroded, prompting concerns about 
identity among people who do not necessarily 
feel the negative economic consequences 
of globalisation. Cultural and societal matters 
such as multicultural tolerance, women’s 
rights, same-sex marriage or gay rights have 
gained prominence, and are thus also more 
important as a potential source of division 
in our societies. There is a deepening divide 
between what one could call status quo-
minded ‘conservative traditionalists’ and 
progressive ‘cosmopolitan globalists’, which 
is playing into the hands of authoritarian 
populists. The NPE debates revealed that this 
divide was evident in many member states.
Conservative traditionalists are concerned 
about rapid change as they feel exposed 
by the erosion of social, ethical, ethnical, 
and cultural norms, such as traditional 
family configurations or religious values. 
They cherish local and family ties and see 
patriotism as a virtue, believing their country 
and culture are special and worth defending. 
They are critical of progressive cosmopolitan 
elites, who they feel are undermining 
traditional values, norms, and customs. 
This opposition weakens a shared sense of 
identity in a progressively unstable moral 
environment. Conservative traditionalists 
often fear those who they perceive to have 
values different from their own, seeing this 
as a fundamental threat to something 
they hold dear and wish to defend. They 
are particularly concerned about the 
‘overwhelming’ volume of immigrants 
from a different cultural and religious 
background entering Europe, viewing high 
levels of Muslim immigration as a threat to 
the integrity and moral order of ‘Western’ 
societies (see figure 12). As a result, migration 
issues impacted the Brexit referendum and 
were central themes in the Austrian, Dutch, 
French and German elections in 2017.
Conversely, cosmopolitan globalists cherish 
the benefits of open societies, global 
mobility, and multicultural diversity and 
exchange. They have moved away from 
traditional values (family ties, local bonds, 
religious beliefs) towards more ‘secular 
values’. They are much more tolerant, open 
to change and progress, supportive of 
immigration as well as global and regional 
cooperation, and despise nationalism as 
an anachronism. They tend to believe that 
transnational entities such as the EU are 
morally superior to nation states marked by 
their introverted narrow national interests. 
They consider the latter as outdated 
relics that have become irrelevant in an 
increasingly interdependent regional and 
global environment. They embrace diversity 
and feel as ‘citizens of the world’ who have 
more in common with other cosmopolitan 
globalists across national frontiers than with 
‘parochialists’ in their own country. They tend 
to be concentrated in big cities, national 
capitals, university towns, and commercial 
hubs. In fact, many of them move to urban 
areas, while those with traditional values 
settle in suburbs and rural areas, which 
magnifies the cultural and political rift 
within societies. During the refugee crisis, 
cosmopolitan globalists were highlighting 
the need to show solidarity, arguing that 
Europe had a moral obligation to open its 
borders and help all of those in need.
Source: eupinions, a Bertelsmann Stiftung project. For more data see www.eupinions.eu
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GENERATIONAL INSECURITIES
With a widening gap between generations 
in terms of wealth and prospects, many 
young Europeans feel doomed to be part of 
a ‘lost generation’. They have little hope for 
their future based on the disproportionally 
high levels of enduring unemployment 
among young people. This phenomenon was 
discussed at length by the Greek, Italian and 
Portuguese National Reflection Groups.
Many young Europeans get off to a slow start 
in a closed job market and face the risk of a 
lifetime of lower earnings. Declining wages 
and/or precarious employment feed into 
rising levels of poverty and social exclusion. 
As a result, young people have left (or plan 
to leave) their home country, resulting in 
‘brain drain’ and creating more frustration 
among those who feel they have little option 
but to move (see especially the Greek and 
Portuguese NPE reports).
Younger generations throughout the EU 
often also fear that their societies will not be 
able to deal with demographic change and 
that their future will be negatively impacted 
by a shrinking workforce of younger people 
having to finance the pensions of a growing 
elderly population (see figure 13).
Concern about the declining living 
standards that young people will face is also 
a matter of concern for older generations. 
A shrinking workforce will also jeopardise 
countries’ ability to maintain the same level 
of economic growth and social protection, 
with disproportionate effects on younger 
generations. At the same time, one can 
witness that more and more older people 
are living in poverty, with elderly women 
particularly affected.
Source: You Gov Study for TUI Foundation p. 80, PEW Research Centre, Spring 2017 Global Attidues Survey, Q8
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TECHNOLOGICAL INSECURITIES
Large segments of our societies feel left 
behind by technological developments and 
disruptions that affect every aspect of their 
lives. In an era of rapid change, many see 
technological innovations – that they cannot 
fully comprehend – as a risk, rather than an 
opportunity from which they can profit in 
their personal and professional lives. This is a 
phenomenon that can be experienced in all 
countries covered by the NPE project. Indeed, 
new forms of human interaction have been 
established and entire sectors are being 
reshaped in an increasingly knowledge- and 
information-based economy.
Working life is being radically transformed 
and workers must cope with a much faster 
pace of innovation. It is very difficult to 
predict the full impact of automation and 
artificial intelligence on our economies 
and the speed at which progress will occur. 
But what is certain is that people will have to 
change and constantly adapt their skills to 
technological innovations and to the future 
Many young 
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off to a slow 
start in a closed 
job market and 
face the risk of a 
lifetime of lower 
earnings.
A shrinking 
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of work, which will focus more and more on 
output rather than on physical presence in a 
specific workspace. Workers will need to be 
more flexible: they will no longer have a job 
for life, but rather up to ten or more jobs in a 
career.
Skills are also becoming paramount, with 
the demand for skilled labour rising while 
the number of low-skilled jobs is decreasing. 
This results in rising wage inequalities and 
makes it harder for low-skilled workers in 
low-quality, poorly-paid jobs to advance. All 
of this is happening at a time when many 
people feel that public authorities and 
institutions are incapable of mastering the 
downsides of technological development, 
especially in highly sensitive fields such 
as biogenetics, cyber security and data 
protection. Thus, technological change is 
fuelling insecurities, prompting many to fear 
that they will be left behind (see figure 14).
Source: Special Eurobarometer 460 - Attitudes towards the impact of digitisation and automation on everyday life, 10 May 2017, Question "Do you agree with the following statement? 
Due to the use of robots and articial intelligence, more jobs will disappear than new jobs will be created"
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Source: Eurobarometer, question “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?”
Terrorism 
Immigration
Economic Situation 
Public debt
Unemployment 
0% 
30% 
60% 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING THE EU Figure 15
3.  The ‘winners and losers’ of change
‘Zukunftsangst’ 
and the ‘politics 
of fear’ are 
the result of 
these multiple 
insecurities.
New Pact for Europe         39Third Report – November 2017
SECURITY INSECURITIES
For the past 25 years, terrorism, organised 
crime, regional instabilities, and geopolitical 
confrontations have given rise to a spiralling 
number of domestic and international threats. 
Recent history has demonstrated that security 
– internal and external – is a precious and 
vulnerable public good that cannot be taken 
for granted. As a result, our societies have been 
adapting the way they live, work, travel and 
enjoy entertainment to cope with these new 
insecurities. While economic concerns were 
Europeans’ biggest worry a few years ago, 
the perception of insecurity and high-profile 
terrorist attacks in recent years have become 
the most pressing preoccupations for 
Europeans today (see figure 15). Authoritarian 
populists try to exploit these fears by indicating 
to potential voters that their country can shield 
itself from the problems ‘out there’. They often 
employ an isolationist rhetoric suggesting that 
each country should tackle its own problems 
alone and let others deal with their own issues 
without outside interference.
A visitor shakes 
hands with AILA, or 
Artificial Intelligence 
Lightweight Android, 
during a demonstration 
at the German Research 
Center for Artificial 
Intelligence GmbH. 
(CARSTEN KOALL / AFP)
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ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT RESENTMENTS
The (potential) ‘losers’ of change are a very 
heterogeneous group – as diverse as the 
insecurities fuelling polarisation. There is not 
one clearly identifiable set of people with a 
specific social, educational, ethnic, or cultural 
background who make up the authoritarian 
populists’  ‘constituency’.
There is one thing, however, that unites 
them: anti-establishment sentiments. 
They feel that traditional political elites are 
overwhelmed by today’s problems; that they 
do not care about the concerns and anxieties 
of ‘ordinary people’ who are suffering from 
the various insecurities they are experiencing. 
In their eyes, the elite cannot be trusted 
as it is ready to betray or leave the people 
behind. Many are angry, searching for an 
outlet to express that anger. In that context, 
they fall for simplistic and often counter-
factual arguments, which are in many cases 
linked to nostalgic perceptions of the past.
‘Zukunftsangst’ (fear of the future) and 
the ‘politics of fear’ are the result of these 
multiple insecurities, which fuel polarisation 
in societies and thus play into the hands of 
authoritarian populists and extremists. 
A growing number of citizens and parts 
of the elite no longer see the benefits 
of cooperation, but are rather increasingly 
inclined to either withdraw from traditional 
political processes or ‘stand up’ and oppose 
the establishment – a development that can 
be witnessed in one way or another in all NPE 
countries. Individualism, tribalism, mutual 
distrust, and all sorts of ‘anti’ movements – 
anti-globalisation, anti-migration, anti-Islam, 
anti-establishment, anti-EU/euro etc. – thrive 
and prosper in these conditions. 
Growing polarisation undermines political 
cohesion within national societies and 
between EU countries. Ultimately, it results 
in a spirit of ‘anti-cooperation’ that hampers 
our ability to forge compromises and reach 
a consensus at all levels of political life. It 
thus becomes increasingly difficult to arrive 
at balanced win-win outcomes while an 
inability or unwillingness to cooperate leads 
to sub-optimal consequences.
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4.  EUrope’s vulnerabilities
In this climate, traditional political forces 
on both the left and right are gradually 
squeezed. The mainstream struggles to 
present a credible counter-narrative.
Many parties feel that to avoid losing even 
more support among voters, they must 
change their leaders and/or adapt their 
political rhetoric and policy choices to take 
better account of the sentiments of those 
who are attracted by the simplistic rhetoric 
of populist forces. They want to show that 
they are listening to citizens’ concerns, 
hoping that voters will not abandon them 
or will return to them once the situation 
improves (i.e. the economy recovers or the 
number of refugees falls). But in many cases, 
those who turned to anti-establishment 
populist parties do not come back, but 
rather attribute any improvements in the 
situation to those political forces who 
were ‘courageous’ enough to stand up to 
traditional elites.
Some mainstream parties go one step 
further: instead of confronting the flawed 
and divisive arguments and simplistic 
rhetoric of authoritarian populists, they 
adopt them, even though experience has 
repeatedly shown that voters attracted to 
populist parties tend to prefer the original to 
imitators. Thus, the political establishment is 
itself hollowing out some of the core values 
underpinning our liberal democratic system 
and indirectly legitimising the illiberal agenda 
of authoritarian populists.
While the mainstream struggles with this 
dilemma, the real damage is being done: 
simplistic rhetoric and radical thinking are 
infiltrating, guiding or even dominating the 
political discourse and many arguments 
previously considered unthinkable and 
unsayable are becoming socially and politically 
acceptable, and proliferate on traditional 
and new social media. The result, which can 
be witnessed in most countries covered 
by the NPE project, is a brutalisation of the 
debate that further deepens divisions within 
societies, playing once again into the hands of 
those who seek to undermine cooperation.
In some cases, authoritarian populists who 
began their careers on the political fringes 
are not only framing the debate, but have 
managed or are on the verge of becoming 
the ‘new mainstream’, replacing traditional 
parties without abandoning their original 
beliefs or early supporters. By moving into 
the mainstream, populists expand their 
political reach and move closer to the centre 
of power, thereby creating even more 
headaches for established parties.
None of this is just a European phenomenon. 
A glance across the Atlantic shows other 
established Western democracies facing 
similar threats. But Europe is much more 
vulnerable to this than other political entities: 
the EU has become a popular ‘punching 
bag’, an easy target, even though it is not 
really the central concern of many of its 
attackers. For them, stopping or blocking 
the European construction represents an 
easy quick win. Authoritarian populist forces 
throughout the EU use their opposition to 
the European Union as a vehicle for their 
ultimate objectives. What they care about is 
not (predominantly) the state of the Union 
or the prospects for European integration 
but rather their position at home, and they 
use fierce criticism of the EU to strengthen 
their political influence and power at national 
level.
This also explains why authoritarian populist 
parties at times adapt their European stance 
according to the ‘mood of the day’. It thus 
comes as no surprise that some Eurosceptic 
and populist parties have become less 
radical about their country’s future in the 
EU or in the Eurozone given the (somewhat) 
improved public perception about Europe, 
which can be witnessed since the end of 
2016.
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There are several reasons why the EU 
has been easy prey:
q The EU as an ‘agent of unfettered 
globalisation’. In the eyes of many 
Europeans, the European Union 
is associated with many negative 
developments related to globalisation 
that overshadow the positive 
effects of more integrated markets 
and international free trade. This 
phenomenon can be witnessed in 
almost all NPE countries, as the EU 
is often equated with a social and 
environmental ‘race to the bottom’, 
where the interests of financial markets 
dominate and global companies have 
the capacity to exploit the system in 
their favour. In the words of the Finnish 
NPE report, “the EU’s success in managing 
the effects of globalisation is directly 
linked to its legitimacy.“ Criticism towards 
the EU also relates to the circumstance 
that the Union lacks a strong ‘caring 
dimension’ given that social policies 
are by and large determined in the 
member states. Because of all this, the 
EU appears to be ‘part of the problem’ 
and not ‘part of the solution’, poisoning 
national debates and public attitudes 
towards the Union.
q The EU as a powerless and 
‘inconsequential’ construction.  
The European Union is accused of 
being unable to ‘deliver’ because it 
lacks the powers and means required 
to perform the tasks it is called upon 
to fulfil. Given the current balance of 
competences and limited resources 
available at European level, the Union is 
not adequately equipped to provide 
(more) effective responses to many 
of the insecurities mentioned above. 
In many ways, the criticism of today’s 
EU is the result of an inconsequential 
construction of Europe, which has led 
to serious structural flaws in Europe’s 
institutional and legal architecture that 
undermine the Union’s credibility. The 
member states have not equipped the 
EU with the instruments and powers 
it would need to effectively counter 
the major crises and challenges it 
has and will face in future. Its ability 
to deliver is further undermined by 
a widening ‘implementation deficit’, 
with member states failing to enact 
decisions taken collectively at EU level. 
The impression that the EU is constantly 
underperforming is further fuelled 
by national politicians’ tendency to 
blame it for some of their own failings 
and a reluctance to give it credit for its 
successes (‘scapegoating’).
q The EU as an undemocratic, distant 
and ‘elitist project’. To many citizens, the 
European Union appears as something 
the ‘old establishment’ created and 
which acts predominantly in the 
interests of political and economic 
elites, not ‘ordinary people’. While 
increasingly aware of the EU’s growing 
impact on their lives, citizens feel that 
they have little or no influence over 
the formulation of policies because of 
the EU’s complex, inefficient and often 
incomprehensible decision-making 
system. This leads to a profound crisis 
of legitimacy and democratic authority, 
especially given the circumstance 
that many people still underestimate 
the prerogatives of the European 
Parliament. Citizens see themselves 
as the objects, not the subjects, of 
European policymaking and voice their 
discontent by voting for anti-EU forces 
in European elections. With respect 
to the countries covered by the NPE 
project, this phenomenon is particularly 
present in Greece and Portugal 
that have been subject to ‘rescue 
programmes’, which have determined 
crucial policy reforms while lacking 
(sufficient) democratic scrutiny at the 
European level.
q The EU as a common player losing 
its moral high ground. The European 
Union is not (any longer) perceived 
as ‘special’, transcending the flaws 
and mistakes of nation states, i.e. as 
a supranational entity governed by 
higher values and objectives which 
are not predominantly guided by 
narrow national interests and concerns, 
but rather by common European 
interests reflecting shared values. 
This notion of the EU as being unlike 
nation states came under heightened 
pressure in the context of the refugee 
crisis and especially in relation to 
the EU-Turkey agreement, with a 
widespread public perception that the 
Union concluded a deal very much 
grounded in Realpolitik, undermining 
some of its core principles and human 
rights values.
HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE EU?
Source: Chatham House, “The Future of Europe: Comparing Public and Elite Attitudes”, 20 June 2017
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Based on the analysis of the current state 
of the Union and the identification of the 
biggest challenge facing the EU and its 
members, drawn from the debates organised 
under the auspices of the NPE project, there 
are three top priorities on Europe’s to-do list:
q Repairing the collateral damage caused 
by the poly-crisis to restore and consolidate 
trust among member states and regain 
support from citizens and elites by creating 
a win-win situation reflecting the distinctive 
interests, considerations and concerns of 
governments and citizens;
q Bolstering the EU’s defences by 
overcoming stalemates in crucial areas and 
making progress on ‘unfinished business’ 
to ensure the Union is better equipped to 
withstand future storms;
q Countering the polarisation of our 
societies and addressing the multiple 
insecurities felt by citizens at all levels 
(European, national, regional and local) to 
head off the danger of a more regressive, 
nationalistic, closed, illiberal and authoritarian 
Europe.
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
To achieve all this, the EU and its institutions 
should exploit the current political window 
of opportunity, which is neither very wide 
nor expected to remain open for very long. 
It is likely to close by the end of 2018, when 
the EU institutions’ current mandate enters 
its final stage, attention turns towards the 
2019 European Parliament elections and the 
complex and politically sensitive discussions 
on the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) move into a decisive phase. Given these 
time pressures, the next few months will be 
decisive.
The European Union needs a new sense 
of direction, even if the recommendations 
included in this report cannot be taken 
up immediately. Member states need to 
create positive momentum as the basis for a 
‘positive self-fulfilling prophecy’; to exploit 
and prolong the current, more optimistic 
spirit. If they are ready, willing, able and 
politically courageous enough to seize the 
moment, there is potential for a sustainable 
‘EU renaissance’.
A WIN-WIN PACKAGE DEAL
The EU27 could use this momentum to 
demonstrate to European citizens that the 
Union is responsive to their needs, desires 
and concerns. They could also help to  
re-energise the European project by 
showing that the Union can protect its 
members and citizens from future storms in an 
uncertain environment. Most importantly, they 
could show that a nationalistic, xenophobic 
and closed Europe is not an adequate 
response to the challenges of an increasingly 
complex and interdependent European and 
global environment.
Without the will to put aside taboos and red 
lines, nothing substantial will be achieved 
and the EU’s defences may not be strong 
enough to withstand future crises, much to 
the delight of Eurosceptic forces, who would 
then probably attract even more electoral 
support. So, what should be done?
This report suggests that two things are 
paramount. First, the EU and its members 
should agree on an ambitious but realistic 
win-win package deal involving action 
in three crucial areas: economic and social 
affairs, migration and security. Second, there 
is a need to fight the danger of a more 
regressive, nationalistic, closed, illiberal 
and authoritarian Europe by addressing 
the fundamental factors fuelling the threat of 
authoritarian populism at European, national, 
regional and local level.
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A Win-Win
Package Deal
for the EU27
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There is no need for yet another ‘more or less’ Europe debate. Such discussions only lead to 
stalemate. Further teleological debates about the EU’s ultimate destination (finalité) will also 
lead it nowhere, given the many diverse opinions on Europe’s long-term future. What is needed 
is a more concrete debate focused on specifics and subsequent agreement on what should be 
done in the short to medium term.
FOUR PRINCIPLES
Reflecting the national and transnational 
discussions held in the framework of the 
NPE project, this report argues that the 
elaboration of an EU27 package deal must be 
guided by some major principles:
q Standstill (let alone regression) is not 
an option. Without progress in key areas, 
the EU27 will not be able to sustainably 
overcome the poly-crisis, prepare the Union 
for future crises, and enable it to meet current 
and future challenges in an increasingly 
interdependent European and global 
environment;
q Focus on delivery. Citizens want the 
EU to concentrate on tangible outcomes 
and not focus on yet another institutional 
debate, although some of the identified 
reforms might require limited institutional 
adaptations;
q Beware of the existing ‘dogma of realism’.  
Member states and citizens want the EU 
to deliver, but are not ready for a major 
(institutional) overhaul. The EU27 must be 
ambitiously realistic or realistically ambitious. 
It should not aim for a major treaty change 
or a constitutional convention, at least not 
now. The clear majority of national political 
elites and citizens cherish the benefits of EU 
membership, but are reluctant to pool core 
features of national sovereignty at European 
level. In other words, this exercise is not about 
achieving a final decisive breakthrough, but 
rather about aiming for the ‘highest possible 
common denominator’ while considering the 
realities of the current situation;
q Avoid symbolism and lip service.  
The envisaged bargain should not duck 
tough issues. Genuine compromise, with 
give-and-take on all sides, is needed to 
move things forward. Symbolic reforms and 
innovations, like some of those we have seen 
in the past, could backfire if expectations are 
created which the EU and its members are 
unable or unwilling to fulfil.
RE-ENERGISING EUROPE
While acknowledging that the EU will 
have to constantly reform itself in light of 
developments inside and outside Europe, the 
deal envisaged in this report concentrates on 
the immediate future. The EU and its members 
should agree on more immediate reforms and 
innovations now and begin implementing 
them, instead of postponing action to some 
indeterminate point in the future.
A win-win package deal will not only help the 
EU to deliver, but will also help to restore trust 
and public support, which is a prerequisite for 
more fundamental reform efforts in the future, 
when more substantial institutional innovations 
and EU treaty change will be needed that will 
have to be ratified by all member states, in 
some cases through referenda.
Explicitly setting out the overall logic, 
direction and potential ingredients of a 
win-win package across various dimensions 
might also help to promote national and 
transnational political debates on the 
future of Europe, which is a central aspiration 
of the NPE project. Such debates are vital, 
given that a comprehensive agreement on 
moves towards deeper cooperation and 
integration will involve tough political 
choices, which can no longer be made 
exclusively behind closed doors. A debate 
and the greater understanding among 
member states that this deal could foster 
might also help to steer the upcoming 
discussions on the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) by identifying priorities and 
overcoming major differences.
A win-win package 
deal will not only 
help the EU to 
deliver, but will 
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and public 
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The bargain 
outlined in this 
report does not 
seek to reinvent 
the wheel.
Enlarging the 
reform agenda 
beyond just one 
specific field 
can also help to 
identify wider 
compromises 
by overcoming 
stalemates and 
red lines in other 
policy areas 
which have 
previously proven 
unsurmountable.
PRAGMATIC AND AMBITIOUS
The package deal described in this report 
does not pretend to be a ‘grand bargain’ 
aspiring to solve all problems in one go 
with one giant ‘qualitative leap’ forward. 
It is less ‘grand’ in its objective. It rather 
aspires to be a pragmatic but ambitious deal 
aimed at achieving progress in the current 
circumstances by overcoming stalemates and 
taking a step in the right direction.
The bargain outlined in this report does not 
seek to reinvent the wheel. In most cases, it 
includes proposals that have already been 
floated or tabled. What is most innovative 
is that it aims to elaborate a complex win-
win bargain across various dimensions 
reflecting diverging positions among and 
inside member states, in an attempt to 
unlock progress going far beyond the lowest 
common denominator. 
THREE DIMENSIONS FOR ONE DEAL
To make the EU ‘storm-proof’, to restore 
and consolidate trust among the member 
states and between national capitals and EU 
institutions, and to regain the confidence of 
citizens, the EU27 should agree on a concrete 
win-win package deal that reflects the 
distinctive interests and considerations of all 
member states and their citizens.
Given the concerns of less influential EU 
countries about the dominance of a few 
big players, the proposed bargain takes 
everyone’s preoccupations into account and 
is not limited to the concerns of the strongest 
countries or constrained by what the most 
influential member states are ready to agree 
on. Consensus among the EU27 will have 
to balance the distinctive concerns and 
aspirations of member states and citizens in 
selective areas. Some are more anxious about 
the economy and social issues, while others 
put more emphasis on issues related to 
migration or internal and external security.
It is therefore important to include all three 
dimensions in a win-win package deal, 
involving intra- and cross-dimensional 
compromises that can help to overcome 
some of the major divisions between 
different camps both within and among 
member states. Enlarging the reform 
agenda beyond just one specific field can 
also help to identify wider compromises 
by overcoming stalemates and red lines in 
other policy areas which have previously 
proven unsurmountable. One example is 
future EMU reform, where member states 
have not been ready to take up some of 
the proposals in the Four Presidents or Five 
Presidents reports. Attempting to forge a 
compromise among the EU27 in other areas 
of concern could help to push negotiations 
on those ideas forward.
The subsequent sections of this report 
lays out the rationale, basic objectives and 
concrete elements to be included in a 
bargain on each of the three dimensions. It 
builds on the discussions conducted in the 
framework of the NPE project since 2013. 
Obviously, the outcome of negotiations 
among the EU27 would lead to a distinct 
compromise. Hence, the components of 
a potential bargain outlined in the next 
sections are not exhaustive, but rather 
indicate the direction of reforms and 
innovations necessary to bridge the gaps 
between and within the EU27. The overall 
aim is thus to show that it is possible to 
construct a win-win package deal.
Room hosting the meetings of the European Council, in the Europa Building, Brussels, 
inaugurated in December 2016. (EUROPEAN UNION) 
UNITY BETWEEN 
EURO & NON-EURO AREA
A WIN-WIN PACKAGE DEAL / THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSION
The bargain needs to strike a fair balance between the ‘responsibility and competitiveness’ camp 
and the ‘solidarity and caring’ camp while preserving the principle of unity among the EU27 
and the members of the euro area.
Avoid any kind of discrimination based 
on the euro
Open the new forms of cooperation among 
euro-area members to non-euro countries
Inform countries outside the euro area 
about major euro-area developments
Do not undermine the role of existing 
supranational institutions by creating 
parallel structures
Do not create barriers to future 
membership of the euro area
MORE SOLIDARITY 
BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
Complete the Banking Union through 
the gradual introduction of a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme
Reduce the burden of non-performing 
loans on banks
Establish a crisis shock-absorption mechanism 
through complementary European Unemployment 
Reinsurance Scheme and/or 'rainy day' fund
Enable the European Stability Mechanism 
to function as a credible backstop 
to the Single Resolution Fund
Exclude some public investment from 
a country's deficit calculation
Support citizens disproportionately 
affected by major structural reforms
Intensify the fight against tax evasion 
and avoidance
Introduce concrete measures to implement 
the European Pillar of Social Rights
Safeguard the level playing-field 
within the Single Market
Stimulate investment and demand 
in EU countries with excessive surpluses
 FEWER RISKS AND 
MORE DISCIPLINE 
ACROSS THE UNION
Scale up technical assistance programmes
Speed up work on more comprehensive 
free trade agreements
Enforce the no-bailout rule through the introduction 
of a credible debt restructuring mechanism
Enforce the Fiscal Compact and the Stability 
and Growth Pact rules and obligations
Establish contractual Reform 
and Investment Agreements
Reinforce the links between national 
reforms and EU funding
Complete the Single Market to enhance 
Europe's global competitiveness
Speed up the Capital Markets Union
Reduce regulatory uncertainties and hurdles 
undermining cross-border investment
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1.  The economic and social dimension 
Balancing responsibility & competitiveness 
and solidarity & caring
The national and transnational discussions in the context of the NPE project have made it clear 
that further action is needed in the economic and social dimension. The European Union and 
its members have made some progress in recent years and the socio-economic situation has 
improved, but more needs to be done to equip it to withstand future storms.
RATIONALE
To overcome stalemates in key areas, a 
package deal including tangible measures 
and innovations that respect the limits 
of the EU Treaties will have to reflect the 
interests and concerns of those who put 
stronger emphasis on ‘responsibility and 
competitiveness’ and those who attach 
more importance to ‘solidarity and caring’ 
aspects – while preserving the principle of 
unity among the EU27 and members of the 
euro area, even though differentiation will 
remain an indispensable feature of European 
integration.
q Those who emphasise responsibility 
and competitiveness want a stricter 
implementation of rules, re-affirmation of 
the ‘no bail-out’ principle, a reduction of 
risks, more market discipline, and heightened 
pressure on EU countries to implement 
long-overdue structural reforms (‘do their 
homework’). This, they argue, would not 
only improve the economic competitiveness 
of individual countries, but would also 
strengthen the Union’s overall position in an 
increasingly competitive global economic 
environment.
q Those who stress the importance of 
solidarity and caring aspects (‘we are all in 
this together’) want more flexible and smarter 
rules, common risk-sharing instruments, more 
EU support, more incentives for national 
reform efforts and more fiscal room for 
public investment to reduce macroeconomic 
imbalances. They also seek to bolster the 
Union’s caring dimension by reinforcing its 
ability to establish minimum social standards, 
even though social policies are ultimately 
determined at national level.
q The NPE discussions have also revealed 
mounting concerns in countries that 
have not (yet) adopted the euro of being 
discriminated and disadvantaged by 
additional EMU reforms and pushed further 
into the EU’s political periphery – a prospect 
most people in these countries want to avoid.
The package deal 
is designed to 
secure the stability 
of the euro, spur 
sustainable 
growth and 
reboot the process 
of economic 
convergence, 
while 
strengthening the 
Union’s ‘protective 
arm’ and 
preserving unity 
among the EU27 
and the members 
of the euro area.
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OBJECTIVES
The different camps have set multiple red 
lines when it comes to prospective reforms. 
Recent experience has shown how difficult 
it is to bridge these differences, especially 
in relation to EMU. A win-win package deal 
among the EU27 would thus consider three 
equally significant objectives:
q Securing the stability of the euro. Much 
has been achieved in recent years, but more 
needs to be done. The ECB cannot play the 
role of ‘saviour of last resort’ indefinitely and 
the disagreements which have prevented 
any further deepening of EMU must be 
overcome to further strengthen the euro’s 
defences. The EU needs to prepare for the 
moment when the ECB significantly reduces 
and eventually terminates its quantitative 
easing programme. The final stage of EMU 
cannot be reached in one giant step, but the 
complacency of recent years needs to be 
replaced with an ambitious but pragmatic 
agreement on a gradual implementation of 
tangible reforms.
q Spurring sustainable growth and  
re-energising economic convergence while 
strengthening the EU’s ‘protective arm’. 
Despite the recent improvement in Europe’s 
economic situation, more needs to be done 
to consolidate sustainable growth and 
reverse the widening gap between member 
states since the outbreak of the ‘great crisis’. 
Economic convergence would boost overall 
growth, ascertain political stability within 
and among member states, and make it 
easier for the ECB to apply a single monetary 
policy to the entire euro area, moving away 
from near-zero or negative interest rates, 
which have become a heavy burden on 
savers. It would also reduce the risk of ‘cross-
country’ contagion, thus delivering a win-
win for all member states. The Union must 
also respond to growing social inequalities 
and injustice within societies as well as to 
fears of the negative impact of changing 
socio-economic realities.
q Preserving unity among the EU27 and 
Euro-19. Future reforms should neither 
disadvantage non-euro countries nor lead to 
any kind of differentiation between countries 
that have adopted the euro. This does not 
mean that the EU cannot advance in some 
important areas through differentiated 
integration, but future initiatives should clearly 
avoid the creation of a closed ‘core Europe’ 
that would effectively result in diverse classes 
of EU membership (see also separate part on 
differentiated integration on page 72).
KEY ELEMENTS
To achieve the above objectives, the EU27 
could agree on the following concrete 
reforms as part of a potential package deal in 
the economic and social dimension:
1.  Strengthening the resilience  
of the financial sector
Despite efforts to create a Banking Union 
and a Capital Markets Union, Europe’s 
financial system remains highly fragmented 
and vulnerable. The link between sovereigns 
and banks (‘doom loop’) has not been broken. 
Difficulties in the sovereign debt market can 
negatively affect the financial sector and thus 
the ‘real’ economy.
Taxpayers are still being asked to save 
ailing financial institutions, with private 
debt morphing into public debt. Contagion 
within the sector is still possible, and non-
performing loans are a heavy burden on the 
balance sheets of banks in many countries. 
Further action is therefore needed to 
strengthen the resilience of Europe’s financial 
sector. Actions could include:
q Completing the Banking Union through 
the gradual introduction of a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), to equally 
protect bank deposits up to EUR 100,000 in 
all member states and prevent excess capital 
inflows to stronger economies. A next step 
could include risk-sharing among national 
deposit insurance schemes with the EDIS 
providing loans to national insurers if they 
have used up their financial resources.
q Speeding up the Capital Markets Union 
to further integrate capital markets in Europe 
and provide more innovative, sustainable and 
diversified sources of funding for households 
1.  The economic and social dimension 
Balancing responsibility & competitiveness and solidarity & caring
The institutional 
system underpinning 
European economic 
governance lacks 
coherence and 
democratic scrutiny 
– especially when 
the Eurogroup takes 
decisions on national 
budgets and reforms 
behind closed doors. 
Economic 
convergence would 
boost overall growth, 
ascertain political 
stability within and 
among member 
states, and make it 
easier for the ECB 
to apply a single 
monetary policy to 
the entire euro area 
Future reforms 
should neither 
disadvantage non-
euro countries nor 
lead to any kind 
of differentiation 
between countries 
that have adopted 
the euro.
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and businesses. This would help end Europe’s 
excessive reliance on bank-based financial 
systems, improve risk-sharing and bolster the 
capacity of financial markets to absorb future 
shocks.
q Reducing the burden of non-performing 
loans on banks, which are destabilising 
the financial sector, inhibiting banks from 
providing liquidity to the ‘real economy’, and 
making it difficult to reach a compromise 
on the EDIS. This could involve creating an 
‘Asset Management Company’ as a European 
‘bad bank’ able to independently buy non-
performing loans from financial institutions.
q Enabling the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) to function as a credible 
backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) 
in the form of a credit line for the SRF. This 
would require a change to the ESM Treaty.
2.  Enforcing stricter rules and more 
institutional coherence
Many fiscal rules set at European level are 
being interpreted with great flexibility. This 
may be necessary at times to spur growth, 
but tests the credibility and predictability of 
a rule-based system. The no-bailout principle 
is de facto undermined; the Stability and 
Growth Pact and Fiscal Compact rules are 
thrown into doubt; and the institutional 
system underpinning European economic 
governance lacks coherence and democratic 
scrutiny – especially when the Eurogroup 
takes decisions on national budgets 
and reforms behind closed doors. There 
is thus a need to apply the rules more 
strictly, streamline the institutional system 
at European level, and strengthen the 
involvement of national institutions. Actions 
could include: 
q Enforcing the no-bailout principle  
to reduce the danger of moral hazard and 
heighten market pressures on countries that 
do not abide by rules agreed at the European 
level. This would require a credible ‘debt 
restructuring mechanism’ to ensure an 
orderly sovereign default if countries cannot 
return to sustainable public debt levels.  
The ESM could play a role in assessing when 
sovereign debtors have become insolvent, 
how much the debt must be reduced 
and what future primary surpluses will be 
required to reach debt sustainability.
q Ensuring that all member states comply 
with the Stability and Growth Pact and 
Fiscal Compact, with more transparent 
rules to ensure a level playing field for all 
member states. The ESM could play a role, 
alongside the Commission, in monitoring 
country risks that could endanger the euro’s 
overall stability, yet without undermining 
the prerogatives of the Commission as 
the ‘guardian of the Treaties’. Any future 
European Monetary Fund should also be 
accountable to the European Parliament.
q Making the European Commissioner for 
Economic and Financial Affairs the President 
of the Eurogroup as well to ensure more 
institutional coherence, improve democratic 
legitimacy – as s/he would be accountable 
to the European Parliament – and help to 
strengthen the euro area’s representation in 
international fora (e.g. G7, G20, International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank).
q Strengthening the involvement of 
national parliaments in the European 
Semester to boost national ownership by 
fostering parliamentary debates on national 
reform programme priorities. These debates 
should also involve the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Commissioner.
3.  Preparing the EU for large 
asymmetric shocks
The Union still cannot provide stabilisation 
measures when responding to countercyclical 
crises in individual member states. A crisis 
shock-absorption mechanism is needed to 
provide temporary financial support to EU 
countries when they are hit by major crises 
that could spill over into other member states. 
Actions could include:
q Creating a complementary European 
Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme (EURS) 
to automatically support national insurance 
schemes when unemployment levels rise 
rapidly. The EURS could be financed through 
a small share of existing contributions from 
employers and employees.
q Creating a ‘rainy day fund’ to cushion large 
country-specific economic shocks on a case-
by-case basis. Payments would be limited 
to accumulated contributions from national 
budgets and would have to be paid back 
once the crisis has passed.
A European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme (EDIS) 
would protect bank 
deposits up to €100,000  
in all member states and 
prevent excess capital 
inflows to stronger 
economies.
The institutional system 
underpinning European 
economic governance 
lacks coherence and 
democratic scrutiny 
– especially when 
the Eurogroup takes 
decisions on national 
budgets and reforms 
behind closed doors.
The Union still cannot 
provide stabilisation 
measures when 
responding to 
countercyclical crises 
in individual member 
states. 
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4.  Creating more room for public 
and private investment
Public and private investment are still 
below pre-crisis levels. More investment 
in innovation, research and development, 
education and skills would support both 
the supply and demand sides of European 
economies. Countries with (very) limited fiscal 
space need a significant surge in investment 
to bolster convergence. Furthermore, 
increasing investment in member states that 
have enough room to raise public spending 
would help to boost Europe’s growth. Actions 
could include:
q Reducing regulatory uncertainties 
and hurdles undermining cross-border 
investment by further harmonising insolvency 
rules, implementing a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), supporting more 
efficiency in national judicial systems, and 
building up the EU’s capacity to monitor fiscal 
fraud and corruption.
q Introducing a ‘golden rule’ allowing some 
public investment to be excluded from a 
country’s deficit calculation based on an 
independent assessment of those investments 
and in accordance with clear rules. Defence 
expenditures conducted in the framework of 
PESCO could also be included. In return, fiscal 
rules would be applied more strictly to all 
remaining public spending, including the use 
of sanctions when necessary.
q Stimulating investment and demand 
in EU countries with an excessive balance 
of payments surpluses, in line with the 
procedures on macroeconomic imbalances 
foreseen in the Six-Pack.
q Establishing a European Investment 
Protection Scheme (EIPS) to act as a 
buffer for public investment during severe 
economic downturns in individual countries, 
and a European Investment Guarantee 
Scheme (EIGS) to reduce the risks for private 
investors in crisis-hit countries.
5.  Promoting Europe’s 
competitiveness through 
structural reforms and the 
completion of the Single Market
Although European economies have 
recovered in recent years, the gap has 
widened among member states. Economic 
adjustment has been highly asymmetric, 
with the burden falling almost exclusively 
on deficit countries in Europe’s periphery, 
who have had to undergo painful internal 
devaluations to curtail their deficits rapidly. 
They still need to implement demanding 
structural reforms. This is primarily a matter 
for them, but more can be done at EU level to 
promote competitiveness by supporting and 
incentivising national reform programmes 
and reducing economic barriers. Actions 
could include:
q Establishing contractual ‘Reform and 
Investment Agreements’ between member 
states and the Council based on major reform 
priorities identified in the country-specific 
recommendations within the European 
Semester framework, to instil discipline and 
boost national ownership of reforms in return 
for financial support proportionate to the effort 
made by those countries. The Commission 
should in cooperation with the Council oversee 
the implementation of these Agreements and 
report to the European Parliament. Financial 
support could be provided either through a 
separate fiscal capacity financed via national 
contributions or through a separate line in 
the EU budget scrutinised by MEPs coming 
from member states that have agreed to 
the introduction of Reform and Investment 
Agreements.
q Reinforcing links between national 
reforms and EU funding by providing 
extra resources to support national reform 
programmes, with a focus on public social 
investment in areas such as education, re-
skilling or early childcare (using funds partially 
taken from the Common Agricultural Policy).
q Extending and developing technical 
assistance programmes run by the 
Commission through the Structural Reform 
Support Service or provided by national, 
regional and local administrations.
1.  The economic and social dimension 
Balancing responsibility & competitiveness and solidarity & caring
Economic 
adjustment has 
been highly 
asymmetric, 
with the burden 
falling almost 
exclusively on 
deficit countries 
in Europe’s 
periphery, 
who have had 
to undergo 
painful internal 
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to curtail their 
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q Completing the Single Market to boost 
Europe’s global competitiveness, especially 
in relation to the Digital Single Market, Energy 
Union and Capital Markets Union, while 
stepping up the fight against social, tax and 
environmental dumping and ensuring that 
the four freedoms are not abused.
q Speeding up completion of additional 
comprehensive free trade agreements with 
Mexico, South American countries, Australia 
and New Zealand, while providing evidence 
of the benefits of such agreements to avoid 
the EU being perceived as an ‘agent of 
unfettered globalisation’.
6. Bolstering the ‘protective arm’  
of the European Union
Rising inequalities undermine social contracts 
and can endanger social peace both within 
countries and between generations. Anxieties 
and despair are fuelled by the downsides 
of economic transformation, tax dumping 
and tax evasion, unfair trade practices, and 
fears of being left behind in an increasingly 
competitive economic environment in which 
Europe’s share of global trade, GDP and 
population is shrinking. The EU should boost 
its ‘protective arm’ to counter its image as 
an institution fostering a social race to the 
bottom, where the interests of influential 
market players dominate over the socio-
economic concerns of citizens. Actions could 
include:
q Supporting those in society 
disproportionately affected by the impact 
of major structural reforms. In the words 
of the German NPE report, "structural 
reforms should be better prioritised and take 
into consideration whether and possibly 
how to compensate losers." Temporary and 
complementary support provided through the 
EU budget could, for example, help to smoothen 
out pension losses from severe pension cuts 
or co-finance the transition to ‘flexicurity’ 
mechanisms by providing partial funding to 
cover health and/or social security costs.
q Intensifying the fight against tax 
evasion and ensuring taxes are paid where 
companies make their profits with sharper 
tools to combat abuses, fairer taxes for the 
digital industry, and requiring multinational 
companies to publish tax information on a 
country-by-country basis.
q Safeguarding the level playing field within 
the Single Market by taking action compatible 
with WTO rules to pursue the EU’s legitimate 
interests when trading with third countries who 
already use similar means such as investment 
controls, state aids or strategic procurement.
q Implementing measures to operationalise 
the European Pillar of Social Rights through, 
for example, the introduction of minimum 
wage regimes in all EU countries. A broker speaks on the 
telephone at the stock 
exchange in Frankfurt 
am Main, Germany, 
in October 2017. 
(DANIEL ROLAND / AFP)
The EU should 
boost its ‘protective 
arm’ to counter 
its image as 
an institution 
fostering a social 
race to the bottom, 
where the interests 
of influential 
market players 
dominate over the 
socio-economic 
concerns of 
citizens.
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7.  Avoiding discrimination  
based on the euro
The European Union must ensure that non-
euro countries are not negatively affected 
by additional EMU reforms. The deeper 
cooperation needed between countries that 
already share the same currency, which lies at 
the heart of the European project, can cause 
frictions between the ‘ins’, the ‘pre-ins’ and the 
‘outs’. To avoid discrimination, four principles 
must be applied:
q Openness. New forms of cooperation 
between the members of the euro area 
should always be open to non-euro 
countries;
q Information. Countries outside the euro 
area should be kept constantly informed 
about major euro-area developments;
q No duplication. EU institutions should be 
fully involved and no parallel institutional 
structures should be created which could 
undermine the role of existing supranational 
institutions;
q No barriers. Insurmountable barriers 
to future membership of the euro area 
for current ‘pre-ins’ and ‘outs’ must be 
avoided. It must remain open and joining 
the club should be actively supported and 
encouraged, whenever countries fulfil the 
accession criteria.
Drawing structural distinctions between 
euro and non-euro countries undermines 
cohesion, negatively affecting the future 
of both the EMU and cooperation in other 
policy areas. Interdependence between 
countries sharing the same currency has, 
in the most difficult moments of the euro 
crisis, proven to be a strong glue. Greater 
unity and interdependence should thus be 
in the interests of all member states and 
the EU. Creating a ‘core Europe’ against the 
will of those left behind would lead to the 
emergence of new dividing lines within the 
European Union.
1.  The economic and social dimension 
Balancing responsibility & competitiveness and solidarity & caring
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble talks with 
President of the Eurogroup Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Spanish 
Economy Minister Luis de Guindos, Italian Finance 
Minister Pier Carlo Padoan, and European Commissioner 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs 
Pierre Moscovici during a Eurogroup meeting 
in Luxembourg, 9 October 2017. (JOHN THYS / AFP)
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THE BARGAIN
The above components of a potential 
package deal in the economic and social 
dimension aim to strike an ambitious but 
realistic balance between the diverse 
interests and concerns within and among 
the EU27. They are designed to secure the 
stability of the euro, spur sustainable growth 
and re-energise economic convergence, 
while strengthening the Union’s ‘protective 
arm’ and preserving the principle of unity 
among the EU27 and the members of the 
euro area.
q For those in the ‘responsibility and 
competitiveness’ camp who want a stricter 
implementation of rules, re-affirmation of 
the ‘no bail-out’ principle, a reduction of 
risks, more market discipline, and heightened 
pressure on EU countries to implement long-
overdue structural reforms, the above bargain 
includes the following key actions: speeding 
up the Capital Markets Union; enforcing the 
no-bailout principle through the setting up 
of a credible debt restructuring mechanism; 
ensuring that all member states comply 
with the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
Fiscal Compact with more transparent rules 
to ensure a level playing field for all member 
states; reducing regulatory uncertainties 
and hurdles undermining cross-border 
investment; establishing contractual Reform 
and Investment Agreements; reinforcing 
the links between national reforms and EU 
funding; further extending and developing 
technical assistance programmes; completing 
the Single Market to enhance Europe’s 
global competitiveness; and speeding up 
work on more comprehensive free trade 
agreements. 
For this group, it is equally important that 
the package deal does not include certain 
measures that they have clearly defined 
as red lines: no permanent transfer union; 
no mutualisation of debt; no issuance of 
common debt with joint liability of euro 
countries; no unconditional support which 
could increase the danger of moral hazard; 
and no additional fully-fledged euro area 
budget for deep symmetric crises/shocks.
q For those in the ‘solidarity and caring’ 
camp who want more flexible and smarter 
rules with greater discretion, the direct 
or indirect introduction of common risk-
sharing instruments, more support from the 
European level for national reform efforts, 
more fiscal room for public investment, 
actions to reduce macroeconomic 
imbalances, and a stronger EU caring 
dimension, the above bargain includes 
the following key actions: completing the 
Banking Union by gradually introducing a 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme; 
taking steps to reduce the burden on 
banks from non-performing loans; enabling 
the European Stability Mechanism to 
function as a credible backstop to the 
Single Resolution Fund; establishing a crisis 
shock-absorption mechanism for large 
asymmetric shocks with a complementary 
European Unemployment Reinsurance 
Scheme and/or a ‘rainy day fund’; 
introducing a ‘golden rule’ allowing for 
public investment to be excluded from a 
country’s deficit calculation; stimulating 
investment and demand in EU countries 
with excessive surpluses; supporting those 
in society disproportionately affected by 
major structural reforms; intensifying the 
fight against tax evasion and avoidance; 
safeguarding the level-playing field within 
the Single Market; and implementing 
measures to operationalise the European 
Pillar of Social Rights.
q For non-euro countries which fear that 
further EMU reforms might leave them at a 
disadvantage and push them further into the 
EU’s periphery, the above bargain guarantees 
adherence to a number of key principles, to 
avoid future reforms discriminating against 
those outside the common currency area.
A bargain in the 
economic and 
social dimension 
needs to strike 
a fair balance 
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‘responsibility and 
competitiveness’ 
camp and the 
‘solidarity and 
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euro area.
Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, 
during a press conference. (Daniel Roland / AFP)
SOLIDARITY 
BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
Create an asylum-seeker
‘exchange mechanism’
Better inform refugees about welcome 
conditions in EU member states
Incentivise municipalities to welcome 
refugees or asylum-seekers
MEASURES TO COUNTER 
INSECURITY
Speed up national asylum procedures
Establish asylum processing centres in major 
transit countries to reduce irregular flows
Increase financial support to improve the 
conditions for migrants/refugees in Libya
Reform EU policies that negatively 
impact countries of origin and transit
SOLIDARITY 
WITH COUNTRIES 
OF ORIGIN & TRANSIT
Boost (financial) support for Africa
Create legal avenues of (economic) migration
Establish a permanent European 
resettlement framework
Increase and accelerate returns
Create a permanent relocation 
mechanism
Make asylum recognition rates 
converge across member states
Establish asylum-seeker reception centres
in Central and Eastern European countries
A WIN-WIN PACKAGE DEAL / THE MIGRATION DIMENSION
The bargain needs to reflect security and solidarity concerns to enhance the notion of a protective Europe 
while avoiding the pitfalls of a 'fortress' Europe and preventing a further unravelling of Schengen.
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2.  The migration dimension  
A balanced human mobility strategy
The NPE debates have clearly shown that migration needs to be a core dimension of any win-
win package deal on the future of Europe. Following the crisis of 2015-16, asylum, migration 
and refugee issues remain high on the agenda, but efforts to strike a bargain at EU level 
continue to be highly challenging. But a compromise seems possible, provided that one can 
bridge the divide between security and solidarity.
RATIONALE
The European Union has made some progress 
in recent years, but the focus has been on ad 
hoc fire-fighting. Today, the EU27 risk running 
out of steam before delivering the more 
fundamental structural reforms, which are 
necessary in the migration dimension for a 
number of reasons:
q Continuously high migration pressures. 
It is an illusion to believe that migration can 
be halted. Although the number of people 
arriving on Europe’s shores has been reduced 
substantially since 2016, the EU will remain 
under pressure given the instability in its 
wider neighbourhood, population growth 
(especially in Africa), and the political, 
economic and social problems driving many 
people to leave their homes to seek a better 
future in Europe. 
q Shrinking and ageing population. 
Migration is not only a challenge, but also an 
opportunity and a necessity. Demographic 
change in all EU countries is undermining 
Europe’s growth potential and the long-term 
sustainability of social security systems. 
A continuous inflow of people will be 
needed to compensate for the negative 
consequences of ageing. In the words of 
the Italian NPE report, "migration can boost 
national and European economies by creating 
new demands for services and goods, fill gaps 
in the work force, foster innovation and start-up 
companies and prevent population decline."
q Moral and legal obligations. In response 
to the 2015-16 crisis, the EU and its members 
have done their best to reduce the numbers 
arriving at the Union’s borders, making it 
much more difficult for people in need of 
international protection to reach the EU. 
Closing the Western Balkans route and the 
2016 EU-Turkey deal have partially sealed 
Europe’s borders. Further steps towards a 
‘fortress Europe’ would seriously undermine 
basic human rights and the Union’s 
international asylum obligations.
q Playing into the hands of populists.  
The chaotic situation during the crisis 
unleashed fundamental anxieties among 
wide sections of the population in many EU 
countries. Migration remains a major public 
concern. It has been a central theme in 
many election campaigns and authoritarian 
populists have exploited those anxieties, 
claiming ‘national identities’ and internal 
security are increasingly at risk.
Demographic 
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OBJECTIVES
To respond to future needs, EU countries 
should agree on a comprehensive and 
balanced human mobility strategy based on 
a holistic concept of migration management, 
that combines security and solidarity 
elements. In other words, member states 
need to enhance the notion of a ‘protective 
Europe’ while avoiding the pitfalls of a 
‘fortress Europe’.
EU governments have struggled to respond 
effectively to the crisis and still find it difficult 
to forge compromises because of deep 
differences of opinion between and within 
countries. It remains very difficult to reconcile 
the two basic camps:
q those who argue that Europeans have a 
moral, humanitarian and legal obligation to 
support those in need of help and refuge 
(‘solidarity’ camp);
q and those who argue that Europe must 
protect itself from the large numbers of people 
trying to reach the continent (‘security’ camp).
The response to the crisis has been 
characterised by an imbalance between 
solidarity and security. When faced with an 
unprecedented influx of people in 2015-16,  
the pendulum swung sharply towards 
the latter, with the EU and its members 
concentrating predominantly on (mostly)  
ad hoc temporary solutions rather than 
systemic structural reforms.
This echoed the agreement among member 
states on three core objectives:
q To prevent a further unravelling of the 
Schengen area;
q To safeguard Europe’s external borders 
and
q To reduce the number of people arriving 
in the EU.
But the Union now needs to move from 
provisional schemes to long-term mechanisms 
to address structural weaknesses.
KEY ELEMENTS
A win-win package deal between EU countries 
needs to reflect both security and solidarity 
concerns, considering the distinctive interests, 
circumstances and aspirations among and 
within the EU27. In effect, boosting security is 
a prerequisite for increasing solidarity and vice 
versa – and both are necessary to secure the 
long-term endurance of Schengen. Should 
member states fail to reach a compromise, 
migration issues will remain highly divisive, 
with negative consequences within and 
among member states.
1. Measures to counter insecurity
To combat feelings of insecurity, order must 
be ensured by fighting and ‘regularising’ 
irregular inflows, strengthening the 
protection of Europe’s borders, making a 
clearer distinction between migrants and 
asylum-seekers, as well as intensifying 
cooperation with countries of origin and 
transit. There is already a broad consensus 
among the EU27 on security issues, but more 
should be done with respect to the following 
issues:
q Increasing and accelerating returns. 
The EU27 need to establish more effective 
arrangements to ensure that more of those 
whose applications to stay in Europe are 
rejected are rapidly returned. Critics argue 
that current low levels of return motivate 
migrants to embark on dangerous journeys, 
knowing that once they reach Europe, they 
stand a good chance of staying. Increasing 
and accelerating return is predominantly a 
member state responsibility, but the EU could 
support them by putting more emphasis 
on assisted voluntary return programmes 
through intensified cooperation with the 
International Organization for Migration 
(IOM); concluding return agreements with 
more countries of origin to boost their 
readiness to cooperate in identifying and 
admitting their nationals; incentivising those 
countries by agreeing on a specific date from 
when they would commit to take back their 
nationals without delay (excluding those who 
arrived in Europe before the cut-off date); and 
introducing an EU-wide list of safe third 
countries to which failed asylum-seekers can 
be returned while ensuring that everyone has 
a right to apply for asylum and applications 
are still assessed on a case-by-case basis.
To respond to 
future needs, 
EU countries 
should agree on 
a comprehensive 
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human mobility 
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q Speeding up national asylum procedures. 
While respecting international obligations 
and European norms, the EU27 must speed 
up national asylum procedures. Today, 
despite heightened national efforts, asylum 
applications are processed slowly, generally 
taking far longer than the six-month target 
set by the EU. Assessing asylum applications 
is a national competence and there is no 
appetite among member states to surrender 
this prerogative, but procedures and standards 
need to be further harmonised to create 
a level playing field across Europe and 
establish a genuinely common procedure 
for international protection, while removing 
incentives for asylum shopping and secondary 
movements among member states.
q Establishing asylum processing centres 
in major transit countries to reduce irregular 
flows. The European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees could 
be mandated to assess eligibility as part 
of an accelerated application procedure. 
Those deemed to qualify for international 
protection would be resettled in the EU 
using a distribution mechanism (see below), 
while those who are not would be offered 
voluntary return and reintegration assistance. 
To avoid abuses of the system, all asylum-
seekers would be registered in the Eurodac 
fingerprint database. Those migrants 
arriving in the EU irregularly and who have 
previously been registered would be subject 
to immediate return. Such centres should 
only be established in countries where 
asylum-seekers’ security and human rights 
can be ensured. Libya would currently not 
fulfil these criteria but, for example, countries 
such as Niger would.
2.  Solidarity between member states
Solidarity continues to be a highly divisive 
issue. Consequently, the EU must demonstrate 
that it is possible to protect Europe’s 
borders while at the same time ensuring 
an organised inflow of people without 
undermining basic human and refugee rights. 
Solidarity needs to be strengthened in two 
directions: between EU countries; and with 
those knocking on Europe’s door and with 
countries of origin and transit.
The lack of intra-EU solidarity has been a major 
source of tension between EU countries, 
not only casting doubts over the future 
of Schengen, but having a wider negative 
impact on cohesion within the Union. As the 
Belgian NPE report states, "sharing the burden 
of refugee management is a litmus test for 
European solidarity." Future measures must be 
underpinned by a clear agreement that any 
burden-sharing decision taken at EU level is 
binding and must be implemented by every 
EU country. Nevertheless, great care must be 
taken in exerting pressure on those that are 
unwilling to demonstrate greater solidarity. 
Coercion is not the answer. Quite the 
opposite: NPE discussions have shown that 
singling out individual countries and putting 
excessive pressure on them can backfire. 
Linking solidarity to Schengen membership 
or regional funding, for example, may further 
undermine their readiness to shoulder more of 
the burden and could play into the hands of 
those seeking to portray the EU as a ‘dictating 
force’ undermining national sovereignty. 
In this context, how can the existing gap be 
bridged and solidarity between member 
states reinforced?
q Creating a permanent relocation 
mechanism. To share the burden between 
the EU27, the Union must replace the ad 
hoc system introduced in 2015. The 2016 
European Commission proposals – which 
aim to create a fairer, more efficient and 
sustainable system for allocating applications 
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A group of African asylum-seekers volunteer with the Italian Red Cross 
 at an avalanche-hit hotel in central Italy, January 2017. 
(FILIPPO MONTEFORTE / AFP) 
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and include a corrective (‘fairness’) 
mechanism to determine automatically when 
a country is handling a disproportionate 
number of applications and relocate all 
additional applicants to other member 
states – are a reasonable and balanced 
basis for compromise. But EU governments 
are struggling to agree on the specific 
implementation procedures. One solution 
could be to give sceptical countries more time 
to implement the new relocation mechanism 
fully while requiring them to make a ‘solidarity 
contribution’ for each applicant they turn away 
in the meantime. This money could either go 
to the country which took ‘their’ applicants in 
or into a new ‘Schengen Fund’ managed by the 
Commission that could compensate those that 
agree to welcome more migrants than required.
q Making asylum recognition rates 
converge across member states. Recognition 
rates for asylum applicants coming from 
the same country vary significantly across 
EU countries, suggesting their asylum 
procedures and standards do not guarantee 
equal treatment. This encourages many 
asylum-seekers to head for those with higher 
recognition rates to boost their chances of 
being accepted. To address this, EASO’s role in 
monitoring implementation of EU standards 
and procedures could be strengthened.
q Incentivising municipalities to welcome 
refugees or asylum-seekers. Providing 
additional funding to cities that voluntarily 
take in and integrate asylum-seekers could 
help improve public services, including 
nurseries, schools, medical institutions and 
social housing etc. This would also allay 
citizens’ concerns that taking in refugees 
reduces their access to public services.
q Establishing asylum-seeker reception 
centres in Central and Eastern European 
countries. Asylum-seekers from countries 
with higher recognition rates would be 
transferred to EASO-administered reception 
centres and relocated to other EU countries 
once their application has been accepted. 
This would help to alleviate some of the 
burden on frontline countries such as Italy 
and Greece, while keeping the number of 
asylum-seekers allowed to stay in the EU low 
in Central and Eastern European countries.
q Creating an asylum-seeker ‘exchange 
mechanism’. EU countries would be able to 
exchange asylum-seekers who prefer to settle 
elsewhere. This mechanism would operate 
on a one-for-one basis, with countries 
exchanging asylum-seekers in a quota-
neutral way. It would reduce secondary 
movements of relocated refugees and 
would probably make them more willing to 
integrate in a country where they want to 
settle. Secondary movements could also be 
reduced by introducing a ‘European identity 
refugee card’ which every refugee would be 
obliged to carry.
q Better informing refugees about 
welcome conditions in EU member states. 
Most asylum-seekers want to go to specific 
member states, which puts a heavy burden 
on a limited number of EU countries. This is 
partly because they lack information about 
the situation in other, seemingly less attractive, 
countries that are willing to shoulder more 
of the burden. The EU could help by funding 
information campaigns to fill this gap.
3.  Solidarity with countries  
of origin and transit
A package deal aiming to establish a 
comprehensive human mobility strategy 
must reflect the need to show solidarity not 
only between member states but also with 
the countries of origin and transit. This is 
necessary both to secure the cooperation  
of third partners and to respect basic human 
rights as well as the EU’s international legal 
obligations. The following elements are 
necessary to achieve this objective:   
q Boosting (financial) support to Africa. 
Introduced in 2016, the new Partnership 
Framework approach for cooperation with 
third countries on migration was designed 
to help contain migrant movements by 
pooling instruments, tools and leverage 
and to form comprehensive migration 
partnerships (‘compacts’). It reflected 
the EU’s recognition of African countries’ 
significance in the fight against the root 
causes of the refugee crisis. Europe needs 
to do more, however, to incentivise African 
countries to cooperate. Using punitive 
measures to force them to do so will not 
work, but rather undermines trust and 
readiness to work together to reduce 
irregular migration flows and boost returns 
and readmissions. Instead, the following 
actions could help foster a willingness  
to cooperate: 
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Refugees are welcomed 
upon arrival onboard a 
special train coming from 
Munich at the railway 
station in Berlin, 13 
September 2015. 
(AXEL SCHMIDT / AFP)q Trust Fund for Africa. Member states 
should deliver the contributions they 
pledged to the fund and further augment 
the funds available to improve the situation 
in African countries. This money could 
support the EU’s External Investment 
Plan, help African countries to improve 
their border control and anti-smuggling 
capacities, and provide support for  
people living in refugee camps in transit 
countries.
q New study and work visa schemes could 
be launched to reduce irregular forms of 
migration. For each returnee a third country 
accepts, a negotiated number of study or 
work visas could be offered to the citizens 
of that country. The EU’s role in this would 
be limited to harmonising the criteria and 
providing political and diplomatic support, 
as issuing long-term visas is a national 
competence.
q Efforts to link development aid and 
migration to ‘persuade’ people to stay 
in their home countries, should target 
middle-income rather than lower-income 
countries. Research shows that migrants 
are more likely to leave their country 
for economic reasons when they have 
enough resources to do so. Support for 
lower-income countries is thus likely to 
increase rather than decrease the number of 
people wanting to migrate. Development 
aid to middle-income countries should 
focus on promoting good governance and 
supporting an active role of women in 
their societies. It should involve the private 
sector, while taking effective steps to avoid 
any misuse of EU funds.
q Establishing a permanent European 
resettlement framework. The European 
Union must provide direct legal and safe 
pathways to enter its territory and relieve 
pressure from countries of origin and transit. 
This would replace the two-year temporary 
emergency resettlement scheme agreed in 
2015. Establishing an orderly resettlement 
process could be a game changer. It would 
help to reduce irregular flows of migrants 
and show solidarity with third countries and 
Establishing 
an orderly 
resettlement 
process could be 
a game changer.
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those in need of international protection. 
To this end, member states should agree 
on the permanent resettlement framework 
proposed by the Commission in 2016, which 
foresees the establishment of a common 
set of standard procedures for selecting 
resettlement candidates and a common 
protection status for persons resettled in the 
EU. To support member states’ resettlement 
efforts, the Commission would provide 
EUR 10,000 from the EU budget for each 
person resettled, allocated from the EU’s 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
(AMIF).
Although some progress has been achieved, 
EU institutions and member states have not 
yet been able to agree on the introduction of a 
new (more) permanent resettlement scheme. 
If they fail to find a compromise, a ‘coalition of 
the willing’ should not only commit to do this 
but also raise the annual target proposed by 
the Commission to 100,000 migrants given 
the circumstance that global resettlement 
needs are at a historical high of 1.2 million.
q Creating legal avenues of (economic) 
migration. To reduce the incentives for 
irregular migration, the EU must provide safe 
and legal channels to Europe. This would also 
help to incentivise cooperation by countries 
of origin, as many of them depend heavily on 
the remittances migrants send home. Besides 
direct resettlement, there are numerous 
other potential measures that could be 
implemented to create legal avenues of 
migration, such as a more effective Blue 
Card system to attract highly-skilled workers, 
measures to allow for higher levels of 
circular migration, and more study visas and 
scholarships.
q Increasing financial support to improve 
conditions for migrants in Libya. Some 
human rights organisations and national 
government representatives have compared 
the conditions in Libya to ‘concentration 
camps’. More financial and material support 
should be made available to substantially 
improve the conditions in these camps, as 
has been done in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.
q Reforming EU policies that negatively 
impact countries of origin and transit. 
Numerous EU policies – including the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the Common 
Commercial Policy and the Common Fisheries 
Policy – should be screened to check for 
negative impacts on countries of origin and 
transit.
2.  The migration dimension 
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Visitors attend the 
second edition of a job 
fair for refugees and 
migrants in Berlin, 25 
January  2017. 
(STEFFI LOOS / AFP)
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Refugee families take 
part in a registration 
process prior to the asylum 
procedure in Greece, 
13 June 2016.
(LOUISA GOULIAMAKI / AFP)
THE BARGAIN
The above components of a potential 
package deal in the field of migration aim 
to strike an ambitious but realistic balance 
between the interests and concerns of the 
diverse camps within the EU, and move closer 
to a comprehensive and balanced human 
mobility strategy. They seek to reflect both 
security and solidarity concerns, enhance 
the notion of a ‘protective Europe’ while 
avoiding the pitfalls of a ‘fortress Europe’ and 
preventing a further unravelling of Schengen.
q For those who argue that Europe must 
counter the sense of insecurity among its 
citizens and protect itself from potentially 
overwhelming numbers of people trying to 
reach it, the bargain includes the following 
key proposals: increasing and accelerating 
returns; speeding up national asylum 
procedures; establishing asylum processing 
centres in major transit countries to reduce 
irregular flows; and strengthening the 
incentives for countries of origin and transit 
to reduce irregular migration and increase 
returns and readmission.
q For those who insist on the need 
to increase the solidarity between EU 
countries, the bargain includes the following 
key proposals: creating a permanent relocation 
mechanism; making asylum recognition rates 
converge across member states; incentivising 
municipalities to welcome refugees or asylum 
seekers; establishing asylum-seeker reception 
centres in Central and Eastern European 
countries; creating an ‘exchange mechanism’ 
allowing member states to exchange asylum-
seekers who prefer to settle elsewhere; and 
better informing refugees about the conditions 
in EU countries ready to accept more people in 
need of international protection.
q For those who argue that there is a need 
to show more solidarity with those knocking 
on Europe’s doors and with countries of 
origin and transit, the bargain includes the 
following key proposals: boosting (financial) 
support to Africa; establishing a permanent 
European resettlement framework; creating 
legal avenues of (economic) migration; 
increasing financial support to improve 
the conditions for migrants in Libya; and 
reforming EU policies that negatively impact 
countries of origin and transit.
FIGHT AGAINST 
TERRORISM
Foster a culture of cross-border cooperation 
between national intelligence agencies and 
law enforcement authorities
Boost efforts to prevent and counter 
radicalisation within Europe
Tackle the implications of the blurring 
boundaries between internal security 
and external defence
DEFENCE 
COOPERATION
Support defence cooperation 
with adequate financial instruments
Coordinate the review of national defence planning
Establish an ambitious and inclusive PESCO
Strengthen the military operation 
planning capacity
Revise the rules on the common funding of EU 
military operations
Reinforce the rapid response capacity
A WIN-WIN PACKAGE DEAL / THE SECURITY DIMENSION
External and internal security cooperation could help 
to coalesce an overall bargain between the EU27.
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3.  The security dimension  
Defence cooperation and the fight against terrorism
The security dimension of a potential 
package deal between the EU27 differs from 
the other two dimensions as there are no 
major ‘opposing camps’ whose differences 
need to be bridged. The national and 
transnational discussions under the auspices 
of the NPE project have exposed distinct 
priorities and some divides between EU 
countries, but they have also revealed a 
consensus across Europe that member states 
need to deepen cooperation on both internal 
and external security. As the Greek NPE report 
argues, "security is an area where European 
citizens demand a truly common European 
policy."
Mounting uncertainties and security 
challenges cannot be dealt with at national 
level alone and citizens want the EU to 
do more. Consequently, elaborating a 
potential bargain between the EU27 in this 
area is less arduous than in others. But the 
current political momentum needs to be 
maintained to ensure that cooperation 
commitments are implemented, which 
has not always been the case in the past. 
Progress on the ground will crucially depend 
on national leaders driving it through regular 
discussions in the European Council.
Given the widespread support for deeper 
internal and external security cooperation, 
a deal in this domain could help to create 
a political context conducive to a more 
constructive debate on the two other more 
contentious dimensions of the bargain. 
Progress on security could foster compromises 
in the economic and social as well as the 
migration dimension, where member states 
have drawn some clear red lines.
Within the internal and external security 
dimension, two areas stand out because of 
their direct relevance to European security, 
the relative convergence of national positions, 
public support and demand for close 
cooperation, and the pressing need to deliver 
tangible added value through joint efforts: 
q defence cooperation; and
q the fight against terrorism.
While intense negotiations are ongoing to 
narrow differences among member states on 
issues related to European defence, the gap 
between countries over counter-terrorism 
matters is much thinner. There is a need, 
however, for the EU27 to enforce agreed 
measures, intensify the cooperation between 
national agencies, counter the root causes of 
radicalisation and consider the implications 
of the blurring boundaries between internal 
security and external defence.
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PRIORITY 1 – DEFENCE 
COOPERATION
The debate on European security and defence 
has gathered pace since 2016, driven by a 
renewed sense of urgency reflected in the 
EU Global Strategy. Despite distinctive 
geopolitical concerns and strategic cultures, 
member states are increasingly aware that 
they need to deepen their cooperation 
to ensure their security. Rising global and 
regional instability, uncertainty over the US 
commitment to Europe’s security, Germany’s 
heightened interest in playing a stronger 
role, the impact of Brexit on Europe’s security, 
mounting military pressures on France, and 
a more ambitious European Commission 
have all contributed to create more common 
ground and ambition among the member 
states on progress towards stronger defence 
cooperation.
1. Rationale
There is a need, however, to manage 
expectations concerning the future 
of European defence cooperation. 
Supranational integration is not on the 
cards as security lies at the core of national 
sovereignty. The measures currently 
envisaged do not constrain national 
prerogatives, but rather aim to augment the 
EU’s added value as a ‘cooperation multiplier’. 
Through economies of scale, the EU can 
help to develop new capabilities and pool 
them in integrated and more deployable 
multinational force packages.
Four policy initiatives promoted over 
the past year can and should be mutually 
reinforcing: strengthening EU planning 
structures for operations in the framework of 
the Union’s Common Defence and Security 
Policy (CDSP); establishing a process to 
regularly review national defence planning 
through the Coordinated Annual Review 
on Defence (CARD); launching permanent 
structured cooperation (PESCO) for countries 
ready to invest more, collaborate on more 
ambitious joint capability projects and 
contribute forces to multinational units; and 
the envisaged launch of a European Defence 
Fund supporting both research and the 
development of new capabilities.
EU funds are intended to encourage 
member states to undertake collaborative 
projects and procurement, including through 
binding commitments under PESCO. The 
CARD process is designed to highlight 
capability gaps and shared priorities, thereby 
improving coordination and contributing to 
identifying areas for further cooperation.
Progress on security and defence is expected 
to strengthen relations between the EU and 
NATO, while helping Europeans to move 
towards being able to act alone or alongside 
allies. Strategic autonomy requires more 
than capabilities; it also depends on the 
convergence of distinct national strategic 
cultures and on a common assessment of 
risks and priorities for action. That said, this is 
to some extent a circular argument: without 
adequate capabilities enabling significant 
military tasks, there will be no incentive to 
advance on other prerequisites for strategic 
autonomy.
The challenge is 
not so much to 
establish new 
mechanisms and 
structures, but to 
make them deliver 
and advance 
Europe’s strategic 
autonomy.
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3.  The Security Dimension 
Defence cooperation and the fight against terrorism
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2. Objectives
Member states need to implement what they 
have agreed to do. Having agreed to launch 
the EDF and PESCO, they must now focus on 
turning words into deeds. The jury is still 
out as to whether they will be able to fulfil 
the expectations they have raised. They still 
need to demonstrate their determination 
to overcome resistance from various 
quarters, including parts of the political and 
military establishment and national defence 
industries defending their prerogatives and 
interests. The challenge is not so much to 
establish new mechanisms and structures, 
but to make them deliver and advance 
Europe’s strategic autonomy.
The overarching objective of a bargain 
between the EU27 on defence should be 
the collective empowerment of EU countries 
through joined-up capability development 
and procurement as well as operational 
efforts.
To match the level of ambition set by 
member states in December 2016, deeper 
European defence cooperation is vital in 
three major areas: responding to external 
conflicts and crises; building the capacity of 
EU partners; and protecting the Union and its 
citizens. These ambitions need to be spelled 
out in more detail, particularly in relation to 
the military tasks that European forces are 
expected to be able to perform.
The European defence agenda features  
three priorities:
q Member states must fulfil their 
commitment to progressively raise defence 
spending, especially to expand investment in 
equipment, research and technology.
q They should better coordinate defence 
planning cycles to enable joint capability 
development and acquisition, thereby 
maximising the impact of defence spending 
and avoiding wasteful duplication.
q They should not only jointly develop 
and procure capabilities, but also establish 
integrated and readily deployable 
multinational force packages, adequately 
supported by common funding 
arrangements.
Pursuing these objectives brings to the fore 
differences among member states over 
specific priorities and broader approaches to 
European defence. Some are mainly focused 
on developing expeditionary capabilities; 
others stress the need to counter cyber-
attacks or upgrade infrastructure to ensure 
the mobility of military assets within the 
EU. Nevertheless, this should not hamper 
progress. Various member states show 
a degree of flexibility and the menu of 
available measures gives many countries 
reasons and incentives to contribute, while 
not necessarily subscribing to all initiatives.
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A French army helicopter transporting  
marines attached to the European Union 
Naval Force - EUNAVFOR-Somalia.
(AYMERIC VINCENOIT / AFP)
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3. Key elements
Striking a win-win package deal on defence 
means calibrating initiatives in ways that 
meet national interests and concerns while 
ensuring that political momentum is not 
diluted. Ambitions for cooperation must 
remain high. The bargain should encourage 
and sustain meaningful progress by 
countries determined to advance faster while 
promoting the engagement of all member 
states.
To achieve this, the following actions will 
prove essential:
q Establishing an ambitious and inclusive 
PESCO. Designing PESCO is the first test of 
a complex balancing act. France sees it as a 
springboard to mobilise capacity for military 
action, while Germany views it as a pathway 
to capability development. These differences 
have been reconciled by defining PESCO as 
‘inclusive and ambitious’, a good enough 
compromise for now. To ease inherent 
tensions, PESCO will have to deliver tangible 
added value by generating adequate defence 
capabilities and boosting the capacity to use 
them for operational purposes.
PESCO should secure a set of commitments 
from member states ready to join, while 
keeping the door open to those willing 
but not necessarily able to meet the 
conditions yet. These commitments should 
be scrutinised to ensure they translate into 
concrete deeds. PESCO should also enable 
more far-reaching cooperation between 
subsets of countries willing to take part in 
more advanced projects. 
This ‘modular’ approach should not, however, 
lead to dispersing efforts across too many 
small projects. PESCO should include a 
limited set of core projects covering both 
the capability and operational dimensions. 
Only results from concrete projects can 
demonstrate that PESCO works and thus pave 
the way towards a higher level of ambition.
q Supporting defence cooperation with 
adequate financial instruments. PESCO’s 
success will depend, in many ways, on 
the availability of financial incentives 
for member states to work together. 
Governments will be sensitive to the 
distribution of these incentives and the 
impact of deeper cooperation on national 
industrial sectors. This also involves the 
balance between support for large and small 
companies in the defence market, since 
the former are concentrated in a handful of 
member states.
The EU27 should support the Commission’s 
proposals for various financial instruments 
and measures. Furthermore, its idea 
of discounting collaborative defence 
investments in the calculation of national 
deficits could be included in a win-win 
package deal. Together, these proposals can 
help foster cooperation among member 
states while supporting a high level of 
ambition.
q Coordinating the review of national 
defence planning. To foster capability 
development through joint initiatives, better 
coordination of national defence planning 
processes is required to ensure that national 
budgets can be simultaneously mobilised. The 
revision of the Capability Development Plan 
(CDP) in 2018 and the trial implementation 
of the Coordinated Annual Review on 
Defence (CARD) will be critical in this respect. 
They should both enable a more structured 
exchange between EU countries on defence 
spending plans and facilitate the identification 
of shared priorities and capability gaps, thus 
paving the way for pooling national resources 
to fill those gaps.
q Reinforcing the rapid response capacity, 
strengthening the military operation 
planning capacity, and revising the rules 
on the common funding of EU military 
operations. If Europeans need to intervene in 
hostile theatres and perform extensive crisis 
management tasks, then progress on these 
three issues is crucial for the defence deal 
to deliver tangible operational added value. 
More demanding military operations will 
require not only more pooling of resources 
and cost sharing but also the setup of sizeable 
deployable units and adequate headquarters 
to steer these operations.
There is a need 
to overcome 
the operational 
limitations of 
existing tools and 
to foster greater 
confidence  
and trust among 
national actors. 
PESCO’s success 
will depend, in 
many ways, on 
the availability 
of financial 
incentives for 
member states  
to work together.
PESCO should 
include a limited 
set of core projects 
covering both 
the capability 
and operational 
dimensions.
3.  The Security Dimension 
Defence cooperation and the fight against terrorism
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4. The bargain
A package deal on defence is within reach. If 
member states truly engage through the new 
frameworks, show ambition and join forces 
to enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy, the 
deal could reverberate politically beyond the 
field of defence. 
Closer cooperation in this area, supported 
by common funds, and tangible results 
would fuel political cohesion and mutual 
confidence, which could help to create the 
conditions to narrow divisions on other 
issues. The balanced implementation of the 
package would meet the interests of all 
member states and help bring their strategic 
cultures and priorities closer. In more 
concrete terms, the deal would help to:
q Improve burden sharing with the US 
and contribute to strengthening NATO, while 
making the EU better able to carry out more 
demanding missions if and when needed;
q Respond to calls for the EU to acquire 
greater operational capabilities for 
expeditionary operations to cope with 
destabilisation in its turbulent neighbourhood, 
while reinforcing Europe’s defences against 
conventional and hybrid threats;
q Encourage more member states 
to spend more, and more effectively, 
on defence, thus reducing the gap in 
expenditure as a share of GDP among them 
and enhancing the security dividend from 
joint efforts for everyone;
q Provide financial incentives to those 
countries willing to join forces;
q Support competitiveness in the 
European defence market, not least by 
promoting the inclusion of SMEs in joint 
development and procurement projects.
Soldiers of a Eurocorps 
detachment carry the European 
Union flag in front 
of the European Parliament. 
(PATRICK HERTZOG / AFP)
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PRIORITY 2 – FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
Europe has become a target of terrorism and 
there is no sign that the danger is receding. 
Although not a new phenomenon, the rise 
of terrorism is having a particularly negative 
effect on our societies. Surveys show it 
tops the concerns of European citizens. It 
is perceived as a constant risk in many EU 
countries.
Terrorism is a global phenomenon and 
terrorist groups operate beyond national 
borders. The challenge can therefore not 
be addressed at national level alone. In fact, 
it requires coordinated action at European 
level. In recent years, the EU has adopted 
numerous statements and measures to 
tackle terrorism. Concrete steps have 
been taken, for example, to improve the 
exchange of information among national law 
enforcement agencies; to disrupt terrorist 
online propaganda and develop counter-
narratives; to secure borders through more 
effective collection and sharing of data; to 
manage the risk posed by returning foreign 
terrorist fighters; or to cut terrorists’ access to 
firearms, explosives and financial support.
The NPE debates have shown, however, that 
more needs to be done to boost the EU’s 
ability to counter terrorism. For the purpose 
of formulating a win-win package deal, there 
is a need to focus on three basic priorities:
q Fostering a culture of cross-border 
cooperation between national intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement authorities, 
who are often not ready or able to share 
information and cooperate beyond national 
borders. Fragmentation is a fundamental 
obstacle in the EU-wide fight against 
terrorism. There is a need to overcome the 
operational limitations of existing tools and 
to foster greater confidence and trust among 
national actors. Without better information 
exchange between national agencies and 
with EU agencies, the EU27 will not be able to 
close operational loopholes and intelligence 
gaps, which in turn will limit their ability to 
effectively undermine terrorist activities.
National authorities need to improve the 
interoperability and interconnectedness of 
their information systems and databases. 
While ensuring proper protection of 
personal data, they must be able and willing 
to exchange information about potential 
terrorists’ movements, biometric data (DNA 
profiles and fingerprints), law enforcement 
data including criminal records, digital 
evidence and financial transaction data to 
identify terrorist funding. The European 
Counter Terrorism Centre’s ability to act 
as the law enforcement intelligence hub for 
analysing risks must also be strengthened.
q Boosting efforts to prevent and counter 
radicalisation within Europe. To date, actions 
at national and European level have mainly 
focused on reinforcing security responses to 
terrorist attacks. This is clearly essential, but 
it is also vital to focus efforts on preventing 
violent radicalisation and tackling its multiple 
causes. Terrorists aim to polarise societies, 
undermine their cohesion and provoke a 
repressive over-reaction that then fuels 
even more violence and triggers a spiral of 
violence and counter-violence to radicalise 
societies. Terrorist organisations target 
those who feel excluded, marginalised and 
discriminated against in our societies, and 
cultivate a sense of ‘us’ against ‘them’. In 
recent years, most of the suspects implicated 
in terrorist attacks were radicalised Europeans 
who were turned against their fellow citizens.
There is a serious risk that a narrow security-
driven response to terrorism will prevail 
over a more comprehensive long-term 
strategy. The latter would include an 
emphasis on prevention and tackling the 
Europol Director Rob 
Wainwright, Dutch Minister 
of Security and Justice Ard 
van der Steur and European 
Commissioner for Migration, 
Home Affairs and Citizenship 
Dimitris Avramopoulos launch 
the European Counter Terrorism 
Centre, 25 January 2016.
(BART MAAT / AFP)
Given the similar 
nature and 
interconnectedness 
of the terrorist threat 
throughout Europe, 
however, the Union 
can play a supportive 
role.
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causes of radicalisation. It would include social, 
economic, education and integration policies 
and engage a variety of actors at all levels, 
especially the local one. A long-term strategy 
must include measures fostering social 
inclusion; enhancing mutual intercultural 
knowledge, understanding, tolerance and  
respect; tackling socio-economic 
inequalities; preventing the marginalisation 
and stigmatisation of certain groups or 
communities; and combatting hate speech 
and crime.
The EU has already made some progress 
in this direction but more needs to done. 
Measures to counter radicalisation must be 
implemented on the ground and lie primarily 
in the hands of member states. Given the 
similar nature and interconnectedness of 
the terrorist threat throughout Europe, 
however, the Union can play a supportive 
role. In the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF), the EU27 should agree to 
augment support for comparative research 
on radicalisation and de-radicalisation; boost 
efforts to counter terrorist propaganda 
and hate speech online; break the cycle 
of radicalisation in prisons; strengthen 
intercultural dialogue; and support media 
literacy to raise awareness about the risks of 
online extremism.
q Tackling the implications of the blurring 
boundaries between internal security 
and external defence. The international 
and domestic realms have become more 
closely intertwined, and are thus harder to 
circumscribe. The old divide between internal 
and external affairs, still mirrored in national 
and European political and administrative 
structures, hampers the ability of both levels 
to effectively identify, prevent and react to 
new multi-faceted threats that transcend 
national borders. Islamist terrorism, which uses 
all kinds of modern means of communication, 
transport and financing, is exploiting the 
loopholes offered by an interconnected 
European and global environment. Many 
of the root causes of international terrorism 
lie in developments in third countries, with 
civil wars, interstate conflicts, failed states, 
unprotected borders, climate change, poverty, 
and resource scarcity all playing into the hands 
of terrorist organisations.
At the same time, technological developments 
are having a major impact on Europe’s security. 
Social media, big data, cloud technology, 
artificial intelligence and digitalised 
infrastructures are making our highly-
connected economies increasingly vulnerable 
to non-conventional and asymmetric hybrid 
attacks. New threats from within or outside 
the EU may have the potential to destabilise 
entire cities, economies and countries. As 
the Polish NPE report argues, the EU and its 
members should take the multifaceted nature 
of security threats more into account. Efforts 
to counter disinformation campaigns and 
foreign propaganda, like the East StratCom 
Task Force, should thus receive additional 
human and financial resources.
The expanding connection between internal 
security and external defence calls for a 
better alignment of our policies, instruments 
and structures, at both national and EU level. 
Several measures are being discussed in this 
regard. A win-win package deal in the area of 
security should include the following main 
proposals:
qEU summits dedicated to security  
and defence issues;
qRegular joint meetings of the Ministers  
of Defence and Interior; 
qEnhanced coordination between EU 
institutions and agencies dealing with 
internal and external security issues;
qA European White Book on Security and 
Defence defining coherent internal and 
external security objectives to translate the 
EU Global Strategy goals into practice; and
q stronger links between the security area 
and other dimensions of cooperation in EU 
partnerships with third countries, especially 
in Africa.
There is a serious 
risk that a narrow 
security-driven 
response to 
terrorism will 
prevail over a more 
comprehensive 
long-term strategy.
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4.  Functional and pragmatic 
differentiation
The implementation of the above package 
deal would lead to a higher level of 
differentiated integration. Diverse groups of 
member states would intensify their level of 
cooperation in specific fields. Cooperation in 
defence (within the framework of PESCO) or 
in certain aspects of migration management 
would not involve all EU countries. Similarly, 
boosting the resilience of the euro would 
require deeper cooperation and integration 
among countries that have already joined 
the Union’s common currency.
These higher levels of differentiated 
integration would be guided by functional 
and pragmatic needs and the willingness 
to progress. At times, variable geometry 
is the only way forward. Differentiated 
integration has been, is and will remain, 
an indispensable feature of the European 
construction. The EU is already characterised 
by varying levels of cooperation and 
integration among its members.
Multiple speeds are already a reality: not all 
members share the same currency; some EU 
countries are not part of Schengen; some 
do not participate in all aspects of the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice; some are 
only partially involved in the Union’s security 
and defence policy; and the UK wants to 
exit the EU altogether, opening the door to 
‘differentiated disintegration’. Given these 
realities, the central question is not whether 
there will be a differentiated Europe, but 
rather what it will look like.
Differentiated integration is no magic potion 
and should not be considered an end in itself. 
Multiple speeds should be the exception, 
unity the rule. On many occasions, however, 
differentiation becomes a functional necessity 
to help overcome stalemates in a bigger, 
more heterogeneous and more complex 
EU. History has repeatedly shown that more 
intense cooperation among a smaller group 
of countries or opt-outs exempting some 
countries from part of the Union’s acquis can 
help to overcome situations where some 
member states are neither ready nor willing to 
go further, helping the EU to remain effective 
and cope with current and future challenges. 
As the Polish NPE report argues, "the alternative 
to a multi-speed Europe is de facto a speed-less 
Europe."
Differentiation as foreseen in this report adheres 
to a functional and pragmatic approach. It 
aims to prevent individual member states 
from blocking cooperation in specific areas. 
The institutional, legal and political challenges 
related to a multi-speed Europe can be eased 
if cooperation is ‘organised’ inside the Union. 
Differentiated cooperation should, if possible, 
build on the instruments and avenues foreseen 
by and made legally possible under EU primary 
law (e.g. enhanced cooperation; PESCO; 
constructive abstention; opt-outs etc.). The fact 
that these instruments are governed by clearly 
specified rules and constraints enshrined in 
the EU Treaties minimises the potential for 
negative externalities from a differentiated 
Union.
At times, variable 
geometry is 
the only way 
forward. 
Differentiated 
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been, is and 
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should be the 
exception, unity 
the rule. 
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Closer 
cooperation 
needs in some 
cases to be 
organised 
outside the 
EU framework 
to make a 
significant step 
forward instead 
of waiting 
indefinitely for 
smaller steps 
within the Union 
framework.
RULE-BASED DIFFERENTIATION
In more concrete terms, differentiation within 
the EU’s framework:
q Respects and benefits from the Union’s 
single institutional framework;
q Preserves the prerogatives and powers of 
the Commission, the European Parliament 
and the European Court of Justice;
q Limits an anarchic and uncontrolled use of 
flexible forms of cooperation and integration 
(no ‘cherry-picking’);
q Guarantees a high level of transparency 
and visibility for both member states and 
EU institutions thanks to the existence of 
clear-cut rules concerning the inception, 
functioning and widening of differentiated 
cooperation;
q Is characterised by a high degree of 
inclusiveness and openness towards 
member states that do not participate from 
the beginning (‘pre-ins’ and ‘outs’);
q Ensures a high level of democratic 
scrutiny by involving the European 
Parliament and (when applicable) national 
parliaments;
q Enables the continuous development 
of the Union’s acquis in line with the 
requirements of the EU Treaties; and, most 
significantly,
q Reduces the overall risk of a rupture or 
even confrontational split between the EU27.
OUTSIDE EU TREATIES – INTERGOVERNMENTAL AVANT-GARDE
However, although it is preferable to 
overcome deadlocks within the framework 
of the EU Treaties, experience has repeatedly 
shown that closer cooperation needs in 
some cases to be organised outside the 
EU framework to make a significant step 
forward instead of waiting indefinitely for 
smaller steps within the Union framework. 
There have been numerous cases were a 
limited number of member states decided 
(or felt obliged) – given serious opposition 
from certain governments to move forward 
within the Union’s framework – to intensify 
their cooperation outside the EU. The 
Schengen Treaty, cooperation in social 
policy or, more recently, innovations in 
the context of the euro area crisis (Fiscal 
Compact, Euro Plus Pact, SRF, or the ESM) 
have all been examples of this.
But closer cooperation outside the EU Treaties 
bears several potential risks:
q First, it can weaken the EU’s institutional 
coherence, especially if it involves the 
creation of new, separate and parallel 
institutional bodies.
q Second, it may suffer from a lack of 
democratic scrutiny at both national 
and European level if parliaments are not 
(sufficiently) involved.
q Third, it can lead to negative spill-over 
effects on other policy areas, including the 
Single Market.
q Last but not least, it runs the risk of 
creating a (deep) split between the ‘ins’ and 
‘outs’ if the latter feel excluded.
The chances of these risks materialising can 
in practice be reduced if cooperation outside 
the treaty framework follows the notion of 
an ‘intergovernmental avant-garde’, which 
is open to all member states willing to join, 
involves or even strengthens the role of EU 
institutions, refrains from setting up new 
separate and parallel institutional structures 
outside the Union, and aims to integrate the 
legal norms adopted and the cooperation 
initiated outside the EU into the treaty 
framework as soon as possible.
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4.  Functional and Pragmatic Differentiation
‘CORE EUROPE’ – POLITICALLY UNREALISTIC
Although the implementation of the package 
deal presented in this report will require a 
higher level of differentiated integration, 
this does not mean that it should lead to the 
creation of a closed ‘core Europe’ (Kerneuropa) 
involving only a limited number of EU 
countries.
The establishment of an institutionalised 
‘two-tier’ Europe with diverse classes of 
membership is neither likely nor desirable. 
It should not be the Leitbild (guiding 
principle) steering the way towards a more 
differentiated Europe. It could fuel a deep 
rift in Europe between those who are part 
of the core and those who are not. For good 
reasons, differentiated integration has not, in 
the past, led to an institutionalised core; i.e. 
a small, coherent group of countries forming 
an exclusive avant-garde and distinguishing 
themselves from other member states.
The creation of a ‘core Europe’ is politically 
unrealistic for three basic reasons:
q First, even the most integration-friendly 
countries (within or outside the euro area) 
would, at least for now, hesitate to make any 
qualitative leap forward that would imply a 
further loss or pooling of sovereignty.
q Second, the countries most likely to 
be included in any core group (e.g. the 
six founding members or the Euro-19) are 
extremely heterogeneous, lack political 
cohesion and have diverse views on the 
future of the E(M)U.
q Third, no group of countries would be 
ready to actively exclude other member 
states, and some major countries (including, 
first and foremost, Germany) would strongly 
oppose any move that could signal a 
(new) division of Europe into a core and a 
periphery.
Member states may support a multi-speed 
Europe, but they should avoid any impression 
that differentiated integration implies the 
creation of a ‘two-tier’ Europe. In the end, 
debates about creating a ‘core Europe’ are 
not only futile, but also absorb a great deal 
of political energy and further undermine 
political cohesion among the EU27, which 
will make it even more difficult to progress in 
the years to come.
The establishment 
of an 
institutionalised 
‘two-tier’ Europe 
with diverse 
classes of 
membership is 
neither likely nor 
desirable. 
Debates about 
creating a ‘core 
Europe’ are not 
only futile, but 
also absorb a 
great deal of 
political energy 
and undermine 
political cohesion 
among the EU27.
A road sign greets visitors 
to the town of Schengen 
(Luxembourg), where  
the 1985 European Schengen 
Agreement was signed.
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IMAGES)
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Countering  
the persistent threat 
of authoritarian  
populism
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COUNTERING THE PERSISTENT THREAT OF AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM
CONVINCE CITIZENS 
WITHOUT IMITATING 
AUTHORITARIAN POPULISTS
Do not copy the political rhetoric and 
prescriptions of authoritarian populists
Present a persuasive and positive 
counter-narrative 
Promote the ability of citizens 
to 'experience Europe'
Demonstrate why European cooperation 
is a win-win from a national perspective
CONSTANTLY REMIND 
PEOPLE OF THE TRUE 
NATURE AND OBJECTIVES 
OF AUTHORITARIAN 
POPULISTS
Authoritarian populists seek to undermine 
the basic pillars of liberal democracies
Authoritarian populists seek to divide 
and polarise our societies
Proposals made by authoritarian populists are 
either unrealistic or economically ludicrous
End the Brussels blame game that plays 
into the hands of the populists
Enhance the EU’s ability to act as 
a 'democratic watchdog'
DELIVER CREDIBLE 
RESULTS AND 
STRENGTHEN THE EU 
AS A 'DEMOCRATIC WATCHDOG'
Demonstrate that the EU is not an 
'agent of unfettered globalisation'
Avoid raising expectations the Union 
cannot live up to
Address the multiple insecurities 
fuelling authoritarian populism
ACKNOWLEDGE 
CITIZENS’ CONCERNS AND 
BOOST THEIR DEMOCRATIC 
PARTICIPATION
Listen also to the concerns of people
from other EU countries
Take citizens' hopes and fears seriously 
rather than dismissing them as irrational, 
exaggerated or even irrelevant
Boost citizens' involvement in EU 
decision-making
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The national and transnational debates 
conducted in the framework of the NPE 
project revealed a broad consensus that the 
danger of a more regressive, nationalistic, 
closed, illiberal, and authoritarian Europe 
persists, even though some authoritarian 
populists have not done as well as predicted 
in recent elections. The pressures on liberal 
democracies remain serious and there is 
no reason to believe that the phenomenon 
of authoritarian populism has peaked. 
The surge of populism is not new and its 
successes are the result of profound political, 
socio-economic and societal challenges 
questioning the prevailing order, which 
cannot be ignored. But what can be done at 
European, national, regional and local level to 
address the rise of illiberal democracy?
The implementation of a win-win package 
deal along the lines presented in this report 
could help to strengthen the Union's 
defences against future crises, rebuild trust 
in the EU27 among citizens and elites and 
thereby augment the chances of an 'EU 
renaissance'. Conversely, if the Union cannot 
find the political will and courage to exploit 
the current window of opportunity, it may 
not be able to weather future storms and 
deliver results on the issues which matter 
most to citizens throughout Europe, which 
in return would play into the hands of 
Eurosceptic and authoritarian populists. 
Either way, it is essential that the EU27 strike 
a bargain, but it would not be enough. The 
analysis presented in this report shows that 
the danger of a more regressive, nationalistic, 
closed, illiberal, and authoritarian Europe lies 
deeper and threatens much more than the 
EU. The response needs to encompass efforts 
at various levels of governance. Clearly, there 
is not one silver bullet that can avert this 
danger. The reality is much more complex, 
varies from country to country, and no one 
can claim to have the 'right' answer.
Based on the findings of this report, however, 
there are several things that should be borne 
in mind when looking for ways to counter 
authoritarian populism, which can be 
summarised in four principles:
q Deliver credible results and strengthen the 
EU as a 'democratic watchdog';
q Convince citizens without imitating 
authoritarian populists;
q Acknowledge citizens’ concerns and boost 
their democratic participation; 
q Constantly remind people of the true 
nature and objectives of authoritarian 
populists.
The pressures 
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1.  Deliver credible results  
and strengthen the EU  
as a ‘democratic watchdog’
The European 
Union can provide 
added value in 
crucial areas. It 
cannot, however, 
compensate for 
deficiencies at 
national level and 
it cannot, on its 
own, solve today’s 
complex problems.
‘Gesture politics’ 
should be avoided, 
as non-delivery 
raises valid 
criticisms of the 
Union.
q Address the multiple insecurities fuelling 
authoritarian populism. Citizens want 
the EU to deliver tangible responses to 
their concerns. The win-win package deal 
outlined in this report could help it to do so. 
If blockages that have stymied progress in 
recent years can be removed, the EU27 could 
advance in major areas linked to Europe’s 
economy, borders (migration), and the 
Union’s role as a security provider.
This bargain could help to address the 
multiple insecurities fuelling authoritarian 
populism. It would be a significant response 
to the profound anxieties about the future 
fuelled by fears of being among the ‘losers’ of 
rapid change in all spheres of life; insecurities, 
anxieties and fears which make people more 
inclined to vote for authoritarian populists, 
who give voice to their concerns, frame them 
in an antagonistic fashion and promise a 
fundamental overhaul of the current order.
A package deal among the EU27 would 
obviously not solve all the problems 
Europeans face, but it could help to counter 
the growing polarisation of our societies, 
the fertile ground on which authoritarian 
populists thrive. It addresses not only 
the socio-economic consequences of 
change, but also other sources of division 
and insecurity, including cultural, societal, 
generational, technological, and security 
issues. Ensuring the stability of the euro and 
enhancing sustainable growth while also 
strengthening the Union’s ‘protective arm’ 
could help to counter some of the socio-
economic insecurities sparked by the ‘great 
crisis’. Proposals aimed at (re-)balancing 
security and solidarity concerns raised by 
migration and border management could 
help to counter some of the cultural and 
societal anxieties unleashed by the refugee 
crisis in some sections of the population. 
Proposals aimed at strengthening the Union’s 
ability to play a stronger role in defence and 
counter-terrorism could help to counter 
security fears from an external and internal 
perspective.
q Avoid raising expectations the Union 
cannot live up to. While a win-win package 
deal could help the EU to progress, the 
origins of the polarisation of our societies and 
the means to counter it lie predominantly 
at national level. It is thus primarily the 
responsibility of national actors to address 
them. The EU clearly has a role to play, given 
the transnational character of the challenges 
facing Europe. But it must also be careful 
not to overburden the European level, given 
the current distribution of competences and 
the limits on its powers, to avoid falling into 
an ‘capability-expectations trap’, which can 
then be used against it. In the words of the 
German NPE report, "to enhance its legitimacy, 
the EU should address the growing gap between 
expectations and output."
The European Union can provide added 
value in crucial areas. It cannot, however, 
compensate for deficiencies at national 
level and it cannot, on its own, solve today’s 
complex problems. The old narrative that 
what cannot be solved at national level 
must be tackled at European level needs 
to be refined, as this asks too much of 
an EU whose competences and powers 
remain constrained. The Union should thus 
concentrate on initiatives in areas where 
it can make a tangible difference. This 
‘delivery filter’ was applied to elaborate the 
package deal presented in this report and 
it should also be used to scrutinise all new 
EU initiatives. It is not about ‘less Europe’, but 
rather about a more effective, realistic and 
credible EU. ‘Gesture politics’ – measures 
designed simply to show the Union is doing 
something– should be avoided, as non-
delivery raises valid criticisms of the Union.
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If EU leaders and governments demand 
action in areas where the Union’s powers or 
resources are limited, EU institutions should 
outline what they need in terms of resources 
and national commitments to meet these 
demands. If the Commission comes forward 
with a proposal which is then significantly 
watered down, it should not shy away from 
withdrawing it. Once agreement is reached, 
member states must implement what has 
been collectively decided at European level. 
EU institutions should do more to monitor 
and publicise implementation failures at 
national level, which have surged in recent 
years.
q End the Brussels blame game. Putting 
together a new bargain between the EU27 
will not be enough: pluralist political forces 
committed to an open and values-based 
Europe must also end the ‘Brussels blame 
game’, which plays into the hands of 
authoritarian populists. Experience in the UK, 
where public attitudes towards the Union 
were poisoned by decades of EU-bashing, 
has shown that constant criticism of the 
European project can ‘poison the well’. 
Defending European integration when a crisis 
strikes after attacking it for years is an almost 
impossible task. 
The importance of taking national ‘ownership’ 
of actions at EU level is progressively being 
recognised, but is often invoked simply 
to argue that scapegoating harms the 
Union. This does not appear to be enough 
to convince national politicians to desist. 
Ultimately, decisions to change habits will 
not be driven by idealistic pro-Europeanism, 
but rather by ‘enlightened self-interest’. 
Political leaders must recognise that the 
blame game fuels anti-EU sentiment and 
undermines the Union’s ability to deliver 
tangible results on issues which can only be 
effectively addressed at European level. All of 
this strengthens those who argue in favour 
of a much looser and disconnected Europe 
and weakens pro-European democratic 
forces. What hurts the EU will, in the end, hurt 
national leaders and their countries.
q Demonstrate that the EU is not an 
‘agent of unfettered globalisation’. To regain 
popular support, liberal democratic forces 
committed to an open and pluralist society 
will have to identify ways to protect citizens 
and counter the perception that the EU is an 
agent of unfettered globalisation. Protecting 
citizens from its ‘dark’ side (unsustainable 
excesses in the financial sector, a social 
‘race to the bottom’, unfair competition, the 
European Commissioner 
for Competition Margrethe 
Vestager addresses a press 
conference at the European 
Commission in Brussels, 4 
October 2017.
(EMMANUEL DUNAND / AFP)
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exploitation of loopholes in an unregulated 
global economy by international companies 
etc.) needs to start with an honest debate 
about the risks and benefits of globalisation. 
Europeans have profited immensely from 
expanding markets and free trade, and 
Europe has been a strong promotor of 
economic development in other parts of the 
world. But EU citizens are increasingly critical 
of, and fear, the negative consequences of 
globalisation, as evidenced by the mass 
demonstrations against the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) with Canada in many 
member states.
The Union and its members must show 
that they are ready and able to protect their 
citizens from the excesses of globalisation, 
by defending social and environmental 
standards, countering tax evasion, and 
creating an ethical framework for the 
development of new technologies. 
Some of the proposals in this package deal, 
especially in the socio-economic dimension, 
indicate what should be done at the EU level. 
It means strengthening the Single Market 
not only through further liberalisation and 
promoting the Digital Single Market, Energy 
Union or Capital Markets Union, but also by 
stepping up the fight against social, tax and 
environmental dumping and ensuring that 
the four freedoms are not abused. In trade 
policy, the EU should not only safeguard 
the level playing-field within the Single 
Market but also take action compatible with 
WTO rules to pursue the Union’s legitimate 
interests when trading with third countries 
who already use similar means such as 
investment controls, state aids or strategic 
procurement.
Nevertheless, cooperation at EU level will 
not suffice. More needs to be done at the 
national level. Member states control the 
main levers of economic and social policy 
and need to find ways to combine the 
benefits of open and integrated markets with 
the requirements of a social-market economy, 
make the best of opportunities while 
correcting market failures and protecting 
the vulnerable, who feel that inequalities are 
rising and economic opportunities are not 
being shared fairly.
q Enhance the EU’s ability to act as a 
‘democratic watchdog’. When authoritarian 
populists come to power, they often seek 
to limit the powers, independence and 
freedoms of pluralist institutions and 
players such as the (constitutional) courts, 
media, political parties, or civil society 
organisations. If the EU is serious about 
protecting pluralist liberal democracies, 
member states must enhance the Union’s 
ability to act as a ‘democratic watchdog’ 
in response to serious breaches of its 
fundamental principles. Monitoring the state 
of democracy does not end once a country 
has joined the Union.
An EU that cannot defend its principles will 
lose its credibility both inside and outside 
Europe. In times of profound uncertainty, 
adherence to its values and more efficient 
safeguards are vital to ensure there are 
consequences if governments flout basic 
membership obligations. There are some 
things the EU and its members could do 
within the framework of the current  
EU Treaties:
q Given that a country’s future is ultimately 
decided within its own borders, national 
civil society organisations must be 
strengthened and their ability to monitor 
illiberal tendencies and counter anti-pluralist 
measures through public pressure and/or 
legal action enhanced;
q In the event of a continuous serious 
breach of fundamental values and principles, 
EU governments must stand united and send 
a strong political signal to the government 
concerned, even if they cannot trigger the 
‘nuclear option’ of suspending membership 
rights as foreseen in Article 7 of the EU Treaty;
q National parties in the same European 
political family should put pressure on 
their sister party instead of protecting it, as 
the latter makes it easier for authoritarian 
populists to undermine pluralist structures 
and individual freedoms in their country;
q To counter the argument that EU 
institutions and member states are trying 
to undermine the national sovereignty of a 
country by marginalising it, the Union must 
show that each country’s interests are equally 
reflected in the EU’s policy agenda.
What hurts the EU 
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Going beyond the current EU Treaties, 
member states and EU institutions should, 
in the context of a future treaty reform, 
strengthen the Union’s ability to act as a 
‘democratic watchdog’ by introducing 
a more functional process for imposing 
sanctions if governments flout fundamental 
EU rights and values. Such decisions should 
in future be taken by reverse majority (i.e. 
a Commission recommendation is deemed 
adopted unless the Council decides by 
qualified majority to reject it within a given 
deadline) and the procedure should be 
based on an independent assessment by 
outside experts. Consideration should also 
be given to creating a mechanism that 
points members towards the exit door if they 
refuse to adhere to the Union’s fundamental 
principles.
In whatever they do, EU institutions and 
national politicians should always be careful 
not to fall into the trap of authoritarian 
populists who characterise any outside 
action as a ‘foreign interference’ undermining 
their country’s national sovereignty. External 
actors should thus maintain dialogue with 
opposition parties and other civil society 
players in the country concerned, and refrain 
from polemics which could be turned against 
them. The Commission should be the main 
interlocutor and national politicians should 
support its prerogatives – respect for 
democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental 
individual freedoms and rights must be a 
common concern of member states and not 
just of the Commission as ‘guardian of the 
treaties’.
Finally, the EU should not link adherence 
to civil rights and fundamental democratic 
values and principles to other European 
cooperation issues. Threatening to impose 
sanctions in individual policy areas or to cut 
off EU financing run the risk of playing into 
the hands of authoritarian populists, who will 
argue that ‘Brussels’ and other capitals aim to 
punish their country.
Threatening to 
impose sanctions 
in individual policy 
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Austria’s President 
Alexander Van der Bellen. 
(EMMANUEL DUNAND / AFP)
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2.  Convince citizens without imitating 
authoritarian populists
q Do not copy the rhetoric and 
prescriptions. In many EU countries, 
mainstream parties fearful of losing votes 
have adapted or even copied their populist 
opponents’ political rhetoric, policy 
prescriptions and techniques, instead of 
challenging them. They do this to show they 
are listening to citizens’ concerns, hoping that 
this will prevent voters from turning away 
from them or encourage them to return once 
the situation improves.
This tactic is short-sighted and flawed. 
Adopting the divisive arguments and 
simplistic rhetoric of authoritarian populists 
hollows out core values of our liberal 
democratic system and legitimises their 
illiberal agenda. Furthermore, those who turn 
to populist parties tend not to come back, 
attributing the growing focus on ‘their’ issues 
to those who were ‘courageous’ enough to 
stand up to traditional elites. Experience has 
also shown that copying populist rivals does 
not pay off, as voters attracted to them tend 
to prefer the original to imitators. Finally, even 
if mainstream parties profit from fighting 
the populists on their terms at election time, 
they are confronted with the consequences 
of this once in power, which can undermine 
the coherence, stability and credibility of any 
government they form.
q Present a persuasive and positive 
counter-narrative based on a credible set of 
actions at the national and European level. 
Pluralist democratic forces should elaborate 
their own credible counter-narrative linked 
to tangible prescriptions for action at both 
national and European level, setting their 
own agenda while addressing the issues 
raised by authoritarian populists. They must 
have the courage to oppose and differentiate 
themselves from rivals; be proactive rather 
than reacting to the simplistic proposals 
of their populist opponents; move beyond 
the TINA (There Is No Alternative) logic by 
offering distinguishable policy proposals, a 
forward-looking message of hope and the 
promise of change to a gridlocked political 
system. Simply stoking fears of what might 
happen if authoritarian populists move 
closer or even assume power is not enough. 
Defenders of liberal democracy must explain 
the benefits of an open, tolerant, diverse and 
liberal society, and make it clear why such 
societies will be better equipped to deal with 
the forces of change in an interdependent 
European and global environment. 
In addition, pro-European forces should 
explain the intrinsic connection between 
national and European reforms, i.e. that 
national reforms will only succeed if EU 
reforms succeed and vice versa. This message 
should be underpinned by credible proposals 
for action which are implementable, 
forward-looking, and address citizens’ real 
fears and concerns. The win-win package 
deal elaborated in this report tries to show 
that the EU27 could define such a reform 
bargain at EU level reflecting the interests, 
considerations and concerns of all member 
states. In a next step, it would be up to 
national policymakers to link this European 
package with reforms they consider 
indispensable at national level.
q Demonstrate why European 
cooperation is a win-win from a national 
perspective. Counter-narratives to 
authoritarian populist arguments should 
reflect national concerns. They should be 
constructively critical while explaining why 
the EU remains a positive-sum game from 
a national perspective. In some countries, 
the focus will be on socio-economic issues; 
in others, on security or migration; and in 
others, on all three.
Explaining the added value of European 
integration from a national perspective is 
also an indispensable basis for any new 
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‘European narrative’ capable of re-energising 
public support for the EU and developing 
a common functional vision of the EU’s 
future. Any attempt to convince citizens of 
the added value of European integration 
must be a bottom-up process; it cannot 
be artificially constructed and dictated 
from above. It requires a firm belief in each 
member state that European cooperation is 
in its own interests. A win-win package deal 
can help in this endeavour, but it cannot 
be a substitute for debate at national level, 
which is one reason why the NPE project has 
aimed to foster the discourse about Europe’s 
future in member states by establishing 
national reflection groups and organising 
public debates.
q Promote the ability of citizens to 
‘experience Europe’. The European Union 
should expand existing schemes that 
enable citizens to ‘experience Europe’ and 
identify more opportunities for them to do 
so. Extending the possibilities for mobility 
is very effective in developing intercultural 
skills and open-mindedness, the capacity to 
integrate with others, language skills, and 
a greater appreciation of the EU’s benefits. 
Tangible initiatives could include extending 
existing programmes to reach people who, 
until now, have not had the chance to study 
and work in other EU countries, building on 
progress through the Erasmus or Leonardo 
programmes or the European Solidarity 
Corps and using them as models for more 
exchange schemes between people at 
different stages in their professional careers 
etc. Efforts should also be intensified both at 
EU and national level to provide school pupils 
with more opportunities to study in other 
EU countries. To this end, the post-2020 EU 
budget should allocate more resources to 
expanding the possibilities to ‘experience 
Europe’.
Citizens’ Dialogue 
in Norcia with President 
of the European 
Parliament Antonio 
Tajani and Commissioner 
Tibor Navracsics, 4 
October 2017. 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION)
Any attempt to 
convince citizens 
of the added 
value of European 
integration must 
be a bottom-up 
process.
84         New Pact for Europe Third Report – November 2017
3.  Acknowledge citizens’ concerns  
and boost their democratic participation
q Take citizens’ hopes and fears seriously 
rather than dismissing them as irrational, 
exaggerated or irrelevant. Mounting support 
for populists in many countries is, in many 
ways, a symptom – and not the cause – of 
the problems facing liberal democracies in 
Europe and beyond. Authoritarian populists 
succeed when they can tap into people’s 
genuine grievances; when citizens feel 
that their situation is at odds with their 
hopes, fears, and concerns; when they are 
dissatisfied with those in power and the 
state of representative democracy; when 
they increasingly distrust their governments, 
parliaments and/or the media.
These concerns are real and must be taken 
seriously, rather than being dismissed as 
irrational, exaggerated or even irrelevant. It 
would be a grave mistake to try to fight the 
populist phenomenon while losing sight 
of the underlying reasons for its success. 
There is a need at all levels of governance 
to reach out to, and interact with, citizens to 
understand their hopes and fears. 
With respect to the EU dimension, the 
Europe for Citizens programme should 
be strengthened to enable civil society 
organisations to foster public debate about 
Europe’s future. These debates should put a 
particular emphasis on initiatives aiming to 
bridge the widening gap between status-
quo minded ‘conservative traditionalists’ 
concerned about the erosion of accustomed 
social, ethical and cultural norms, and 
progressive ‘cosmopolitan globalists’ who 
cherish the benefits of open societies, global 
mobility and multicultural diversity. The 
results of these dialogues should be analysed, 
summarised and disseminated to decision-
makers both at national and European level.
Given that in today’s social media world 
many people are no longer exposed to 
opposing views and verified facts, silos must 
be broken and attempts made to open the 
‘echo-chambers’ where citizens receive one-
sided information and only communicate 
with those who share their views. EU funds 
could be used to test new methods for 
interacting with citizens who are increasingly 
difficult to reach through traditional means 
(political parties; traditional media; civil 
society organisations etc.). They could also be 
used to co-fund activities in member states 
aimed at educating people to identify ‘fake 
news’ and political propaganda.
q Listen also to the concerns of people from 
other EU countries. Given the increasing 
interdependence between EU member 
states, there is a need to listen not only to the 
views of people in one’s own country, but 
also in others. The poly-crisis of recent years 
has fuelled interest in, and knowledge of, 
the situation and developments in other EU 
countries. But while people in the member 
states talk more and more about each other, 
they do not talk with each other. More 
transnational dialogues are needed, involving 
‘ordinary’ citizens as well as policymakers, 
experts and other stakeholders. They 
should go beyond the ‘usual suspects’ and 
include people who have not previously 
been exposed to EU affairs and critics of 
the European integration process. The NPE 
project has demonstrated that fostering 
transnational dialogue can help to counter 
stereotypes and dispel misperceptions, 
providing a clearer picture of other member 
states’ concerns and fostering more self-
critical analysis of one’s own country. All this 
can help counter the simplistic and often 
counter-factual arguments about the EU and 
the situation in other member states.
q Boost citizens’ involvement in EU 
decision-making. The authoritarian 
populists’ success exposes widespread 
dissatisfaction with the existing state of 
representative democracy at all levels 
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of governance. Outdated democratic 
infrastructures that are no longer adequate 
or attractive enough to meet 21st century 
needs must be modernised to strengthen 
the voice of citizens and enable them to 
influence political developments. 
At European level, action is needed to ensure 
that citizens can affect EU decision-making. 
These efforts should complement attempts 
to strengthen national democratic processes 
– not replacing them, as some national 
policymakers may fear. For example, new 
transmission mechanisms for genuine public 
consultations using modern communication 
channels could be developed, giving citizens 
the information they need and easy ways 
to access the system so they can have an 
impact on debates.
The European elections in May 2019 could 
also be used as an opportunity to conduct 
a more interactive public debate about 
Europe’s future, grounded in concrete 
proposals on progress in areas of concern 
to citizens. Politicians bidding to be the 
European political parties’ Spitzenkandidaten 
in the European Parliament elections could 
use this opportunity to elaborate, explain and 
discuss their priorities to European voters.
Finally, enhancing the Union’s democratic 
dimension will, at some point in time, 
necessitate a profound reform of the EU 
Treaties, which will require ratification 
referenda in some member states. The 
introduction of transnational lists, enhanced 
democratic scrutiny of the Eurogroup, 
strengthening the European Parliament, 
or a further clarification of the division of 
competences between various levels of 
governance will require another European 
Convention to prepare changes to the 
Union’s primary law and a reform of its 
institutional architecture. As this report has 
argued, now is not the right time for a major 
legal and institutional overhaul – it would 
be unwise to open this Pandora’s Box in the 
current EU climate. But the win-win package 
deal of the type proposed in this report 
could help to restore trust among member 
states and win back public support, which 
will be the prerequisite for more substantial 
institutional EU reforms in future.
Syriza supporters gather in front of the Greek Parliament to back  its
demands for a renegotiation of the bailout debt, 11 February 2015 
(YORGOS KARAHALIS / AP PHOTO) 
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4.  Constantly remind people  
of the true nature and objectives  
of authoritarian populists
q Authoritarian populists seek to divide 
and polarise societies. They exploit divisions 
in societies to develop their ‘us versus them’ 
logic. Polarisation and antagonism are part 
of their political DNA: they are dividers 
who want to separate societies into two 
opposing camps and portray themselves as 
the champions of ‘ordinary people’ against 
a ‘corrupt elite’. Their opponents must 
underline that populists seek to widen the 
divisions within and between societies, that 
they do not represent the will of ‘the people’ 
but rather only that of those who voted 
for them, and that respect for everyone’s 
constitutionally guaranteed rights is essential.
q Authoritarian populists seek to 
undermine the basic pillars of liberal 
democracies. They may try to come to power 
through elections and portray themselves 
as democrats, but illiberal populists are 
undermining vital pillars of our open liberal 
democracies, including the rule of law, the 
separation of powers, minority rights, and the 
protection of basic civil rights and liberties. 
Once in power, they try to install an ‘illiberal 
state’ and seek to mix democracy with a 
substantial degree of illiberalism, limiting the 
powers of pluralist institutions, discrediting 
the very notion of democracy. Despite 
numerous examples in Europe and beyond, 
many voters doubt their real intentions. 
Citizens thus need to be constantly reminded 
of the true nature of authoritarian populists 
by explaining in detail what has happened 
in other countries where illiberal forces have 
misused their authority. 
q Proposals made by authoritarian 
populists are either unrealistic or 
economically ludicrous. Authoritarian 
populists often make unrealistic demands 
and put forward policy proposals that neither 
they nor mainstream political forces can 
deliver. Defenders of liberal democracy must 
demonstrate that this is no coincidence: 
populists do this on purpose because 
they do not want the ‘old establishment’ 
to succeed. They rather want to be able 
to argue that their political opponents 
are not ready, willing or able to do what 
it takes to address ‘the people’s’ concerns. 
If they win power, they do not necessarily 
seek to translate their words into deeds, 
but rather continue portraying themselves 
as an ‘anti-establishment’ force, often by 
invoking conspiracy theories that elites and 
‘foreign powers’ acted behind the scenes to 
frustrate their efforts to introduce real change 
reflecting the will of ‘the people’.
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The Way Forward
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This report argues that Europe needs to be 
re-energised. After years of multiple crises, 
the EU27 should exploit today’s positive 
momentum. They need to overcome the 
blockages holding back progress in tackling 
crucial issues. They must convoke political 
will and courage to agree on a win-win 
package deal and confront the greatest 
challenge Europe is currently facing: the 
danger of a more regressive, nationalistic, 
closed, illiberal, and authoritarian Europe.
If they can seize the moment, there is 
potential for an ‘EU renaissance’. Through 
concrete deeds, the EU27 could demonstrate 
its ability to protect its members and citizens 
from potential future storms. Bolstering the 
defences of a protective Europe will help 
the EU regain trust and support. European 
cooperation is not an ideology: it is a 
necessity in an interdependent world in 
which individual countries cannot defend 
their values, interests and aspirations alone. 
The EU must act collectively to strengthen its 
defences and withstand future turbulences. 
If the EU27 fail to exploit the window of 
opportunity, Eurosceptic forces will cheer and 
attract even more support among a growing 
number of disillusioned citizens.
To strengthen the EU’s defences, to restore 
and consolidate trust among member 
states and between national capitals and EU 
institutions, and to regain the confidence of 
citizens and elites, the EU27 should agree on 
an ambitious but realistic win-win package 
deal along the lines of the one proposed 
in this report. It does not pretend to be a 
‘grand bargain’ aspiring to solve all problems 
in one go with one giant qualitative leap 
forward. It is less ‘grand’ in its objective, 
concentrating instead on the immediate 
future and aspiring to achieve concrete 
progress in the framework of the current 
EU Treaties. This report outlines the main 
components of a package deal involving 
intra- and cross-dimensional compromises 
that can help to overcome divisions between 
different camps both within and among 
member states.
While acknowledging that the actual 
outcome of negotiations among the EU27 
would lead to a distinct compromise, the 
ambitions of this report are three-fold. 
First, it demonstrates that sketching a 
win-win package deal is possible. For each 
dimension, the report provides the rationale, 
basic objectives and concrete elements to be 
included in a bargain. Second, it hopes that 
by explicitly laying out such proposals, it can 
spark national and transnational political 
debates about the future of Europe, which 
is a central aspiration of the NPE project. 
Third, a deal that takes the various positions 
between and within EU countries into 
account can help to counter the current 
fragmentation and growing polarisation of 
our societies, which is the fertile ground on 
which extremist and authoritarian populists 
thrive.
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New Pact for Europe 
debate in Lisbon,
March 2014.
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More public discussions are indispensable 
for two core reasons. First, elaborating a 
comprehensive agreement on future steps 
towards deeper cooperation and integration 
will involve tough political choices, which 
can no longer be pre-cooked by a limited 
number of actors behind closed doors. 
Second, the implementation of a package 
deal aimed at fixing some of the EU’s 
remaining structural deficits will require 
public support – a precious commodity 
and key challenge, given that many 
people have turned their backs on the 
EU during the poly-crisis because of their 
dissatisfaction with the current state of the 
Union.
Generating public support for the 
implementation of such an EU27 bargain 
will require debate at national and 
transnational level. The experience of the 
NPE project has shown that discussions on 
the future of Europe are most constructive 
when they are based on tangible proposals 
rather than on a vague exchange of views 
about ‘more or less’ Europe or the EU’s 
ultimate destination (finalité), which lead 
nowhere given the many diverse opinions 
on Europe’s long-term future.
What is needed now are more specific 
discussions at national level in as many 
member states as possible about what 
should be done in concrete terms in the 
years to come. The outcome of these debates 
could then inspire transnational discussions, 
which would allow people to talk to each 
other instead of talking merely about each 
other.
The NPE project has demonstrated that 
fostering transnational dialogue can 
help to counter stereotypes and dispel 
misperceptions, provide a clearer picture 
of other member states’ concerns and 
encourage more self-critical analysis of one’s 
country. To exploit the current momentum 
and more positive mood about the EU, this 
process should begin as soon as possible and 
involve a multiplicity of stakeholders ready to 
engage in a critical but constructive debate 
about the future of Europe.
The New Pact for Europe 
high-level conference “Is 
there a need for a ‘new 
pact’ for Europe?”, 
June 2015.
NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL DEBATES  
TO SECURE EXCHANGE AND OWNERSHIP
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BALANCING INCLUSIVENESS AND DIFFERENTIATION
The elaboration and subsequent 
implementation of an EU27 package 
deal, such as the one presented in this 
report, will require a strong impetus from 
an inclusive Franco-German initiative. 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
French President Emmanuel Macron have 
committed themselves to a common effort 
to further strengthen the EU and their 
bilateral relationship in the years to come. 
Berlin and Paris will not find it easy to reach a 
compromise, given their differences on many 
policy options and on how ambitious EU 
reforms should be. The result of the German 
federal elections has not made things easier. 
But a Franco-German agreement is still 
feasible, given that both sides are aware that 
any substantial progress at European level 
will only be possible if they can strike a deal.
As in the past, a compromise between Berlin 
and Paris can constitute the basis for an 
overall deal. In today’s much more complex 
and heterogeneous Union, however, an 
exclusive deal between the leaders of France 
and Germany will not be enough. To win 
broad support, a Franco-German initiative 
must consider the views of other member 
states and should leave them ample room 
to contribute to the outcome of a collective 
process at European level. Ignoring the 
interests of other countries (both big and 
small), or even discriminating against them, 
would run into opposition in many capitals, 
undermining the chances of exploiting the 
current momentum.
The win-win package deal presented in this 
report could help to inspire and promote 
this inclusive process given that it has been 
explicitly drafted with the interests, concerns 
and ambitions of the EU27 in mind. It reflects 
concerns in smaller and less influential 
EU countries that European decisions are 
heavily influenced or even dominated by 
the interests and views of specific member 
states, and that today’s Union is struggling 
to balance national interests and reconcile 
diverging preferences within the wider 
context of the overall European interest.
As in the past, the implementation of 
the deal presented in this report would 
result in more differentiated integration, 
with different groups of member states 
intensifying cooperation in different policy 
fields. Fuelled by the willingness to move 
forward, greater differentiation will have to be 
guided by functional and pragmatic needs, 
and not by a desire to create a closed ‘core 
Europe’ (Kerneuropa) involving only a limited 
number of countries. The creation of an 
institutionalised two-tier Europe with diverse 
classes of membership is neither likely nor 
desirable. Multiple speeds should be the 
exception, unity the rule.
It is by no means certain that the EU27 
will be able to reach a compromise. 
It will take strong political will and 
even more political courage. But this 
is what leadership is ultimately about: 
understanding the need for action, 
identifying opportunities, pre-empting 
potential risks, and taking concrete next 
steps while having a sense of the overall 
direction.
Now is the time for all Europeans to 
show such leadership. This report has 
demonstrated that there is a lot of work 
to be done and unfinished business to 
be completed, that there is a window of 
opportunity, that inaction would risk future 
crises, and that a win-win bargain to re-
energise the EU and strengthen its ability 
to protect its members and citizens from 
future storms is possible. It is now up to all 
of us to respond to this call and for future 
generations of Europeans to judge us.
In today’s much 
more complex and 
heterogeneous 
Union, however, 
an exclusive deal 
between the 
leaders of France 
and Germany will 
not be enough.
Reforms will 
require a strong 
impetus from an 
inclusive Franco-
German initiative, 
which must 
consider the views 
of other member 
states and leave 
them ample room 
to contribute to 
the outcome of a 
collective process.
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, and Donald Tusk,  
President of the European Council, give a joint press conference ahead of the European  
Summit’s dinner in Brussels, 19 October 2017. (AURORE BELOT / AFP)
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After years of multiple crises, the European Union of 27 (EU27) 
should re-energise the European project. This third New Pact 
for Europe report, which is the culmination of five years of work 
reflecting more than 120 national and transnational debates 
throughout Europe, argues that the EU27 should have the political 
will and courage to agree on an ambitious but realistic win-win 
package deal to overcome deadlocks and counter the danger of 
a more regressive, nationalistic, closed, illiberal and authoritarian 
Europe, the greatest challenge we are currently facing.
The New Pact for Europe initiative – launched in 2013 and steered 
by the King Baudouin Foundation, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Open 
Society Initiative for Europe and the European Policy Centre, 
supported by Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Open Estonia 
Foundation, the BMW Foundation and the Network of European 
Foundations – aims to rebuild trust through national and 
transnational dialogue and develop new common ground on the 
way forward for the European Union.
